

A. Klein

Between the death penalty and decriminalization : new directions for drug control in the Commonwealth Caribbean

Traces the changes in public attitudes toward and political stances on drug control in the British Caribbean between 1980 and 2000. Author first discusses the origins of drug control, the role of US pressure, and the vulnerability of the Caribbean. He then looks at European involvement and the different plans and policies to control drugs in the region. Finally, he describes the consequences of these policy approaches on the justice system and legal reform, drug demand, and social structures in the region.

In: New West Indian Guide/ Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 75 (2001), no: 3/4, Leiden, 193-227

This PDF-file was downloaded from http://www.kitlv-journals.nl

NWIG

New West Indian Guide/Nieuwe West-Indische Gids

Editorial Board

Kenneth Bilby

Rosemarijn Hoefte (managing editor)

Harry Hoetink

Wim Hoogbergen

Gert Oostindie

Richard Price (book review editor)

Sally Price (book review editor)

P. Wagenaar Hummelinck (honorary editor)

Dan Vennix (editorial assistant)

Eithne Carlin (associate editor)

International Advisory Board

James Arnold (University of Virginia)

Bridget Brereton (University of the West Indies, Trinidad)

Alain Buffon (Université Antilles-Guyane)

David Geggus (University of Florida)

Barry Higman (Australian National University, Australia)

Peter Hulme (University of Essex)

Woodville Marshall (University of the West Indies, Barbados)

Stephan Palmié (University of Maryland)

Anthony Payne (University of Sheffield)

Angel Quintero Rivera (University of Puerto Rico)

Rebecca Scott (University of Michigan)

Bernardo Vega (Fundación Cultural Dominicana)

Brackette Williams (University of Chicago)

The New West Indian Guide/Nieuwe West-Indische Gids (NWIG) is a direct continuation of the West-Indische Gids. Published continuously since 1919, the NWIG is the oldest scholarly journal on the Caribbean. The NWIG publishes articles and book reviews relating to the Caribbean in the social sciences and humanities. The language of publication is English.

The NWIG is a publication of the KITLV/Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology in Leiden.

Please consult our website: www.kitlv.nl

For individuals, subscription to the *NWIG* (2 issues) includes the annually published reference book *Caribbean Abstracts* and membership in the KITLV/Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology. This membership grants access to the Institute's library and a 25% discount on single copies of all KITLV publications (including the KITLV *Caribbean Series*). The price of the subscription and KITLV membership is 100 Dutch guilders in the Netherlands, and 112,50 guilders (approx. US\$ 50) abroad. For institutions, the subscription price to the *NWIG* and *Caribbean Abstracts* is 165 guilders in the Netherlands, and 185 guilders (approx. US\$ 75) abroad and does not include KITLV membership.

To subscribe, please write to the following address; you will be billed later.

KITLV Press P.O. Box 9515

2300 RA Leiden

The Netherlands

fax 31 - 71 - 5272638

e-mail: kitlvpress@kitlv.nl

NWIG New West Indian Guide/Nieuwe West-Indische Gids vol. 75 (3 & 4) 2001

ARTICLES

AXEL KLEIN	
Between the Death Penalty and Decriminalization: New	
Directions for Drug Control in the Commonwealth Caribbean	193
KAREN S. DHANDA	
Labor and Place in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad:	
A Search for a Comparative Unified Field Theory Revisited	229
ERNA KERKHOF	
The Myth of the Dumb Puerto Rican: Circular Migration	
and Language Struggle in Puerto Rico	257
REVIEW ARTICLE	
WILLIAM O. WALKER III	
Security, Insecurity, and the U.S. Presence in the Caribbean	289

BOOK REVIEWS

Capitalism and Slavery Fifty Years Later: Eric Eustace Williams –	
A Reassessment of the Man and His Work, edited by Heather Cateau &	
S.H.H. Carrington (reviewed by Stanley L. Engerman)	297
Writing West Indian Histories, by B.W. Higman (reviewed by Philip D. Morgan)	300
Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World, by Alison Games	
(reviewed by Daniel Vickers)	303
An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean, by	
Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy (reviewed by Christopher L. Brown)	305
The Indigenous People of the Caribbean, edited by Samuel M. Wilson	
(reviewed by Lennox Honychurch)	308
The Maroon Story: The Authentic and Original History of the Maroons in the	
History of Jamaica 1490-1880, by Bev Carey (reviewed by Kenneth Bilby)	310
Slavery in the Caribbean Francophone World: Distant Voices, Forgotten Acts,	
Forged Identities, edited by Doris Y. Kadish (reviewed by Bernard Moitt)	313
Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 1616-1782, by Virginia Bernhard	
(reviewed by Michael J. Guasco)	316
The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands, by Roger C. Smith (reviewed by	
Michael J. Jarvis)	318
Patterns of Pillage: A Geography of Caribbean-based Piracy in Spanish America,	
1536-1718, by Peter. R. Galvin (reviewed by Paul E. Hoffman)	320
Cadenas de esclavitud y de solidaridad: Esclavos y libertos en San Juan,	
siglo XIX, by Raúl Mayo Santana, Mariano Negrón Portillo & Manuel	
Mayo López (reviewed by David M. Stark)	321
Changing History: Afro-Cuban Cabildos and Societies of Color in the Nineteenth	J . 1
Century, by Philip A. Howard (reviewed by Ada Ferrer)	323
Anatomy of Resistance: Anti-Colonialism in Guyana 1823-1966, by Maurice	525
St. Pierre (reviewed by Alvin O. Thompson)	325
Guyana: Microcosm of Sustainable Development Challenges, by Barry Munslow	323
(reviewed by Linda Peake)	327
Bacchanal! The Carnival Culture of Trinidad, by Peter Mason (reviewed by	52,
Stephen Stuempfle)	329
Corps, jardins, mémoires: Anthropologie du corps et de l'espace à la	رير
Guadeloupe, by Catherine Benoît (reviewed by Christine Chivallon)	331
Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities, by	551
Mary C. Waters (reviewed by Katherine E. Browne)	334
Los Estados Unidos y Trujillo – Los días finales: 1960-61. Colección de	551
documentos del Departamento de Estado, la CIA y los archivos del Palacio	
Nacional Dominicano, by Bernardo Vega (reviewed by Eric Paul Roorda)	336
The Cuban Democratic Experience: The Auténtico Years, 1944-1952, by Charles	550
D. Ameringer (reviewed by Javier Figueroa-de Cárdenas)	339
The U.S. Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, by Charles T. Williamson	337
(reviewed by Robert Lawless)	341
The Shaping of the West Indian Church, 1492-1962, by Arthur Charles Dayfoot	571
(reviewed by Noel Leo Erskine)	343
(10 TIC WOOD DECEMBER	5 13

An Introduction to West Indian Poetry, by Laurence A. Breiner (reviewed by	
Edward Baugh)	345
Caribbean Waves: Relocating Claude McKay and Paule Marshall, by Heather	
Hathaway (reviewed by Lydie Moudileno)	347
Charcoal and Cinnamon: The Politics of Color in Spanish Caribbean Literature,	
by Claudette M. Williams and La mujer negra en la literatura puertorriqueña.	:
Cuentística de los setenta: (Luis Rafael Sánchez, Carmelo Rodríguez Torres,	
Rosario Ferré y Ana Lydia Vega), by Marie Ramos Rosado(reviewed by	
Nicole Roberts)	349
The Missing Spanish Creoles: Recovering the Birth of Plantation Contact	
Languages, by John H. McWhorter (reviewed by William W. Megenney)	352
From French to Creole: The Development of New Vernaculars in the French	
Colonial World, by Chris Corne (reviewed by Robert Chaudenson)	354

[The Book Review Section of this issue has benefited from the expert assistance of Andrea Westcot and the logistical support of the American Studies Program, The College of William and Mary.]

		1	

BETWEEN THE DEATH PENALTY AND DECRIMINALIZATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DRUG CONTROL IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

In the European imaginary, the Caribbean figures as an adult playground of sun-kissed beaches, marine sports, and carnivalesque indulgence. Images of a dreadlocked Bob Marley in a halo of marijuana smoke suggesting a relaxed attitude towards the use of mind-altering substances, continue to pull large numbers of visitors in pursuit of risqué pleasures. The association of the Caribbean with drugs, and particularly with marijuana, is also popular in parts of Africa (Klein 2001; Legget forthcoming). This is an interesting instance of cultural cross-fertilization, all the more ironic as in the Afro-centric discourse of spliff-toting Rastafarians, ganja is often presented as an African drug.

Like all clichés, the picture conjured of carefree islands in the sea, while idealizing one aspect of Caribbean culture, ignores the prevailing ethos of respectability and propriety held by vast sections of the population. Anthropologists have characterized the divergent sets of values, which obtain in the region, as a dyad of respectability and reputation (Wilson 1973; Austin 1979; Littlewood 1980). The drug culture, with its celebration of artistic creativity, deviance from social propriety, and rejection of conventional work, falls well into the sphere of reputation. On the operational level of distribution and production, the drug economy fits neatly into an underground economy, which has flourished in the region since the days of piracy.

Given that this brutal challenge to state formation at the outset, was followed by the trauma of the violence-charged slave societies, plagued by the fear of uprising and ferocious suppression, there is a widespread fear of disorder. A sizeable middle class, which first emerged on the fringes of the plantation economy, has now taken control of the postcolonial state, and by conspicuous subscription to the values of diligence and sobriety sets itself apart from the "worthless people." In spite of differences even among the English-speaking countries, there remains a shared fear of disorder, a sense of fragile political stability, and of an economy in jeopardy.

Since the opening of the Atlantic world, the Caribbean has depended heavily upon colonial masters, and more importantly in the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States. Since the elaboration of the international control regime for illicit drugs in the 1970s (Bentham 1998), degenerating respectively into a crusade, and triggering large-scale violence in South American countries bounding the Caribbean Sea, drug control has become one of the most polarizing and most dynamic political issues across the region.

Viewed over the period beginning from the early 1980s to the present, the public attitudes and political stances on drug control have traveled along an interesting trajectory. A marginal issue, of mainly external concern, that sparked a sudden sense of crisis, jumped to the political center stage, and evinced dramatic political responses. The policies that emerged produced outcomes which were so unexpected, unintended, and possibly counterproductive to the original intentions, that policymakers were pushed by the wider community to rethink their position. Over the past year a series of new initiatives have been launched in different countries, which mark a shift in the drug control paradigm. The article below seeks to plot the course of drug control and to account for the changes in public attitudes.

ORIGINS OF DRUG CONTROL

It was only in the mid-twentieth century that a standardized drugs policy was to take effect throughout the British Empire. Until then regional differences, governed in part by cultural proclivity, but mostly by concerns for revenue and the perceived threat to public order were the norm. In some of the Far Eastern possession, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, opium dens were licensed, and a mainstay of colonial finance (Brooks 2000). In India, the Opium Commission of 1890 had established that the use of opium was neither epidemic, nor so socially deleterious as to merit control. Moreover, for the better part of the nineteenth century it provided the most lucrative cash crop in the empire. The revenue imperative was also at work in Western Africa's wealthiest and most populous possession, Nigeria, a colonial bulwark against the slave trade, financed for the first thirty years almost entirely by alcohol and tobacco tariffs. Yet further south on the continent, where settlers had taken possession of land and the moral high ground, alcohol was reserved for whites only, Africans being thought as too excitable. An early example perhaps, of hiding a keen social and economic injustice behind the supposed impact of an intoxicating agent.¹

1. Pan 1990; Heap 1999; Klein 1999. Note also the international conferences on the alcohol trade in Brussels in 1890. It seems that the more relentless the European exploitation of Africa, the harder the attempts to dress intervention in the garb of humanitarianism. The abstinence movement, closely allied to the churches, thus doubled up as engine and alibi of colonialism.

In the British West Indies, however, a liberal regime in all matters of the alcoholic spirit had prevailed for centuries. This owed something perhaps to the dominant planter-class penchant for strong liqueur, and the difficulties of the reformist churches in gaining a foothold. An attempt to control the alcohol use among the "excitable" classes, read politically disenfranchised, was impossible to uphold since rum production was one of the main export industries. Besides, if alcohol heightened aggression it also dulled the mind. Moreover, the economic foundation was built on stimulants, as the Caribbean was serving as "sugar bowl, tobacco pouch, coffee shop, and rum supplier of the world" (Mintz 1985:130).

Equally cannabis or ganja, the drug of choice of the East Indian population, imported in seed form and cultivated in Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica from the mid-nineteenth century, was tolerated. In Port of Spain cannabis could be purchased in shops. With the 1937 Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, the ban on ganja came in force throughout the British West Indies. From then on a steady trickle of drug law offenders was brought before the courts and the psychiatric hospitals. Legal sanctions have interwoven with social attitudes towards different mind-altering substances, which vary between classes and ethnic groups. In the small Trinidadian community of Pinnacle in the late 1970s, "both rum and ganja are together to the respectable ideal ... both defined as vices, ganja always, rum in excess" (Littlewood 1988:143).

Over the last few years that trickle has turned into a torrent, placing a serious burden on each country's criminal justice system, and straining relations between police and community, and the populace and the elite. The issue conjures deep seated fears of social chaos and external domination. There is little doubt, however, that the drug control agenda is driven externally. According to the head of the Trinidadian National Drugs Council, "if it wasn't for foreign pressure we would not worry about ganja, and give up on the addict." For better or for worse, this pressure cannot be discounted. The challenge for mini- and microstates lies in positioning themselves strategically, heading off domestic discontent while meeting international obligations.

The most obvious and dramatic recent development has been the publication of the findings of the Jamaican Ganja Commission, and its recommendations to decriminalize cannabis use.² Fully aware of the explosive nature of this démarche in foreign policy terms, the commission is careful to distinguish between different categories of drugs as well as drug use, repeatedly stating the authors' awareness of the adverse consequences of cannabis use. It links the proposal with the condition of vigorous demand reduction activities, and finally exhorts the government to elicit support from CARICOM partners

2. A Report of the National Commission on Ganja to Rt. Hon. P.J. Patterson, Q.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Jamaica, August 7, 2001; www.userl.netcarrier.com/~aahpat. ganja.htm.

and other countries "in particular members of the European Union." Indeed, European, and particular Dutch policies are cited repeatedly as models for Jamaican policy. The question is how such a delicate balancing act can be achieved, particularly in times when U.S. demands are ever more stridently asserted.

U.S. PRESSURE

Following the declaration of the war on drugs in the late 1960s, and the founding of the Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) by the Nixon administration in 1973, the Caribbean region came under scrutiny of U.S. drug law enforcement agencies because of the extensive production of cannabis. Working in conjunction with national security forces, the U.S. military conducted "Operation Buccaneer," its first eradication exercise in Jamaica in 1974. These exercises have since spread across the entire region and continue until the present. In Belize, once the world's fourth largest cannabis producer, U.S. forces using aerial fumigation succeeded in curtailing production from 645 tons in 1985 to 180 tons in 1988 (Maingot 1995). Even though production was creeping up once again in the late 1990s, with 270,134 plants destroyed in 1999 – up from 12,777 in 1994 – Belize no longer figures as a major cannabis supplier to the United States (UNDCP 2000b). Indeed, law enforcement officials themselves believe that "Belize may be near the maximum achievable level of marijuana suppression" (Griffith 1993:245).

These success stories could not be repeated elsewhere, especially as most national governments refused to allow the aerial spraying of cannabis fields. Eradication by hand in Jamaica, Guyana, Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago, and most significantly in recent years, in St. Vincent, have impacted on production. But the loss has been met by new cultivation techniques, such as intercropping cannabis with licit crops, and moving into ever more inaccessible bush. National and international agencies operating across the region, however, have improved their intelligence network. At the 1999 "Operation Weedeater in St. Vincent" DEA agents and Regional Security System (RSS)³ troops landed on top of the ganja fields, arresting thirteen farmers right on their plots, and killing one. While the five million plants destroyed were a remarkable increase on the 995,928 figures for the previous exercise, 5 most farmers were back in production within weeks. This cat-and-mouse game

- 3. The RSS is a military alliance set up in 1982 by Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. St. Kitts-Nevis and Grenada joined in 1984 and 1985 respectively.
- 4. San José Mercury News, February 6, 2000.
- 5. Financial Times. December 23, 1998.

seems set to continue, providing the armed forces with an invaluable training opportunity, while stabilizing regional ganja prices. Regional governments, however, have to face the political fallout of these deeply controversial operations, sparking widespread protests in Kingstown in 2000, which contributed to the downfall of the government of James Mitchell.

More critical still to the economic well-being of Caribbean states, have been the measures taken by the U.S. Customs Service against exporters and transporters involved in drug trafficking. Vessels carrying drugs are either seized or subjected to fines of US\$ 1,000 per ounce of cocaine, and US\$ 500 per ounce of marijuana. Applied to airlines, this can have devastating effect. State-owned Air Jamaica accumulated fines of US\$ 37 million between 1989-91 for illegal drugs found on its planes in the United States. In 1992 the Guyanese Airways Corporation was fined over US\$ 1 million for a seventeen-pound cocaine seizure found in an unaddressed mailbag (Griffith 2000:22).

Drug consignments hidden between licit exports, such as apparel or agricultural exports, have also dealt a severe blow to the formal sector. Shippers such as the Evergreen Line, had to be dissuaded from pulling out of Jamaica in 1986, after the marijuana consignments were found in three containers, while literally hundreds of shipping agents have had their registration cancelled (Khan-Melnyk 1995).

The economic blows against Caribbean companies were accompanied by growing pressure on governments to intensify measures against drug trafficking. Under the Reagan and Bush administrations, the U.S. interests were vigorously asserted, in mainly bilateral dealings with frequently reluctant partners. As the war on drugs turned into a crusade, with increasing emphasis on cocaine and heroin, the role of the Caribbean as a major transit route came sharply into focus. According to the U.S. State Department, regional governments were dragging their feet in the fight. The demanded measures included: introduction of the appropriate legislation to penalize drug trafficking and money laundering; extradition treaties with the United States; access to territorial waters when pursuing suspected smugglers; beefed-up security services. The emerging concept was of "shared sovereignty," phased in as a "voluntary, beneficial erosion of sovereignty" just short of "full colonial status."

Additional pressure to conform to the U.S. led anti-narcotic crusade was exerted on the region by the "certification" process run annually by the U.S. State Department. The efforts of each country in the field of drug control are evaluated in the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (INCSR). When a country is found wanting, as for instance Colombia in 1996 and 1997,

^{6.} Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs during the Reagan administration, quoted in Munroe 2000.

penalties are applied, ranging from loss of U.S. foreign aid, to higher tariff barriers on export goods, and the suspension of assistance packages by the international financial institutions, where the United States is a major share holder.⁷

THE VULNERABILITY OF THE CARIBBEAN

While international pressure was mounting in the 1980s, governments and elites within the Caribbean were also becoming worried about the impact the drugs economy was having on the social fabric and political structure. Across the Anglophone Caribbean, the 1980s were a decade marked by International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed structural adjustment (SAP) programs, economic stagnation, and a fall in service delivery. Unable to meet the expectations for social services and infrastructure, the prestige of the state began to suffer, as people sought recourse elsewhere.

The private sector, though expanding vigorously in some countries and sectors, did not match wealth creation with social equity. Employment in such expanding sectors like information technology, textiles, and tourism, has mainly been to the benefit of applicants with educational qualifications. Marginalization has become a self-perpetuating phenomenon for residents of deprived urban neighborhoods, such as Tivoli Gardens in Kingston, Laventille in Port of Spain, or Tiger Bay in Georgetown. With run-down schools delivering inadequate education and skill training for the job market, area stigma mitigating the likelihood of finding employment, and high ancillary costs due poor service provision, many people are locked out from employment in the licit economy. Women have proven to be far better adapted to the demands of this new economy. Female participation in the labor force has risen dramatically in the economically most successful countries.

Table 1. Female Participation in the Labor Force in %

_ ·			
	1980	1995	
Barbados	47.7	62.7	
Trinidad and Tobago	26.6	44.9	
Jamaica	42	61.8	

Source: Barbados Ministry of Labour; adapted from Freeman 2000.

7. This mechanism originated in a motion by U.S. Congressman Charles Rangel, chairman Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, concerned over the devastating spread of crack cocaine in black urban neighborhoods. Since then, it has become a potent foreign policy instrument, much resented throughout the hemisphere.

One of the consequences of this economic growth differential has been widening social inequality, fueling tension across society. Carla Freeman (2000: 22) captures the impact of female mobility on gender relations with an episode outside a data processing company in Bridgetown, Barbados. As a well-dressed young woman joins the bus queue, her former boyfriend jumps out from the shade of a breadfruit tree, shouting loud for all to hear "You see she? Don't mind she dress so. When Friday come, she only carryin' home ninety-eight dollars." A sharp reminder that in spite of the elegant appearance, the lady is a "village girl with a factory wage."

In Kingston the abuse heaped by out-of-school boys on "bookish girls, seeking social mobility and respect through conventional routes," is cruder, and on occasions accompanied by stones (Ankomah *et al.* 1999:75). A large number of young men, who for structural and voluntary reasons have dropped out of the labor force, look toward the government to cushion the fall. In the face of falling tax revenues and rising demands, however, the state is in no position to provide welfare payments or work creation schemes. At the same time opportunities beckon in the underground, informal and criminal economies, positioning first the individual, and eventually entire communities at odds with the law and the state. The result has left "democratic governance in the Commonwealth Caribbean ... in malaise and very probably in a process of decay" (Griffith & Munroe 1995:367).

The so-called garrison communities of Kingston most explosively demonstrate this process. Here, neighborhood gangs first called into being to man party political bulwarks, in return for benefits, have spun out of the orbit of their political masters. The symbiotic relationship remains sufficiently vibrant to provide criminals with protection and frustrate law enforcement. As the pendulum shifts from the formal to the informal economy, while state decline continues, underground activities, and with it the skills, mores, and institutions that constitute them will flourish. Criminality becomes deeper embedded in the community, widening the disjuncture between informal, endogenous controls, and the assertion of external rule and state authority. A "widening gap between legal and social definitions of crime" produces a growing class of malcontents living outside the state and beyond the law (Harriott 2000:23).

Moreover, investigations into some of the police forces of the region (Dowd 1991) suggest that the police are deeply implicated in criminal activity. "Corruption in the Jamaican Constabulary Force rapidly progressed (after 1977) and became not institutionalised but highly organised" (Harriott 2000:61). The most lucrative sector emerging in the 1980s was the transhipment of cocaine to North America and Europe. Trafficking organizations began recruiting significant numbers of people in areas blighted by structural unemployment. The significance of the drug economy increased even further with the development of a local market for crack cocaine. Within a rela-

tively short space of time drug traffickers developed considerable constituencies of followers and dependents.

It was this perceived challenge to state authority, which first galvanized CARICOM heads of state into developing a regional program for the control of drug trafficking in 1987. Sandwiched between booming North American and European demand for drugs and relentless South American production, the Caribbean governments saw themselves dangerously exposed to economic, political, and technological processes it had could not hope to control. The resources of the criminal organizations were feared to be such as to enable them to outgun and outpay Caribbean states. "A handful of well-armed soldiers, or mercenaries, could make a lightning trip to a country, wreak destruction, and fly out again before a defense could be mounted by states friendly to the small island" (Sanders 1990:84).

Externally controlled criminal activity was seen as rising from the margins threatening to engulf the body politic: "In a real sense the twenty-first century with all its potential for human benefit, because of rapid technological advances, can either be one where we continue to progress, or one in which anarchy takes over as the criminal cartels seek to dominate the global political economy." Aware of the capacity constraints of small states, Michael Manley together with A.N.R. Robinson, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, submitted a proposal to the United Nations for a multilateral strike force to deal with interdiction of drug flows. It signaled willingness on behalf of Caribbean governments to cooperate with international partners on drug control.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL PARTNERS

The threat by non-state actors to the small polities in the region coincided with a withdrawal by traditional partners, principally the United States and the former colonial European powers. In the late 1980s the collapse of the Eastern bloc removed the last vestige of a strategic threat posed by Cuba (Cope 1998:73) thereby significantly debasing the coinage of the Caribbean "arch of democracy." Symbolically, the U.S. embassies in Grenada and Antigua-Barbuda were due to close in 1994, to release resources for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.⁹

U.S. counter narcotic measures also refocused from interdiction along the major transit routes in the Caribbean basin and Mexico, to crop eradication in

- 8. Michael Manley, The Drugs Menace, address at the opening of the Inter-Ministerial Conference on Drugs, Kingston, Jamaica, October 2, 1989.
- 9. In the event, the Black Caucus in the U.S. Congress forestalled the closures following protests.

the Andean countries, culminating in current support for Plan Colombia. Economically the region had to sustain further blows from the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

A corollary of the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy concerns was a vigorous push for the abolition of protective tariffs that had hitherto guaranteed high prices for Caribbean agricultural exports to the European Union. As Clissold (1998:11) points out, Europe too was "increasingly preoccupied with the former Eastern block, non-member Mediterranean countries, Latin America and Asia." Moreover, the privileges granted to Caribbean banana growers set the European Union on collision course with the United States. Under pressure from the World Trade Organization, the United Kingdom and France withdrew their commitment to Caribbean bananas, and agreed to a gradual recognition of tariffs on so-called dollar bananas, and an open market by 2002. A range of other Caribbean products such as sugar and rum are equally affected by these agreements. The result of these developments has been a "Caribbean sense of abandonment by both partners, but also significant European-U.S. tensions" (Clissold 1998:11).

Marginalized by the partner countries in the hemisphere, and neglected by former colonial powers, Caribbean states felt extremely vulnerable in the face of creeping, drug-based criminality. The prevailing fears of the time are encapsulated by the much-quoted findings of the West India Commission (1992:43):

Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in CARICOM countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional governments more. That is the magnitude of the danger of drug abuse and drug trafficking hold for our community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity of the inducements of the illegal drug trade in poor countries. On top of this lie the implications for governance itself – at the hands of both external agencies engaged in international interdiction, and the drug barons themselves – the dons of the modern Caribbean – who threaten governance from within.

THE EVENTS IN ST. KITTS

In 1994 the conceptual threats to island security became reality in St. Kitts and Nevis, population 40,000. Within the space of two years the island was cast into turmoil by the activities of a single man, Charles "Little Nut" Miller. Deported by the United States, and a fugitive from a Jamaican gaol, Miller returned to his native St. Kitts in 1993 after a chequered career in Jamaica and the United States. Employing the tricks of trade he had learned as a member

of the Kingston "Shower posse," Miller overwhelmed the Kittian security forces with an orgy of violence and intimidation. Within a year, the island's murder rate shot up from zero to eleven, including among its victims the head of the Special Branch investigating his case, and the sons of the deputy prime minister. Upon arrest, Miller instigated a riot at the prison where he was held that led to a mass escape and a rampage through the capital, Basseterre. Only the intervention of troops from the Regional Security Service could restore order. In the aftermath, Miller bought political influence by bankrolling the Labour Party, which merged victorious in the 1994 elections after seventeen years in opposition.

One of the last acts of the outgoing prime minister was to appeal for British assistance in filling the vacant post of police commissioner. The serving chief officer of the Thames Valley police was seconded, and could eventually secure Miller's arrest and extradition to the United States in 2000.

FORMULATING A RESPONSE

Caught between an overbearing hegemon and an insidious internal threat. English-speaking Caribbean governments have therefore been looking to one another for support. The first regional undertaking to tackle drugs collectively was given by the Member States at the 1987 meeting of CARICOM heads of government with a commitment to "control the traffic and abuse in drugs" at the regional level, and in addition to national efforts (Munroe 2000:192). While their theoretical willingness was severely hampered by lack of technical expertise and financial means, they could look toward two organizations for support. The older one is the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) founded in 1986 and headquartered in Washington DC. It provides technical advice in all aspects of drug control, and has recently begun coordinating the Mutual Evaluation Mechanism, an instrument designed to eventually supersede the unilateral U.S. certification exercise. With only a handful of countries actively participating in CICAD, the Caribbean region is yet to take full advantage of this hemispheric organization. Dominated by its Latin American membership on the one hand, and the United States on the other, Caribbean concerns are often neglected.

Partly as a result of such regional politicking, the most important multilateral organization in the drugs field has been the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP), established in 1991. It inherited regional offices in Barbados from its predecessor, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC),¹¹ and coming out of the 1990 UN General Assembly Special Session a mandate to address all aspects of drug control. The Caribbean office has a brief to cover twenty-nine countries and territories, including sixteen independent states, six British dependencies, and two autonomous states of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, three French departments d'outre-mer, and two U.S. administered territories. In the first few years, the office saw its role as a center of expertise and a provider of policy advice, with a set of blueprints and off-the-shelf instruments for policies. Acting as a conduit for funds from external donors, it also began taking on a project management role.

In 1996, however, the program of the regional office was substantially expanded with the Barbados Plan of Action. As most countries in the region (including Cuba), and major overseas partners signed up to a drug control strategy with eighty-seven recommended items, the Caribbean drug control Coordination Mechanism (CCM) for the program was located at the UNDCP office in Barbados. This secured one of the Caribbean policy aims, in placing drug control on a multilateral, rather than a bilateral platform, elevated the status of the UNDCP into that of the key regional drug control player, and opened new sources of funding.

THE EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT AND THE LAUNCH OF THE CARIBBEAN DRUGS INITIATIVE

The idea for a regional initiative involving external partners had first been proposed by the Barbadian Prime Minister Owen Arthur in 1995 during talks with his British counterpart, John Major. The British government¹² orchestrated its policy with French President Jaques Chirac, to launch an initiative at the European Council in Madrid, in December 1995.

The bilateral British-Barbadian *remarche* developed into an international issue, with serious ramifications for several of the players involved. Agreed at the European Council, international drug control came onto the agenda of the European Commission. It marked a serious point of departure for the Commission, which had to accommodate its intervention within the framework of international development treaties, defined by the Lomé convention. The out-

- 11. UNFDAC was merged with the Division of Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board, though the later maintains an independent existence within the wider UNDCP.
- 12. Owing to the wide publicity surrounding the death of a British teenager from an XTC tablet, the British government was eager to be seen to be acting against drugs. The Caribbean request provided an opportunity for pursuing domestic policy at an international level.

come was eventually codified in the Council Regulation on north-south cooperation in the campaign against drugs and drug addiction. ¹³ A budget line was opened, and a department established in the Directorate General VIII (now Directorate for Development), which undertook programs in West Africa, Southern Africa, and Latin America. At the heart of the new policy field, however, was the Caribbean Drugs Initiative, launched with some fanfare in May 1996. Not only was the European Union entering a new policy field, it also emerged as the main donor in the Caribbean project, with a budget of € 25 million.

At the European Commission this move was swept up in a passionate debate, in which Pinheiro, the Portuguese commissioner for development remained opposed, while the Swedish commissioner Radin strongly supported further involvement. While the 1997 Council Regulation did expand the brief it also stipulated that the bulk of such work should fall into the areas of institution building, demand reduction, alternative development, and information gathering. At the same time there was a strong lobby to further expand activities in the foreign policy and security field, so-called second pillar subjects. ¹⁴ Drug control, it was realized, allowed the European Commission to take on an international profile in an area where the least opposition from member state interests could be expected. The drugs unit in the Directorate General VIII began to move into uncharted territory by becoming involved with issues such as maritime cooperation, law enforcement training, and intelligence sharing. Little remained of former policy areas of European interest, such as social development, education and capacity building, and poverty alleviation.

Within the European Union drug control had been a policy issue since the adoption in Rome of the first European Plan to Combat Drugs in 1990. Most of the resulting activities, however, were either undertaken by government departments of the member states, or sourced out to independent institutions, such as the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). Within the Commission there was neither the capacity nor the requisite expertise to oversee a drug control program. The desk officer responsible for the drugs brief in Brussels therefore recruited the project managers from the one organization which did have a claim to excellence and a track record in the region: the UNDCP. Once installed in the newly opened European Commission Drug Control Office, the Technical Advisor on drugs used his discretion to subcontract six out of ten budget line supported interventions to former colleagues at the UNDCP.

- 13. Council Regulation No 2046/97, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 287/1.
- 14. The work of the European Union is divided into three pillars: conventionally commission business has been confined to agriculture and trade; foreign policy and security; and justice and home affairs.

FRAMING DRUG CONTROL IN THE CARIBBEAN

Between 1996 and 1999, the multilateral partnership financed and generated an unprecedented level of activity in the Caribbean drugs field. The scene was set by interlocking international treaties committing signatories to the ban of scheduled psychotropic substances, and the imposition of penalties for transgressions. Most CARICOM member states have subscribed to this regulatory framework, fashioned by the UN treaties.

Table 2. United Nations Conventions on Drugs and Commonwealth; Caribbean Adherence*

Country	UN Single Convention	UN Convention	UN Convention against
	on Narcotic Drugs,1961	on Psychotropic	Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
		Substances, 1971	Drugs &Psychotropic
			Substances, 1988
Antigua	X	x	X
Bahamas	x	x	X
Barbados	X	x	x
Belize			X
Dominica	X	x	x
Grenada		x	x
Guyana		x	X
Jamaica	X	X	X
St. Kitts			x
St. Lucia	x	x	X
St. Vincent	t		x
Trinidad	x	x	x

Source: adapted from Jefferson O'Brien Cumberbatch, *The UWI/UNDCP Drug Control Legal Training Program: Legislation Compilation Consultancy Report*, Barbados 1994.

The strategic instruments for implementing these political commitments were developed in the regional accords drawn up in the mid 1990s. The cluster of Caribbean states and their North American and European partners signed four separate agreements:

- (i) Barbados Plan of Action, Bridgetown May 1996; EU sponsored, UNDCP organized agreement between region and partners with eighty-seven recommendations on drug control.
- (ii) Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean, Bridgetown May 1997; Treaty between fifteen U.S. and fifteen Caribbean states on a range of economic and security issues. Section 2.3 covers drug control.

- (iii) Santo Domingo Declaration December 1998, to further implementation of the Barbados Plan of Action.
- (iv) Hemispheric Plan of Action, by the Organization of American States, 1996.

The external partners who motored these agreements through were also willing to make resources available. The European Commission emerged as the main donor, with € 25 million from the Budget Line, and an additional € 10 million designated for drug demand reduction programs from the existing National Indicative Programmes (NIP). 15 European governments with interests in the region – the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Spain – as well as the United States and Canada have also been providing considerable resources to drug control activities. While much bilateral assistance was transferred between counterpart agencies, for instance from the U.S. Customs to Caribbean customs agencies, the main assistance management agencies were the UNDCP and to a lesser degree CICAD.

In the aftermath of the 1996 Bridgetown conference, UNDCP officials traveled the region to assist with two main projects: the setting up of National Drug Councils (recommendation no. 2) and the formulation of a Masterplan (recommendation 2b). These measures have provided the foundation for further engagement, and have created interlocutors for UN and other drug control officials to engage with. Regional interests secured the creation of a so-called Regional Coordination Mechanism, in principle a drug desk, at the CARICOM office in Georgetown. Its functions were on the one hand to give the drug control activities the appearance of a partnership, while allowing CARICOM to keep some tabs on the UNDCP.

Caribbean interests were more closely involved in the network of regional organizations working in different areas of drug control that have come into being since 1996. It was on the basis of joint training, information sharing, and regular consultation that Caribbean law enforcement agencies and their governments have been able to change the balance between the state and non-state challengers.

STEPPING UP THE WAR ON DRUGS

Most visible efforts went into the enhancement of law enforcement capability. Regional coordination was supported with the creation of the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) in Barbados, the Regional

15. NIPs comprise funds already allocated to the recipient country, and treated as "theirs." Interference over spending plans by Brussels has not been appreciated in the region. The dedication of 10 percent of NIPs for demand reduction activities also met with the resentment from desk offices and regional delegations.

Drug Training Centre (REDTRAC) in Jamaica, the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC) in St. Lucia (founded in 1977 with a membership of thirty-four countries and territories, and it has taken a significant role in drug control), and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) in Trinidad. The EU supported Project Maritime Office (PMO) has begun rolling out Joint Intelligence Headquarters (JIHQ) in several countries. Taken from a Trinidadian model, these JIHQs serve as intelligence sharing posts for all law enforcement services. One important function has been to enhance the efficiency of each service, through cooperation and exchange. The unspoken gain has been to establish a sense of peer review, clamping down on rogue units in any of the services.

The gains of interservice cooperation have become manifest in a number of regional exercises. One of the most dramatic so far has been operation "Summer Storm" in 1997, executed under the auspices of the ACCP in which twenty-five countries across the region and beyond participated, leading to 828 arrests, as well as the seizure of 57 kilograms of cocaine. The most important achievement, however, was the coordination and cooperation (Beardsworth 2000). Law enforcement agencies across the region were putting their power on display.

At the national level too, governments have been taking decisive action against drug traffickers. In the wake of the various international accords, Caribbean governments have been reviewing domestic drug control laws to ensure the strengthening of penal codes regulating the production, distribution, and possession of drugs and precursors. Stiff regulations on money laundering have followed in their wake. The investigatory powers of the police and other agencies have been strengthened, and the capacity of the services enhanced. The results were dramatic, and often draconian. Having acceded to the UN 1988 Convention, the Guyanese government introduced legislation that left magistrates no alternatives to custodial sentences for any drug related offence. As provisions for bail were also removed, scores of first-time drug offenders spend up to five years in jail for possession offenses.

Providing governments with model legislation was one of the key roles of the UNDCP, financed generously by EU grants. Tapping into fresh European funds, it put on workshops for senior judges from across the region at a luxury resort in Barbados. Much celebrated by participants enjoying the opportunity to meet their counterparts, "persons who participated in the activities of the project by and large benefited in some way form the experience" (Penn 2000). Having introduced model legislation and trained the judges, the

16. Thus the evaluator. The project budget of € 1.5 million was spent largely on travel and catering for participants. Most of these were high ranking members of the Caribbean justice system. The money came out of EU development funds, at a time when poverty alleviation was gaining prominence in development debates.

organization then checked on countries' compliance with its legal obligations. Officers from the Caribbean drug control Coordination Mechanism, accompanied by a regional representative from the Regional Coordinating Mechanism, visited each Caribbean states to report on drug issues. The reports were then published and distributed among the donor community.¹⁷

The government of Trinidad and Tobago, however, took the most drastic counter narcotic measures. Prime Minister Basdeo Panday came into office in 1995 largely on an anti-drug platform. The country was close to a moral panic as a result of the widely reported atrocities carried out by a notorious trafficker, Dole Chadee. In one of the most spectacular cases of asset forfeiture expansive land holdings were confiscated, and have just been turned into the Pitparo treatment and rehabilitation center. More controversial still, has been the decision by the Attorney General Ramesh Lawrence Maraj to have Chadee and seven of his henchmen executed. He thereby over rode the rulings of the Privy Council, compromised his own professional credentials (while in opposition he had acted as Chadee's defense lawyer), and contradicted some of his own moral tenets. Before assuming political office, Maraj had been the head of the Trinidad branch of Amnesty International.

The death penalty was applied because of Chadee's involvement in several drug related killings. It has also asserted the power of the state over even very wealthy and well-connected criminal organizations. It clearly underlines the point that criminal organizations are no longer in a position to take on Caribbean governments openly. If further proof was needed, the July 2001 disturbances in Kingston have shown that while parts of the city may be beyond the law, the rule of the dons is confined to these no-go areas. As a result of these combined measures, governments no longer feel exposed to political dangers posed by the cartels. Nor does the regional elite worry about sliding into an abyss of lawlessness and drug-crazed anarchy.

FALLOUT FROM DRUG CONTROL MEASURES

While these war aims have been reached, the Caribbean war on drugs has also had a number of unintended and unforeseen consequences. There is wide-spread resentment in the region over the allocation of law enforcement resources. To a large extent, policing activity focuses on cutting supply routes to the North American and European markets. In Jamaica, for example, 90 percent of customs inspections check on outgoing cargo. According to an official in the Ministry for National Security, "We need strong measures to stop ganja exports and to avoid fines." Police resources are allocated to protect

commercial interests, threatened by U.S. sanctions, not to keep Jamaica cocaine free.

Stretching from the South American mainland to the Florida coast the Caribbean island states form a natural arch for the transport of cocaine consignments. Traffickers employ light planes and fast boats to cross the open water, often hopping from island to island until within reach of the destination. They can enter and transit territories from hundreds of different directions. In addition, the long standing ties with colonial powers, and remaining territorial possessions, have interwoven the Caribbean with international transport networks. This vulnerability to trafficking has led to a steady supply of cocaine into the region. While the bulk is destined for export, a growing quantity stays on the local market. The price differential between the Orinoco Valley and Trinidad is sufficient to encourage a stream of Venezuelan independents to run the gamut of patrol vessels and hostile competitors on spec and maintain a ready supply of high-quality cocaine. According to the director of the drug crime task force in Trinidad, the price differentials for a kilogram of cocaine are dramatic.

Table 3. Cocaine Prices per Kilogram across the Caribbean

rable 5. Cocame	Trices per rer	logium ucro	33 the Carlocean
Colombia	US\$	100	
Venezuela	US\$	2,000	
Trinidad	US\$	5,000	
Florida	US\$	30,000	

At the local level too, there is much dismay over misplaced priorities. One informant in St. Lucia complained about ringing the police when his house was about to be burgled. He was lucky when the police arrived – the next day. Yet only the previous week one of his neighbors had rung in to complain about drug dealing on the street, and found that officers were responding within half an hour. Simple, according to the narrator, they would beat up the dealer, steal the drugs, and keep the money.

The emphasis on export control in all CARICOM countries is, according to one Guyanese minister, part of a deliberate policy of diversion, with the northern countries calculating that each kilo of cocaine that remains in the region is one less to come to their shores. This sentiment is shared by some senior police officers, who point to the sudden development of the local market. While it is acknowledged that trafficking methods, and the payment of local operatives in kind rather than in cash, are largely responsible for the "spill-over," the conspiracy theorists remain alert.

The head of an NGO in Dominica, for example, remembers how cocaine only became widely available on the island after the marijuana eradication in 1997. While smokers were unable to find ganja, crack was suddenly available everywhere and cheap. This story was echoed in St. Vincent, Jamaica, and

Barbados. And according to one writer, the cocaine trade is a strategy at "destroying the African race in Trinidad via the spranger's¹⁸ pipe and the 9mm baretta" (Figueira 1997:81). The wide availability of crack cocaine in cities like Port of Spain and Kingston is evident across the region. Crack houses operate a short walk from the heart of Nassau while some of the beach boys provide a delivery service on Barbados' west coast. In the inner city of Port of Spain, neighborhood crack blocks are closely organized. Scouts with mobile phones guard the entrance of the block. The client drops the money with one member of the unit, who sends a runner to retrieve the drugs from a secret store, and picks it up from another member further along. Money and drugs must be kept separate at all times. Strongmen with arms provide the necessary protection.

Well-organized drug distribution is therefore highly visible across many countries of the region. While the political threat has been contained, crack cocaine with its attendant dangers is becoming ever more available. Even in orderly Barbados, a Rapid Assessment Study found that in Bridgetown communities "cocaine was seen as causing or triggering violence and aggressiveness in the community, not directly as a consequence in the user, and indirectly because of violence associated with the cocaine market" (Rehm & Holder 1998:43).

The general sentiments of many law enforcement officers across the region were expressed by one high ranking officer in the Trinidadian defense force: "This is a war we cannot win, and yet cannot afford not to fight." The question is whether spotter planes and patrol boats are the right way of going about it. Citing the ready provision of materiel by particularly the United States, ¹⁹ as over supply, he went on to develop an argument that the war against drugs was not won on the supply front, but on the demand side. While this is the one aspect of Caribbean drug control that has remained sorely neglected, the very impact of the drug war in many countries is overwhelming the capability of the criminal justice system.

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

According to a study by the Caribbean Development Bank, the criminal justice system across the region is in a state of crisis. Police, at the sharp end of the system, are understaffed, underresourced, and increasingly unable to fulfil basic functions of safeguarding public safety. The law courts are so overburdened that cases take years before coming to trial. The crisis is most acute, however, in the rehabilitative services, particularly the prisons.

- Trinidadian term for crack cocaine smoker.
- 19. The United States has provided most of the coast guard, customs services, and police forces in the region with equipment, including patrol boats and aircraft.

Countries that have signed up to, and implemented the UN Conventions have introduced mandatory sentences for drug offenses, clamping down particularly on so-called trafficking offenses. Ostensibly this is a measure to curtail the abuse of Caribbean countries as staging posts in the cocaine trafficking network. In effect, the quantities are so low, that most of the people charged are users or small-time peddlers. In Belize, for example, offenders caught with quantities above one gram of cocaine or fifteen gram of marijuana "shall be presumed to be in possession with intent to supply; the burden of proof otherwise is on the defendant." In Guyana the defining weights are one gram for cocaine, fifteen grams for marijuana. In the Bahamas the "rebutable presumption" is not merely defined by weight but by the packaging of the drug. Where a defender is found with two or more "packages," be these rocks of crack cocaine, or of marijuana, he is charged with trafficking.

Much depends on the police interpretation of the law. In Trinidad, where the legal weight was raised from one gram of cocaine to ten grams in 2000, individual police officer use their discretion; they are likely to use the charge to plug the arrestee for information and build up an informants network. In the Bahamas, the police will pursue only cases where the offender carries more than US\$ 5. In Guyana, at the admission of a government minister, the draconian penalties have been abused by corrupt police officers for blackmail and to frame suspects. And in Jamaica marijuana is smoked so openly in many parts of the island, that the police have almost given up.

In spite of such a de facto relaxation, the number of drug cases coming before the courts remains very high. When reading conviction statistics it needs to be borne in mind that due to the long remand periods, these should not be measured against the number of arrests for that year. According to Prison Reform International, 42 percent of prisoners in the Bahamas, and 37 percent in Trinidad were on remand. In some cases prisoners are awaiting trial remain in prison beyond the maximum time imposed for the relevant offences (Prison Reform International 2000). This has been a particularly bitter experience for some offenders in Guyana, where time spent in pretrial detention is not deducted from the sentence.

It should further be considered that the focus of the CICAD research being drug trafficking – another indication of the priorities in the regional war on drugs – the data on drug offenses per se is incomplete. In most countries, possession related cases are a multiple of the trafficking cases, in spite of the low thresholds. According to Barry Chevannes, the chairman of the Jamaican Ganja Commission, the courts have been inundated with 5,000 to 10,000 possession cases over the past five years. In the Bahamas, the police have been bringing between 1,300 to 1,500 cases to court per annum. Indeed, the sheer

number of offenses brought to trial is one of the main reasons for the capacity crisis facing the criminal justice in the region.

Table 4. Number of People Charged and Convicted for Drug and Trafficking Offenses in Selected CARICOM Countries

Country	Persons Charged	Persons Charged	Convictions	Convictions
and	for Drug	for Trafficking	for Drug	for Trafficking
Year	Offenses	Offenses	Offenses	Offenses
Antigua	173	74		6
1999	year 2000			
Bahamas 1999		1010		
Barbados 1998	1094	189		
Grenada* 1999	445		194	
Guyana 1999	804	395		
Jamaica 1998		2800		2389
St. Lucia 1999	108		37	
St. Vincent		501		321

Source: Mutual Evaluation Mechanism, CICAD, with additional information from Royal Police Force of Antigua and Barbuda and Royal Barbados Police Force.

This has had a disastrous knock-on effect on the regional prison system. Penal services in every country are suffering from dismal conditions and chronic overcrowding. In one recent survey of global prison populations, most Caribbean countries came into the upper third of countries with more than 150 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants. Belize and the Bahamas took ranks 5 and 6 with 490 and 485 respectively (Walmsley 2000).²¹ Everywhere, however, the figures have been rising relentlessly. While the exact numbers of prisoners incarcerated for drug related offenses as a percentage of total prison populations are yet to be established, it is already clear that they are considerable.

21. The field leader was Russia with 684 followed by the United States with 645. With the boom in U.S. convictions since 1998 this may well have changed. The rate for the Netherlands is 85.

^{*} Persons arrested

TO 11 F	ъ.	D	1		* * *	a
Table 5	Pricon	Poni	112tion	ın	Various	Countries
Table 5.	1 113011	I VV	11411011	111	various	Counting

Country	Estimated	Numbers in Penal	Prison Population
	National	Institutions	Rate per 100,000 of
	Population		National Population
Antigua	65,000	225	345
Bahamas	290,000	1,401	485
Barbados	263,000	772	295
Belize	229,000	1,118	490
Dominica	74,000	243	330
Grenada	99,000	327	330
Guyana	852,000	1,697	200
Jamaica	2,500,000	3,629	145
St. Kitts	43,000	109	250
St. Lucia	145,000	325	225
St. Vincent	111,000	420	380
Trinidad	1,300,000	4,715	365

Source: Home Office, London & Prison Reform International, relevant years.

All data are from January 1998 except in the cases of Antigua (November 1995), Dominica (December 1997), and Trinidad (April 1998).

In Trinidad, the number of prison inmates incarcerated for narcotic offenses in 1998 was 1462, close to a third of the entire prison population.²² In the case of the large number of using offenders arrested for possession, this kind of treatment is becoming difficult to justify. Prison officers in most countries admit to the sale of drugs in prison. They cite such different reasons as the collusion of visiting relatives, corruption among poorly paid officers, and the ease of access to many of the old prison located inside the city. In Georgetown, wardens seized a six-kilogram package of marijuana that had been simply thrown over the prison wall.

While drugs are readily available, drug treatment is not. There are some efforts at providing counseling in Trinidad and Guyana, usually provided by prison chaplains and religious organizations, but these efforts are at best sporadic. There is little pretense then that incarceration serves a rehabilitative function with respect to either drug use or criminality. The available information on recidivism with 88 percent of interviewed inmates in Barbados having an arrest history, and 39 percent of inmates in Trinidad and Tobago having been in prison three times or more, suggests that once inside the system prisoners keep moving through a revolving door (Prison Reform International 2000).

22. Information from the Assistant Superintendent of Prisons, Trinidad and Tobago.

In small societies, where anonymity cannot be preserved, the stigma of having been inside raises further obstacles to finding employment in an already tight market. While the severity of prison conditions may fulfil to some degree its role as a deterrent, it also succeeds in alienating those who go through the system. They emerge as embittered individuals, with a grudge against society, and having been in contact with hardened criminals who rule the system, first-time offenders convicted for possession emerge as criminals. One writer puts this graphically: "In prison inmates are given the opportunity to regress into barbarity. Prison de-programs the socialised individual. The system uses tax payers' money to produce predators to carry out carnage on the said body of taxpayers" (Figueiras 1997:81).

There have therefore been concerted efforts in several countries to find alternatives to incarceration. In Guyana and Belize, for example, increasing use is made of fines. Barbados and Trinidad have enacted community service orders to provide community service as an alternative for first-time offenders on possession charges. Grenada, St. Lucia, and Belize are considering the introduction of similar legislation. The most ambitious moves in Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Trinidad have been the introduction of drug courts and the substitution of treatment for prison.

While these drug courts are a laudable attempt at channeling drug offenders past the prison system, they do not address the issue of institutional capacity. In Jamaica the offender has to be assessed by a psychiatrist and is then assigned to a counselor. With no facilities in place this process is initially even more resource intensive than the courts, which explains why so far only about sixty-three people have been processed. The system has been more successful in the Bahamas, where the drug courts have been in operation since 1986. Sentencing guidelines have been developed for magistrates, which give direction through a system of fines, community service, and treatment. Custodial punishment for possession offenses has never been mandatory, and is infrequent. But even in the wealthiest CARICOM country, there are capacity shortages affecting these alternative programs. According to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the "probation services are the weakest link in the chain." Yet the probation services are the crucial element in the development of a punishment option. Several overseas partners, including the U.K. Department for International Development, have recognized this need and are running training programs and capacity building in Jamaica and Belize.

A massive expansion of probation, while a considerable improvement on incarceration, will merely shift the resource burden to a different state agency. An altogether different route is therefore being discussed in Jamaica. Here the Ganja Commission appointed by the prime minister has published its recommendations to decriminalize the possession of marijuana. It is expected that this move would relieve pressure on the police, the courts, and the prison system, improve relations between the community and the police, and bring gov-

ernment policy in line with prevailing public opinion. One of the conditions, however, is that drug education be massively expanded and developed. The report makes clear that it does not approve of ganja smoking, but admit that current policies have failed in dissuading a large section of the Jamaican population from taking up marijuana. Jamaica is not alone, particularly young people all over the Caribbean are taking to recreational marijuana smoking in ever larger numbers.

It is this realization, which is driving an ever wider alliance of public and specialist opinion advocating a shift in policy. For over two decades the thrust of Caribbean drug control has been to stop the flow and production at the source. The failure of this policy in turning the tide of drug use, and the rising social costs have prompted a major change in public opinion, which has trickled up to policy makers. A crucial step was taken at the annual UNDCP organized conference in Barbados in May 2000, when drug demand reduction was given priority status at the insistence of regional representatives. The Regional Coordinating Mechanism at CARICOM, working with support from the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office undertook a demand reduction needs assessment in the summer of 2001, with a series of recommendations for future development. While the winds of change are blowing through the region, there is much work to be done.

DEMAND REDUCTION IN THE CARIBBEAN

The importance given to demand reduction at the inception of the regional drug strategy, is apparent from the Barbados Plan of Action: only eleven out of eighty-three recommendations cover education, treatment, and research. Foreign donors were clearly most concerned about the transit phenomenon. Regional governments, preoccupied by the political threat of organized criminal groups, concurred with the risk assessment. Some were still in denial, regarding cocaine as a northern, not a regional problem. As for the UNDCP, the preferences of the expatriate experts were clearly for the "enforcement" issues, and it was not until 2001 that trained demand reduction experts were appointed to the Barbados office. In a review of demand reduction delivery a newly arrived UNDCP staffer after noting a "nothing short of astonishing" lack of drug related data, concluded that the demand reduction efforts of Caribbean governments were mere "lip service" (UNDCP 2001). Thus the annual budget of the National Council for Substance Abuse is around half that of the police band. This is a particularly telling observation, as the NCSA is probably the most generously endowed, and politically least dependent drugs council in the region.

Yet another product from the UNDCP range of drug control instruments, national drug councils have been formed in all Caribbean countries. With dif-

ferent budgets, constitutions, mandates, and levels of expertise, they serve basically two functions: to advise government on drug related matters and to implement demand reduction activities. They are usually located in the Ministry of Health and sometimes in the Ministry for National Security. With staff usually seconded from other ministries they have had a difficult task in building up drug related expertise. Training facilities in the region are limited to the Caribbean Institute on Alcoholism and other Drugs (CARIAD) and the Addiction Studies course offered at the University of the West Indies (UWI). It should be added that CARIAD, which was founded by the father of Caribbean addiction studies, professor Michael Beaubrun, provides occasional two-week courses and is almost defunct. The addiction course at UWI, financed by the European Union and the Canadian government, managed (and top sliced) by UNDCP,²³ and implemented by the Toronto-based Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, meanwhile has run out of funding and has come to an end.

Regional drug workers and administrators, in other words, are largely reliant on "learning on the job." Most drug councils have therefore focused on less controversial activities such as "public awareness" campaigns and education. Some of these efforts are laudable, considering the meager resources. In Tobago for instance, a public rally celebrating Emancipation Day is followed up by a sustained effort to contact hard-to-reach groups, including beach boys and unemployed young men and women. Information on risk avoidance is disseminated, and people are brought into contact with services.

In the main, however, publicity activities of drug councils consist of radio jingles, posters, stickers that are handed out on public occasions, and school-based education. There are no reported evaluations of any activities, and the anecdotal evidence about declining impact is yet to bear consequences. Given the prominence accorded to drugs in the media, the role of national councils seems quite superfluous. At the same time success seems to be eluding the school-based interventions in bringing about behavior change. Most critically perhaps, is the neglect of such high-risk groups as the unemployed, commercial sex workers, out-of-school youth, fishermen, and transport industry workers.

Short of resources, the councils rely for much of their materials on foreign donors. According to a recent study by CARICOM (2001), most of these are from the United States, and the messages are mainly variations on "just say no," backed up by information to inspire fear, they co-classify all illicit substances with no differentiation of harm, impact, level of intoxication, or dependency profile. Peer based approaches have yet to be introduced, and former drug users do not enter the class room. The major development in school-

23. The UNDCP office deducts a 13 percent charge for overheads, even on projects where it is the managing rather than the implementing agency.

based drugs education, has been the Health and Family Life Education program (HFLE) developed at UWI, and now being introduced in schools across the region. Based on so-called life skills approaches to drugs education, the HFLE includes a drugs module. While this program is being rolled out, the bulk of drug related education is still being provided by drug councils, the police forces (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), and religious groups. In all cases the emphasis is on abstinence rather than safer drug use. As the authors of the Ganja Commission noted, such education has only a marginal impact on drug-using students. The danger with fear-based education is that students with positive attitudes to drugs, and particularly marijuana, discount all information as propaganda. The result has been the spread of so-called ganja myths, which among large swathes of the Jamaican youth is seen as a benign substance. A more worrying development still is the subsequent neutralization of cocaine related information.

Not surprisingly, drug use trends among young people, while still low by U.S. or U.K. standards is up and rising.

Table 7. Drug Use in Selected Countries (from Self-report Surveys)

Country	Cannabis	Cocaine	Alcohol	Year	Trend
Bahamas*	8%	1%	22%	1998	stable
Barbados*	low	low	high	_	-
Belize	low	low	high	1998	(two towns)
Grenada	not known	not known	_		_
Guyana*	2%	1%	60%	1998	increasing
St Lucia**	8%	_	51%	1999	
Trinidad**	27%	3%	high	1991	increasing
Jamaica**	36%	2%	70%	1997	increasing
	7%*	6% ***			

Sources: Caribbean drug control Coordination Mechanism respective country reports.

Notes: Data are not comparable as different methodologies are adopted, different populations surveyed at different times using different measures. Trinidad is a national survey; Belize a survey of two of its major cities; Barbados is based on data from Rapid Assessments; the others are school surveys.

Though the data gathering methods are highly unsatisfactory, the indications of spreading acceptability and normalization of ganja in particular are clear. An overhaul of drug education content and delivery is urgently called for.

^{* &}quot;Current use" among students

^{**} Lifetime use among students

^{***} Lifetime use in the general population

TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION

While CARICOM governments have made concerted, if ill-advised, efforts in the field of drug prevention, the efforts in the field of rehabilitating drug users have largely been left to psychiatric hospitals and NGOs. The former provide a limited number of beds in their detoxification wards. These services are principally geared to dealing with alcoholism, and usually provide little by way of after care. Moreover, they have not as yet developed treatment modalities for the principle problem substance, crack cocaine. Most problem users therefore turn to the NGO sector for assistance; organizations like Verdun House in Barbados, Patricia House in Jamaica, Rebirth House or Pitparo in Trinidad, Marrion House in St. Vincent, and Sandlings in the Bahamas offer well-structured residential treatment courses for dependent drug users. In Jamaica and Trinidad the government has forged partnerships with these voluntary sector service providers, but the capacity is still far short of the need.

Moreover, the abstinence based methodology in all these centers leaves a large number of problem users not wishing to enter full-time treatment uncared for. This shortcoming owes much to an equation of drug problems with chaotic use at the official level. What is most urgently required is a network of low-threshold centers, which allow users access to counseling and medical services, with referrals to residential centers as an option when the client is ready. At the other end of the spectrum, for people emerging from treatment there need to be halfway houses and support groups to facilitate the reintegration into the community. Apart form haphazard Narcotic Anonymous groups meeting in some of the large towns, and the Bevon House facility in Antigua, this remains an unmet need. Relapse rates are likely to remain high.

INTEGRATED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

The importance of the community has already been recognized in one of the most innovative schemes to come out of the region, quite independent from the international agencies. It is the Integrated Demand Reduction Approach (IDER) pioneered during the 1980s in Jamaica, and subsequently adopted in the Bahamas, Trinidad, and Barbados. IDER programs take a holistic approach by situating drugs in a wider web of social, economic, and political problems. Working with and through local people, each project is anchored in a Community Development Action Committee (CODAC), which is responsible for identifying issues and mobilizing local resources. In Jamaica, for example the following factors have been identified in over twenty participating communities: dysfunctional families, incomplete schooling, absence of skill training, unemployment, and the absence of recreational facilities

(UNDCP 2001). The project then sets out to meet these shortfalls, by providing skill training and sports facilities for example.

The success of the approach can be gleaned from the fact that it has been adapted by the UNDCP, that acts as managing agent for IDER programs financed with EU funds. There is a certain tension in this set-up, as the very breadth of the IDER approach runs counter to the generic, drug-centric philosophy, and organizational raison d'être of the UNDCP. Hence, community members will always identify poor service provision or lack of jobs as their primary concerns, whereas the UNDCP representative is primarily concerned with drug issues. On a wider level, however, it becomes difficult to justify infrastructure or skill-training projects as part of a drugs program. Finally, the analytical link between deprivation and drug problems may be compelling, but the required remedies amount to an overall national development program, which lies well beyond the capacity of national drug councils or international organizations.

The very scale of the problem has therefore triggered the radical solution suggested with decriminalization. After years of intense anti-drug campaigning at national, regional, and hemispheric levels, this is a devastating verdict on the effectiveness of technical agencies and policy makers. It is evident that the message "say no to drugs" did not come across. One of the reasons behind the failure was the lack of consultation in the design of campaigns. At multi-and bilateral levels North American and European drug control staff played a critical role in the formulation of policy. These seem like spurious claims to expertise, since neither region can look back on a record of success in reducing drug use. Most importantly, however, the messages missed out on the subtleties of local discourse and its calibration of drugs and related harms.

DISTINCTION OF DRUGS

According to informants in drug councils and the findings of the Rapid Assessment Surveys (Barbados, Trinidad) and the existing epidemiological data (Jamaica) the three problem substances in the region are alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine. There is occasional reportage of heroin, but this is yet to develop into a significant phenomenon. The spread of infectious diseases, such as HIV or Hepatitis B and C as a result of needle sharing is therefore no concern.²⁴ At the clinical level, however, clients report in the main for alcohol

24. The reported diversification of Colombian cartels into heroin production is set to produce a spillover effect, though sharp differences are anticipated. Colombian heroin for the U.S. market will pass via the more western routes. The lesser Antilles, conduit for Europe bound cocaine cargoes are unlikely to be effected to the same degree. In view of the likely cut of traditional supply due to the sealing of Afghani borders at present, however, this may well change.

or crack. Poly drug use is common, with reports of clients switching from ganja to cocaine, or combining alcohol with ganja. None of the non-governmental treatment centers reported having clients with marijuana as their main problem drug.

To understand the significance of this trend, it must be remembered that the media discourse in many Caribbean countries was until recently dominated by a crass moral panic. Newspapers would, and still do carry stories explaining personal tragedy, violent crime, and insanity as the outcome of marijuana smoking. In St. Vincent, one of the most respected members of the medical establishment published newspaper articles and booklets as late as the 1980s, describing marijuana as "that monster that entices to kill" (quoted in Rubinstein 2000). Hymie Rubinstein attributes the inflammatory language used partly to the success of U.S. propaganda, which while misfiring at home, has taken root abroad. More important, however, is the role played by marijuana as a symbol of social order.

The lowest ranked and most destitute Blacks are young rural males between their late teens and mid thirties. Sometimes feared for their alleged predilection for lawlessness or unruly behaviour, often reviled for appearing to flout societal norms of respectability, these youths and young men are the most visible and ardent marijuana growers, sellers and smokers. (Rubinstein 2000:476)

This association of marijuana with the lower social stratum confirms the findings of Littlewood (1988:142) in Trinidad. "Respectability and ganja smoking are firmly incompatible and no man who has pretension to social position in the village would admit publicly in mixed company to having smoked it." Even in Jamaica "an individual's position to *ganja* is typically linked to his social status and to his aspirations for upward mobility ... *ganja* smoking implies participation with others in an illegal activity uniformly judged to be 'lower class'" (Comitas 1975:130).

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the consumption of ganja, now firmly identified with the lower social strata, was set in contrast to alcohol, which in the Anglophone Caribbean was associated with wealthier strata and white communities (Beaubrun 1975). While the information on clients suggests that patterns of substance use still vary among ethnic groups, the significance of the ganja/rum dichotomy as markers of social status has been usurped over the past decade by the arrival of crack cocaine. The sudden arrival of cocaine, imported from South America, and its popularity among North American and European tourists, has had a transformational effect on public attitudes towards ganja.

In Jamaica, where both substances have perhaps made the deepest inroads, the effect has been to intensify the celebration of ganja as a positive aspect of Jamaica's non-European heritage. Attitudes towards cocaine have

been described, as that of "the unsavoury other" polluting local culture and people (Broad & Feinberg 1995:265). In local discourse the spread of crack cocaine, with its debilitating anti-social effects, prompted ganja to be dropped from the drugs chart. The authors describe how informants answer the question of drug use in the negative, even while skinning up a spliff, with an explanatory, "that's just a habit." Cannabis users across the region take the view that marijuana being a natural substance cannot be a drug. The Ganja Commission records this position as "Their argument is that ganja is a natural, not a man-made substance, given by God to be used by mankind as mankind sees fit, the same way he provides other herbs and bushes."²⁵

These notions have been spreading across the region, at the same time as the so-called education and awareness campaigns have been intensifying. Yet the tendency of co-classifying ganja and cocaine under the same rubric of "dangerous drug" only serves to desensitize people to the messages of drug education. To young people growing up in households where cannabis use is approved, and which may even be economically dependent on participation in the drugs economy as farmers or sellers, this conflict between of school-based drug education and family socialization can be alienating.

The spread of crack, and its association with violent crime, addiction, and physical decay, has boosted the standing of cannabis tremendously. It is now widely viewed as a benign substance, which enables people to stay cool, to cope with "the pressure," and to meditate. There is no doubt that a mythology has grown around marijuana, which trivializes the health damage, and the debilitating impact of cannabis. It has, nevertheless, moved the debate from the relentless "war on drugs" propaganda, to a more considered approach.

One of the most vocal lobbying groups has been the expanding Rastafarian movement. In the consultations of the Ganja Commission leaders of the Church of Haile Selassie I develop their argument based on an analogy with the doctrine of transubstantiation, the "pronouncement of the Rastafari priest transforms the herb 'into the body of the mighty Trinity'." The demands for the legalization of cannabis on the grounds of religious freedom has been conducted in Jamaica for many years. In recent years legal challenges by branches of the Nyabinghi Theocracy Order have also been brought at the high court of Antigua. And in St. Lucia and Barbados leading Rastafarians have been raising the tone of the debate on marijuana (UNDCP 2000a).

More surprisingly, perhaps, have been the calls for a change in the legal status in Jamaica, by such people as diverse as CODAC members in urban communities, the chief medical officer, and the head of the Drugs Council

- 25. A Report of the National Commission on Ganja; www.userl.netcarrier.com/~aahpat. ganja.htm.
- 26. A Report of the National Commission on Ganja; www.userl.netcarrier.com/~aahpat. ganja.htm.

himself. The arguments vary, with CODAC members pointing toward the detrimental impact the current law is having on police-community relations. The present system leads to partiality and victimization, and encourages a loss of respect for the law, playing right into the hands of criminal organizations. The medical professionals favor the decriminalization "as a platform for as strategic reduction of ganja use in the society, not for freeing up a lifestyle."

It is realized that decriminalization of consumption would allow drug education to delink marijuana from cocaine, and allow the entry of Rastafarians into drug education. This would add a much needed injection of credibility, into an otherwise well-intentioned but poorly thought-out program. Still, the need for active interventions is brought out by Broad and Feinberg warning of the rhetoric surrounding cocaine, without a clear understanding of either impact or circumstance. "The popular glorification of ganja may represent a compromise with official discourse: we accept your individualisation of blame with one drug" and do so by elevating ganja into a kind of anti-cocaine (Broad & Feinberg 1995:272). Yet the Sticker posse in Montego Bay, who eschew cocaine while bragging about their liberal use of ganja and alcohol, have a reputation for violence (Broad & Feinberg 1995:271).

LEGAL REFORM AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The position of the Ganja Commission is therefore best understood as an acknowledgement of the futility of an abstinent-based policy, and a move toward harm reduction. Aware of the ill effects marijuana can have on the user the commission still suggests the decriminalization of ganja for personal use and as a religious sacrament. It does so mindful of the formidable obstacles thrown up by the UN Conventions: the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. More serious still will be the official response of the United States. "A day after the Ganja Commission revealed its recommendations, U.S. embassy spokesman Michael Keplovsky announced that "the U.S. government will consider Jamaica's adherence to its commitment under the 1988 UN convention when making its determination under the annual narcotics certification review." 28

Neat legalistic footwork is required to take advantage of loopholes in the conventions. One opening lies in the distinction between possession and consumption. The commission has been advised that the letter of the law as it

^{27.} A Report of the National Commission on Ganja; www.userl.netcarrier.com/~aahpat. ganja.htm.

^{28.} Jamaica Observer, August 17, 2001.

224 AXEL KLEIN

stands stipulates that "the possession of an unlit spliff would constitute a criminal offence, but the smoking of it would not." In addition, Jamaica can invoke constitutional principles and the notion of proportionality, to argue that the right to privacy – soon to be enshrined in the new bill of rights going through parliament now – supersedes the narcotics legislation.

A recent study of European interpretations of these international obligation, found that:

the governmental stance that attracts the most criticism from the International Narcotics Control board is official tolerance of illicit drug use, possession or low-level trade when carried on in public. Otherwise, as long as there is official condemnation and strongly voiced public disapproval of these practices, and as long as the countries retain the option of punishability for forms of illicit drug-related behaviour there is room for manoeuver. (Jamieson 2001:247)

Hence it is only the Netherlands and Italy which do not respect the international treaties while Spain, Germany do.

Jamaica may be the country most inclined to pursuing a liberal policy on marijuana, but the support in the region is widespread. The basic idea was spelled out by a senior official in Trinidad: "There are no prostitutes on the street because of ganja, nobody is stealing from their families because of ganja, we don't even see people in treatment because of ganja." The system works, therefore, by a set of contrasts and relative harms. With crack cocaine so easily available why waste resources on a relatively harmless substance.

There are calls for CARICOM solidarity from Jamaica, and a growing cooperation among policy makers as well as practitioners in the drugs field. In all likelihood, however, extra regional support will be required. One of the first places to look to for support is the European Union. Unfortunately, the EU budget for drugs was cut to € 5 million in 2001, and the EU Drug Control Office in Barbados is set to close once the contract of the two technical assistants has expired in the spring of 2002.

The multilateral organizations UNDCP and CICAD are bound by international conventions, and in any case, unlikely to give succor to a scheme that negates some of their fundamental principles.

This leaves bilateral partners with a presence and an interest in the region. The Netherlands has already pioneered innovative policies in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. It is difficult to envision the projection of controversial policies at a time of international crisis. The Jamaicans, it seems, are alone with their drug reform. The other countries in the region, regardless of their stance, are watching closely. Whatever the outcome of this particular initiative, ganja will remain popular and available throughout the region. The question is if the social costs in terms of a clogged up criminal justice system, corrupt police, and an alienated youth will keep rising as well?

REFERENCES

ANKOMAH, AUGUSTINE *et al.*, 1999. Illicit Drugs and the Poor in Transit Countries: Case Studies from the Caribbean and Southern Africa. Swansea, U.K.: Centre for Development Studies.

AUSTIN, DIANE J., 1979. History and Symbols in Ideology: A Jamaican Example. *Man* 14:497-514.

BEARDSWORTH, RICHARD R., 2000. Multilateral Narcotics Interdiction Measures in the Caribbean. *In* Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith (ed.), *The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 230-45.

BEAUBRUN, MICHAEL, 1975. Cannabis or Alcohol: The Jamaican Experience. *In* Vera Rubin (ed.) *Cannabis and Culture*. The Hague: Mouton, pp. 485-94.

BENTHAM, MANDY, 1998. The Politics of Drug Control. London: Macmillan.

Broad, Kenneth & Benjamin Feinberg, 1995. Perceptions of Ganja and Cocain in Urban Jamaica. *Journal of Psychoactive Drugs* 27:261-76.

BROOKS, TIMOTHY & TADASHI WAKABAYASHI, 2000. Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952. Berkeley: University of California Press.

CARIBBEAN DRUG CONTROL COORDINATION MECHANISM, 2000. Third Consolidated Report on the Progress Made in Implementing the Barbados Plan of Action. Bridgetown, Barbados: UNCDP.

CARICOM, 2001. Report on Drug Demand Reduction Needs Assessment in the Caribbean. Georgetown, Guyana: CARICOM.

CLISSOLD, GILLIAN GUN, 1998. Divergent International Perspectives on the Caribbean: The Interaction between the Ongoing Caribbean, U.S. and European Adaptations to the New Global Economy. Washington DC: Georgetown University.

COMITAS, LAMBROS, 1975. The Social Nexus of *Ganja* in Jamaica. *In* Vera Rubin (ed.), *Cannabis and Culture*. The Hague: Mouton, pp. 119-32.

COPE, JOHN, 1998. A United States View of Strategic Balance in the Americas. In Joseph S. Tulchin & Francisco Rojas Aravena (eds.), Regional Perspectives on Strategic Balance and Confidence Building Measures in the Americas. Stanford CA: Woodrow Wilson Center, pp. 60-75.

Dowd, D., 1991. Review of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Unpublished report, Port of Spain.

FIGUEIRA, DAURIUS, 1997. Cocaine and the Economy of Crime in Trinidad and Tobago. S.l: s.n.

FREEMAN, CARLA, 2000. High Tech and High Heels in the Global Economy: Women, Work, and Pink Collar Identities in the Caribbean. Durham NC: Duke University Press.

226 AXEL KLEIN

GRIFFITH, IVELAW LLOYD, 1993. The Quest for Security in the Caribbean: Problems and Promises in Subordinate States. London: Sharpe.

- —, 1997. Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- —, 2000. Drugs and Political Economy in a Global Village. *In* Ivelaw L. Griffith (ed.), *The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 11-28.

GRIFFITH, IVELAW LLOYD & TREVOR MUNROE, 1995. Drugs and Democracy in the Caribbean. *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 33:358-75.

HARRIOTT, ANTHONY, 2000. Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-colonial Constabularies. Kingston: The University of West Indies Press.

HEAP, SIMON, 1999. The Quality of Liquor in Nigeria during the Colonial Era. *Itinerario* 23(2):29-47.

JAMIESON, ALISON, 2001. International Drug Conventions, National Compliance and UN Commentaries: The Shaming Mechanism. *In* Nicholas Dorn and Alison Jamieson (eds.) *European Drug Laws: Room for Manoeuvre.* London: DrugScope, pp. 219-54.

KHAN-MELNYK, ANTOINETTE, 1995. Politics and U.S.-Jamaican Drug Trade in the 1980s. *In* Bruce M. Bagley & William O. Walker (eds.), *Drug Trafficking in the Americas*. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers; Coral Gables FL: University of Miami, pp. 481-509.

KLEIN, AXEL, 1999. Nigeria and the Drugs War. Review of African Political Economy 26(79):51-73.

—, 2001. Have a Piss, Drink Ogogoro, Smoke Igbo, but Don't Take Gbana: Hard and Soft Drugs in Nigeria: A Critical Comparison of Official Policies and the View on the Street. *Journal of Psychoactive Drugs* 33(2):111-19.

LEGGET, TED, forthcoming. Rainbow Vice: The Drugs and Sex Industries in the New South Africa. London: Zed Books.

LITTLEWOOD, ROLAND, 1980. Anthropology and Psychiatry: An Alternative Approach. *British Journal of Medical Psychology* 53:213-25.

—, 1988. Vice to Madness: The Semantics of Naturalistic and Personalistic Understanding in Trinidadian Local Medicine. *Social Science and Medicine* 27:129-48.

MAINGOT, ANTHONY P., 1995. The Drug Trade in the Caribbean: Policy Options. *In* Bruce M. Bagley & William O. Walker (eds.), *Drug Trafficking in the Americas*. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers; Coral Gables FL: University of Miami, pp. 469-79.

MINTZ, SIDNEY W., 1985. From Plantations to Peasantries in the Caribbean. *In Sidney W. Mintz & Sally Price (eds.)*, *Caribbean Contours*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 127-54.

MUNROE, TREVOR, 2000. Cooperation and Conflict in the U.S.-Caribbean Connection. *In* Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith (ed.), *The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 183-200.

PAN, LYNN, 1974, Alcohol in Colonial Africa. Uppsala: Finnish Foundation for Alcohol Studies

PENN, D., Final Evaluation of the UWI/UNDCP Legal Training Programme: Training in the Prosecution and Adjudication of Drug Offences and Post-Conviction Asset Forfeiture Proceedings. Cave Hill, Barbados: University of the West Indies.

PRISON REFORM INTERNATIONAL, 2000. Penal Reform in the Caribbean. A presentation to the CCM by Wendy Singh.

REHM, J. & A. HOLDER, 1998. Report on the Barbados Rapid Assessment Survey on the Extent of Substance Abuse in Communities for Describing the Relevant Services to Respond to Substance-related Problems. Bridgetown, Barbados: National Council on Substance Abuse.

RUBINSTEIN, HYMIE, 2000. Reefer Madness Caribbean Style. *Journal of Drug Issues* 30:465-96.

SANDERS, RONALD, 1990. Narcotics, Corruption and Development: The Problem in the Smaller Islands. *Caribbean Affairs* 3(1): 79-92.

UNITED NATIONS DRUGS CONTROL PROGRAM, 2000a. Conclusions of the 3rd CCM Task Force Meeting, Final Report, CCM Task Force Meetings 2000. Bridgetown, Barbados: UNDCP.

- —, 2000b. Three Decades of Illicit Drugs in the Caribbean. Bridgetown, Barbados: UNDCP.
- —, 2001. The Community Fights Back: The Implementation of Demand Reduction Programs in the Caribbean. Bridgetown, Barbados: UNDCP.

WALMSLEY, ROY, 1995. World Prison Population List. London: Home Office.

WEST INDIA COMMISSION, 1992. Time for Action: Report of the West India Commission. Bridgetown, Barbados: Black Rock.

WILSON, PETER J., 1973. Crab Antics: The Social Anthropology of English-Speaking Negro Societies of the Caribbean. New Haven CN: Yale University Press.

AXEL KLEIN
DrugScope
32-36 Loman Street
London SE1 OEE, U.K.
<Axelk@drugscope.org.uk>

KAREN S. DHANDA

LABOR AND PLACE IN BARBADOS, JAMAICA, AND TRINIDAD: A SEARCH FOR A COMPARATIVE UNIFIED FIELD THEORY REVISITED

Peter Boomgaard and Gert J. Oostindie (1989) provocatively argue that scholars analyzing the relationship between sugar, technology, and labor in the Caribbean between 1750 and 1900 may be asking the wrong questions, looking at the wrong "things," and establishing relationships that should not be made. For example, labor relations and configurations, and management attitudes and strategies changed considerably during this long time period; therefore, to assume that the planter elite was a conservative and restraining force in technological change may not be a valid assumption. Second, to begin with the premise that slavery as an institution was inherently in conflict with innovations also proves questionable. Furthermore, to argue that innovation, of and in itself, was automatically labor and cost efficient is simply not true. The switch to steam-driven mills processed cane more efficiently but required more fuel (dried cane stalks), more labor to fetch it, and more workers to cultivate more cane, transport it to mills, and feed it through the presses. This innovation was labor intensifying. They conclude their argument by stating that there are many more variables that must be brought into the labortechnology equation: land, capital and credit, management strategies, market fluctuations, imperial economic politics, and global shifts in supply and demand.

In Commentary: The Search for a Unified Field Theory (1989), Michael Craton agrees that there is no simple equation. He states that "we are all surely seeking the simplest possible key ... a kind of unified field theory," to explain the complex process of change (Craton 1989:135). Craton, however, moves beyond the debate. He states that it is not enough to seek similar processes in different places and over different time scales. It is important to analyze how developments in one area lead to, or are related to, developments elsewhere and how they are related to global development. This comparative study of Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad is concerned with the dynamics of economic change and development. It emphasizes the interplay between

human agency and large- and small-scale forces in these three British West Indian sugar colonies. More specifically, it proposes that a labor, path dependence, and place dialectical strategy that centers the analysis around labor may hold a key for this complex analysis. This study proposes an overarching approach; however, it does not offer a simple equation.

A search for a key to explain the complex process of change is an ongoing one. Although not a Caribbeanist, almost fifty years ago J. Carlyle Sitterson (1953) produced a fine analysis about sugar sector restructuring in Louisiana; and one that is not far removed from the recent works about the Cuban sugar sector is found in Rebecca J. Scott (1984, 1985). Sitterson explains how the transition to central factories was a gradual and difficult one of trial and error. In his argument, he also explains how external political and economic factors helped re-shape Louisiana's "Sugar Culture" and alter the landscape. After testing a variety of labor configurations, the society was rebuilt upon a labor mix comprised of a southern elite, Negro wage laborers and marginalized tenants. Scott (1985) writes that the central factory, surrounded by decentralized cane farms, emerged in Cuba at the same time that slavery was gradually being dismantled. Her work challenges that of Manuel Moreno Fraginals (1976) who postulated that a central factory system could only emerge in Cuba once slavery was abolished because slavery was incompatible with innovation. Scott demonstrates that the Cuban sugar sector rested upon a variety of labor mixes during its transition period. For example, planters relied on slaves, Chinese indentured laborers, white woodcutters working under contract, black, white and mulatto wage workers, mostly white sharecroppers and cane farmers, and even convicts.

Like Sitterson, Scott seeks to sort out some of the essential relationships that link together the growth of central factories, ordering of labor, and creation of new classes. She, in turn, links those linkages to social, economic, political, and military pressures. Furthermore, Scott (1984) states that large-scale explanations and small-scale historical events can be linked. The key, however, is to establish the "right" linkages. Moreno Fraginals (1976) also contributes to this challenge, although his input is found elsewhere. He argues that planters modernized external strategies and variables but failed to modernize internally. For him, sugar is not a product but an economic complex in which the components must keep in step with each other, certainly a difficult task that is entangled in multiple webs of linkages and flows.

This comparative study of Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad is not specifically concerned with when the dismantling of slavery or the transition to central milling took place, although it does demonstrate how these three sugar colonies also reconstructed their labor mixes during periods of economic trans

^{1.} See, for example, Dhanda (2000) where I use this strategy in my analysis of labor and globalization in Trinidad.

sition and how one did dismantle old mills and erect central factories. Instead, this study is concerned with sorting out the "right" types of linkages in order to analyze how each island responded differently to the postemancipation era and to intensifying globalization.

There were many variables involved in the economic restructuring of these sugar colonies. Changes in imperial sugar politics were very important. Each island's physical characteristics, settlement and livelihood patterns, and attitudes of its people, however, affected how the island responded to shifts in British sugar policy. Imperial immigration policies and the local initiative in implementing these policies had an important impact on the nature of the labor regime. Sources of labor, labor control mechanisms, and labor response influenced employer options. The flow of investment capital affected technological levels. In turn, the nature of the labor regime affected the technological modernization strategies of the sugar producers. Furthermore, changes in consumer demands for particular types of sugar influenced employer labor needs. These relationships were based on a dialectics of power: the struggle between labor and management and struggles between the imperial center and the West Indies periphery. How does one link together all of these elements?

The approach proposed in this article is comprised of three components: labor, path dependence, and place. First, it follows the path of labor. The particular labor mixes that were embedded over time in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad were essential in constructing those island societies. For example, in the early postemancipation era, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad each came to the same fork in the road and each made fateful choices. By successfully switching to an East Indian indentureship, Trinidad found a superior way out of its economic crisis. The island's "superior solution" inspired confidence and attracted money. Barbados found a far less costly solution to its postemancipation economic crisis than Trinidad did, one that did not dramatically change the ethnic composition of its population. Jamaica made other choices that were less satisfactory and less "rewarding."

Second, by incorporating place and path dependence, it is possible to analyze why a particular mechanism at work on all three islands had dramatically different effects on each. John A. Agnew (1987:18, 41-43) states that analysis should be grounded in concrete everyday life. He writes that behavior is intrinsically geographical and can only be explained with reference to the development of places within a world-economic historical-geographical perspective. For him, place is where the universal meets the contextual, it bridges the gap between the "macroscale" and the "microscale" without subsuming one under the other. He states that it is in places that processes converge and that structures take concrete form. Relationships between causes and outcomes can be examined without expecting a universal outcome. Similar elements found from place to place can produce many different outcomes in different places because places and their histories are unique. In Barbados,

Jamaica, and Trinidad large- and small-scale forces, structure and agency all converged but the outcomes were not the same. Path dependence means that history, accidents, chance, and human activity and decision making at the local level are important in structuring economic patterns. Patrick O'Brien (1996) claims that a path dependence approach can be used to analyze structural transformations if positioned within Braudel's la longue durée. In his comparative study of France and England, O'Brien writes that a combination of geographical endowments and a system of property rights, in a large measure, predetermined structural change. He follows the path of geographical, political, and institutional constraints. The path dependence approach used in the present article differs from that of O'Brien. First, O'Brien uses a national unit of analysis in comparing England and France. He places each in a separate "box." The present study puts forward another spatial package. Path dependence operates within a local cluster in which clusters of actors operate within the confines of a particular geographic area. Path dependence, however, has a dynamic and dialectical nature that moves along a global-local nexus. It, therefore, also conveys a sense of the long distance, the "far away," because local actors are forced to operate in response to the actions of actors and to forces outside of their local cluster.

In the end, each island moved beyond path dependence to entrapment. Entrapment is when the path followed structurally traps a place into the globalizing economy. Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad were all sugar islands. Each became locked into that particular commodity flow as a result of the path that it followed. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, outside investors built sophisticated and extremely costly central factories and produced high-quality refined sugar in Trinidad. Trinidad became entrapped in a new growth sugar industry. In 1900 Trinidad held only a 0.36 percent share in the world sugar market.² Most likely, its departure from that market would not have been noticed. Its sugar production levels, though vital to the economic security of that small place, were insignificant in global terms. Both Jamaica and Barbados continued to produce a low-quality muscovado sugar. In Jamaica sugar production dramatically decreased in the postemancipation era and production patterns and technology remained at low levels throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. In Barbados sugar production increased dramatically, despite the island's antiquated production patterns, lowlevel technology, and the fact that it continued to produce low-grade muscovado. Both Barbados and Jamaica, however, became entrapped in a dying muscovado sugar sector.

2. This percentage is based on Deerr's (1949, 1950) statistics.

SAMENESS AND DIFFERENCE

Barbados is 21 miles long, 14 miles at its broadest, and 166 square miles in total. Virtually all of the 106,000 acres are suitable for sugar production although topography, soil, and rainfall in some parts of the island are better suited for sugar cultivation than others. There are no mountain ranges or rivers and the island is gently terraced with rolling hills. Jamaica is 146 miles from east to west and 51 miles across at its widest area, having an area of 4,413 square miles. The terrain widely differs throughout the island. In the west is the Cockpit Country, a rugged area of limestone shelves and steep spiral hills. The island is intersected with mountains in every direction. Prodigious mountains reach over 7.000 feet in the east. There are numerous streams and more than a hundred rivers, most of which are not navigable. Trinidad is the southernmost island in the Caribbean, separated from Venezuela by a mile-wide gulf. It is 1.864 square miles extending 89 miles north to south and 38 miles east to west. Trinidad has three east-to-west mountain ranges intersected by fertile plains. It has rich and abundant lands throughout the island. There are extensive swamps, ideal for rice cultivation, along the eastern, southern, and western coasts. Rivers are numerous.

In Jamaica there were large areas of land unsuitable for sugar cultivation that were allocated to the slaves to grow their food. There were also places to hide; and runaway slaves fled into the interior and created Maroon settlements. By 1800, Barbados was a densely populated island with some 600 people per square mile, with hardly any place to run and hide. Slave provision garden plots were small. In Trinidad, ample land was available to grow provisions and there were many places to hide but not much reason to do so. Maroon communities were very small and rare. Slave resistance was part of the dialectic of slavery; however, there were no slave rebellions recorded in Barbados between 1701 and 1815 (Craton 1982:254); nor did any major slave revolts occur in British Trinidad. Slave revolts were, however, frequent occurrences in Jamaica. Williams (1984:195-96) cites slave revolts there in 1690, 1734, 1746, 1760, 1765, 1769, and 1776.

Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad share a legacy of British Empire and sugar. However, each island was integrated into the British Empire at different times which meant that each developed in different ways. Barbados became the first British sugar colony. It was settled in 1627. Jamaica was seized from Spain in 1655 and made the transition to sugar monoculture some fifty years later. Trinidad, on the other hand, did not become British until 1802, five years before the British outlawed the slave trade and some thirty years before slave emancipation.

When Britain acquired these islands, it was not predetermined that they would become sugar islands. Initially they were home to small-scale cultivators producing a diversity of crops. Sugar came later. If one visited sugar mills

in Barbados, Jamaica, or Trinidad in 1800, each would look much the same, although one might find windmills in Barbados and water mills and cattle mills in Jamaica and Trinidad. The plantation configurations would be similar except that fields in Barbados would have cane cultivated in a patchwork of square holes instead of rows. Sugar processing, however, was the same, still using centuries-old technology and production techniques. Mills produced a low-grade brown muscovado sugar, thick and moist with molasses that continued to drain out of the wooden barrels on to ship floors all the way to Britain. However, the nature of their plantations was different as was their shift in labor patterns following slave emancipation.

The structure of slavery, its regimentation and degree of exploitation differed on each island for many reasons. Environmental attributes, attitudes of individual owners, the percentage of absentee proprietorship, and the size of the free labor pool were all important factors. For example, slave labor forces on Jamaican sugar plantations numbered 200 to 300 while those in Trinidad were small. In Trinidad in 1808 there were approximately 24,000 slaves and only 13,219 worked on 246 sugar estates, an average of 54 on each. The average working on coffee estates numbered 9, on cotton estates 10, and on cocoa estates 11.3 There the ratio of free colored people to slaves was astonishing and extraordinary in comparison to the other two islands. In Barbados in 1786, the ratio of free colored to slave was 1:74. In Jamaica in 1787 it was 1:63. In Trinidad in 1797 it was 1:2 (Mallet 1802; Williams 1984:190).

In 1834, some 255,000 slaves were emancipated in Jamaica, 66,640 in Barbados and almost 21,000 in Trinidad. Woodville K. Marshall (1990:10) writes that following emancipation the productivity of Afro-Jamaicans may have increased by as much as 50 percent; however, planters could not harness this increased productivity. Instead, employers continually blamed labor for production level drops. The island also failed to attract significant numbers of labor migrants. Trinidad could not harness the labor of its liberated slaves either and searched the world for workers. The island attracted more than 148,000 male and female indentured laborers from India. It found its new labor supply in a most unlikely place, at least from the perspective of the employers in the sugar sector who never dreamed that they would become completely dependent on East Indians. Barbados, in comparison, did not recruit laborers because it did not need to. There, planters and labor devised a particular type of arrangement.

^{3.} Public Record Office (PRO), London, Colonial Office (CO), Trinidadian Colonial Office Records (TCOR), Series 295/23, Return of the Estates in the Island of Trinidad, 1808.

BARBADOS

In 1627, some ninety years after the last of the indigenous peoples departed, the first British settlers arrived in Barbados, funded by Courteen, a rich London merchant. The British Crown awarded Courteen and the Earl of Carlisle royal patents to the land simultaneously and both began to colonize the island. Eventually Carlisle acquired control. Few of the settlers recruited by Courteen stayed because they received wages but no land. Those recruited by Carlisle were granted land but did not receive wages. Until 1640, Barbados was dominated by small farms and estates growing provisions, cotton and, principally, tobacco.

The labor force was dominated by white indentured labor, many of whom acquired land after fulfilling their terms of service. Seventeenth-century indentured laborers in Barbados appeared to be quite young, mostly in their teens and early twenties. The first indentured laborers in Barbados were male; however, 24 percent of those registered as departing from Bristol between 1654 and 1686 were women. Toward the end of the century, the West Indies indentured laborers were older and it was these who performed the skilled work. Richard S. Dunn (1973) writes that Barbados attracted more indentured laborers than any other British colony until it became a slave colony; however, even then, the switch to slavery was a gradual one. Slaves worked side-by-side with indentured laborers for some fifty years.⁴

Barbados became a popular and burgeoning place. In 1640 there were fewer than 6,000 black slaves; however, the white population may have been as high as 40,000 (Parry, Sherlock & Maingot 1987:67). The demographic composition of society began to change after that. By 1646, the planter elite had arrived. That year 175 planters, only 7 percent of the property holders, controlled 54 percent of the property and the island's government. These planters had partners in England and Holland and relied on the Dutch who provided credit, slaves, equipment, and technical expertise. The Dutch shipped, refined, and marketed Barbadian sugar. Barbadian planters were rich and prominent. Barbados became the center of British white elite culture, politics, and trade in the British West Indies (Dunn 1973). In 1675 there were almost 22,000 whites and 32,500 slaves. In 1757, the number of whites had fallen to 17,000; there were 63,500 slaves. There were 15,000 white Barbadians when 66,640 slaves were emancipated in 1834 (Deerr 1950:278).

Society became clearly polarized and segregated between whites and black slaves, and both developed a strong sense of belonging. Absentee proprietorship was rare in Barbados. Perhaps as many as two-thirds of these planter entrepreneurs resided on the island (Craton 1997). In 1816, 93 percent of the slaves in Barbados were Creoles, born on the island (Craton 1982:256-57).

4. Deerr 1950:379; Dunn 1973:49, 53, 70-71; Galenson 1981:95, 165.

The free colored only comprised 3 percent of the population. Craton (1982) writes that black Barbadians felt that they had roots on the island. In 1816, one first-hand account stated that masters had allowed their slaves to become comparatively rich which gave the slaves "airs of consequence" and that they "put a value on themselves"; another said that slaves believed "that the island belonged to them and not to the White Men" (Craton 1982:258). Apparently slaves moved freely around this small island. Prior to emancipation the slaves were the main suppliers of fresh fruit and vegetables on the island and provided minor crops for the export sector (Craton 1982:257). A tradition of cash crop production and part-time farming was established. The island, however, never became self-sufficient and had to import foodstuffs for the slaves.

Some 20 percent of the blacks were urban and domestic slaves. The others lived in their communities on the plantations. They lived in family units in small houses with garden plots. They also cultivated small provision grounds. A division of labor existed and particular jobs were more prestigious than others. Women, however, routinely performed the low status, monotonous, and arduous field work. The Barbadian slaves may have been better treated than those in Jamaica. B.W. Higman (quoted in Sheridan 1995:64) writes that the first gang that performed the most strenuous labor worked a total of 3,200 hours annually. In Jamaica, they worked 4,000 hours (Sheridan 1995:64). Even in Barbados, however, the work was laborious. Slaves dug a series of square cane holes and inserted cuttings of old cane stalks into the holes that had to be large and deep in order to be filled with manure and to retain water.

Emancipation did not create a labor problem on the island. In fact, Barbados did not import labor; it exported it. Between 1861 and 1903 net emigration was perhaps as high as 103,500. Barbadians went to work on the Panama Canal and elsewhere. Many returned with money in their pockets and an independent spirit. Bonham Richardson (1985:160) estimates that by 1920 remittances sent home by those working abroad far exceeded £1 million sterling. Freedom did not bring about any major changes in settlement patterns. Those who remained moved to Bridgetown, its major city, or became tenant farmers because they were denied the opportunity to purchase land (Bolland 1981). Plantations and tenancy lasted well into the twentieth century. In 1840, there were only 780 holdings of less than 5 acres. There were 2,300 smallholders in 1875, tilling 5,500 acres. These cultivators continued to grow cane (Momsen 1995:53-56).

After emancipation, sugar production only temporarily dropped and then, surprisingly, reached and maintained all-time high levels. In some of the colonies, including Trinidad, outside investors bought estates and consolidated them into large holdings. This did not happen in Barbados. Barbadian planters avoided borrowing money from outsiders and sold their estates to each other. Large-scale consolidations did not take place. It was not until the turn of the twentieth century that the central factory emerged. There were 485 sugar

works in 1709. In 1849 there were 508 and this was only reduced to 329 by 1912 (Deerr 1949:166; Galloway 1989:154). Technology came slow to Barbados. Although the British consumer was demanding high quality refined sugar, Barbados established new economic linkages and continued to prosper by producing low-grade muscovado. In 1882, 60 percent of Barbadian sugar was sent to Britain, the remainder was shipped to the United States and Canada. In 1896, Barbados's primary market was the United States. The Barbadian sugar growers capitalized on what they had. They continued to produce muscovado sugar using low-level technology and capitalized on the new labor regime that had emerged: the tenant farmer growing cane.

JAMAICA

In 1509 a small Spanish settlement was started in Jamaica, five years after Columbus beached his ships there; however, the island remained relatively unimportant in Spanish times. In 1611, Jamaica had 1,510 inhabitants: 523 Spanish men and women and 173 children, 107 free colored, 74 indigenous people, 558 black slaves, and 75 foreigners. It had one town and two monasteries with six monks and two preachers (Cundall & Pietersz 1919:34). Britain seized the island in 1655.

British Jamaica began as an economically diverse society. It was home to small-scale farmers and ranchers, sugar planters, white indentured laborers, and black slaves. Beginning in the 1660s the island attained notoriety as a haven for over 1,000 buccaneers. When an earthquake destroyed the major city, Port Royal in 1692, many believed that it was an "act of God," bringing justice to the city of sin and plundering. The day of the buccaneer came to an end. The sugar sector was relatively small at that time and the mature slave labor sugar plantation took approximately fifty more years to evolve. Gradually, the small-scale producers of diversified crops disappeared. There were 57 sugar works in 1673, 429 in 1739, and 648 in 1768 (Deerr 1949:176). In 1658 there were 4,500 whites and 1,400 black slaves; in 1698 there were almost 7,400 whites and 40,000 slaves. By 1762 there were 15,000 whites and 146,500 slaves. In 1800 the slaves outnumbered their masters by 10 to 1. Over 255,000 slaves were emancipated in 1834 (Deerr 1950:278).

The Jamaican sugar industry required substantial investment and planters became locked in a vicious circle with their creditors in England. The neighborly paternalistic planter was more the exception than the rule in Jamaica. In 1800 an estimated two-thirds of the plantation owners lived in England,

5. Parliamentary Papers (PP) 1898 L, Report of the West India Royal Commission (henceforth Royal Commission 1898), Analysis: Barbados, 105, 106.

where they had a strong political and social presence (Craton 1997). Slave forces were large and replacement costs expensive. Quite remarkably, given the level of technology at that time, Jamaica produced over 70,000 tons of sugar in 1800 compared to 6,000 tons in Barbados and a mere 3,000 tons in Trinidad (Deerr 1949:193, 198, 201). This was, in part, due to size of the labor force that numbered 200 or more slaves on a plantation. It was also due to the degree of regimentation and well-defined division of labor that, according to the prominent planter Thomas Roughley, had emerged in Jamaica by 1823 (Roughley 1976).

Following slave emancipation in 1834, sugar production began to plummet. A special committee reported that 653 estates operated in 1832 (Deerr 1950:366). There were only 200 in 1880. Production fell from just over 70,000 tons in 1832 to under 20,000 in 1900 (Deerr 1949:198-99; Higman 1988:10-11). In the postemancipation era, Jamaican planters adopted two strategies to reconfigure their labor force. Both failed. Jamaica imported 1,150 Chinese indentured laborers from 1853 to 1884. From 1835 to 1853, some 107 Madeirans arrived, and approximately 7,000 Africans were imported between 1841 and 1855. Finally, some 36,500 East Indian indentured laborers were recruited throughout the nineteenth century (Deerr 1950:385; Look Lai 1993:276). The recruitment program, however, was riddled with problems.

Planters also tried to introduce a tenantry system to encourage former slaves to live and work on the plantations. In many cases, workers refused to accept what they believed were unfavorable terms, high rents, and low wages. For example, on the Cambridge and Oxford estates, they were offered one pound sterling per day and were allowed to live on the estates rent-free. The planter paid for medical care and watchmen to guard provision grounds. Workers agreed to work four days a week out of crop and five days a week at harvest time. On a neighboring estate, the planter paid workers nine pence per day and was still using drivers in the fields to make the laborers work harder (Wilmot 1993:49). Swithin Wilmot (1995) argues that many laborers were women and that their withdrawal from field work led to the first confrontations with employers. In a strike in 1838, only nineteen out of 137 women reported to work while only five of the 142 men refused to work (Wilmot 1995:280). He writes that in the 1840s when sugar prices declined, Jamaica enacted stricter vagrancy laws and planters cut wages by up to 50 percent (Wilmot 1993).

Just as in Barbados and Trinidad, Jamaican slaves were given access to provision grounds and devised a network to sell or barter their small quantities of produce, fish, fowl, small animals, firewood, handicrafts, and other commodities. By the mid-eighteenth century, their Sunday market was an institution.⁶ In the postemancipation era, thousands of former slaves migrated to

6. Patterson 1967, Mintz 1974, Campbell 1988, Mullin 1995.

work on the Panama Canal, in Costa Rica, and elsewhere while many others became small-scale cultivators. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, these peasants re-arranged their marketing networks to serve a finicky and fluctuating marketplace. There were only 2,830 freeholds in 1840. By 1865, there were 60,000; in 1890, these had grown to 110,000, and in 1900 there were 130,000 (Higman 1988:17). Peasants were the major exporters of bananas and coffee until the 1890s. Veront M. Satchell (1995) argues that these peasants were forced out of the export business when new investors began to revitalize the plantation sector beginning in the 1880s. Many peasants withdrew from the export sector and, once again, grew provisions for the internal market. Richard B. Sheridan (1989:88-89) states that the new peasantry produced "a wide range of articles for local consumption and export that were valued at more than four times the produce of the sugar estates."

Jamaican sugar planters did not radically restructure the industry. Instead, as did the Barbadians, they capitalized on what they had. Jamaica produced less sugar and more rum that could be made from low-grade muscovado. In 1837, Jamaica produced 36 puncheons of rum to 100 hogsheads of sugar. By 1897, the ratio was 70 puncheons to 100 hogsheads on some estates. The sugar was sent principally to the United States; the rum was marketed primarily in Britain and, to a lesser degree, in Germany. The sugar sector continued using low-level technology that could capitalize on the flexible labor regime that had emerged.

TRINIDAD

In the 1500s and 1600s, Trinidad was a sadly neglected periphery of New Spain. It was a small world preoccupied with and linked into a micro-geopolitical arena revolving around its closest neighbors, Tobago and the Spanish coastal mainland; and it was ruled by a colorful and cantankerous elite, enmeshed in petty feuds (Joseph 1970:155-58). Columbus visited Trinidad on his third voyage to the Americas but a permanent settlement was not established until almost a hundred years later. The settlers cultivated coffee, cocoa, tobacco, cotton, sugar, and provision crops in small clearings and were integrated into illegal regional trade patterns. This economic diversity persisted throughout the nineteenth century, although sugar clearly became the dominant export product.

In Trinidad, a large-scale slave/sugar plantation structure had neither the time nor the opportunity to emerge. In fact, when the British acquired the island, they targeted it as a place to experiment and to build a world upon a different and more humane basis. Furthermore, Trinidad already had a different

7. Royal Commission 1898, Analysis: Jamaica, 402, 403; Beachey 1957:75-76.

system in existence when Britain conquered it in 1797. Then, the population numbered approximately 17,700, including 10,000 slaves (Mallet 1802). In 1733 the population may have been less than a quarter of that number (Joseph 1970). The increase was due to a migration policy initiated by the Spanish Crown in 1783. The British continued the open migration policy and the population numbered over 40,000 in 1817. At that time, there were nearly 12,000 free colored, almost 24,000 slaves, and 1,160 indigenous people. The white population numbered almost 4,000, including 1,780 British, 1,170 Spanish, and 700 French. The British were forced to maneuver within the constraints of a multi-cultural and multi-racial society.

Trinidadian slaves had frequent contact with free people. First, the slaves were an integral part of the island's marketing network, selling and bartering produce from their provision grounds, fish, small game, and poultry. Second, the free Trinidadian laborers were an integral part of the work force on the estates. Slaves comprised the labor core. They cut firewood, cleared bushwood, dug drains, planted, weeded, and harvested the crop, and manufactured the sugar. The island, however, was extremely dependent on free labor and functioned with a diversity of labor patterns. Day labor, job work, contract work, and task work were all used; and specialists were frequently hired to perform particular types of work. The free labor mix consisted mostly of free blacks, free colored, black American refugees, disbanded black soldiers, and Spanish peons. The peons were a people of mixed Amerindian, African, and Spanish heritage who lived in Trinidad or who traveled back and forth from the Spanish mainland.

Planters from other islands frequently perceived the agricultural process in Trinidad as slovenly; however, many of the agricultural practices were rationally suited to an extremely fertile island with long and intense rainy seasons. First, cane-holing was much less labor intensive than in Barbados. Cane-holes in Trinidad were only about one-fourth as deep because water had to drain off, not remain, around crops, and because little manure was used. Second, laborers seldom had to plant new crops because ratooning, sprouting cane from new shoots growing out of cane stumps, was a common practice in

- 8. PRO, CO, TCOR, 295/44, Crop and Population Report, 1817.
- 9. Carmichael 1969; PRO, CO, TCOR, 295/66, 1825, Negro Character, October 7, 1824, testimony of Bresson.
- 10. PRO, CO, TCOR, 295/85, Report of the Protector of Slaves, September 30, 1830.
- 11. PP 1826-27 XXIII Slave Trade, III, Papers Relating to Trinidad, Negro Character, testimonies of Littlepage, Lamont, Perschier, St. Hill, St. Jago Robbins, Mitchell, Wright, Harrigan; PRO, CO, TCOR, 295/97 Hamilton Correspondence, Grant to Goderich, January 23, 1833; 295/97, Grant to Goderich, April 4, 1833.
- 12. Joseph 1970:91; PP XIII Report from Select Committee on West Indies Colonies (henceforth Stanley Commission 1842), testimony of Church, 1124-25.

Trinidad.¹³ Ratooning could yield crops for thirty years or more in superior soil. Third, laborers only spent one-third of the time weeding compared to laborers on other islands (Joseph 1970:91).

In 1834, just under 21,000 slaves were emancipated, and only approximately 14,000 were classified as working in the entire agricultural sector on the island (Deerr 1950:306). After slave emancipation, planters adopted strategies to re-constitute their labor force. First, they tried to keep former slaves on estates by controlling their access to land; however, by 1850 the majority had purchased small holdings. 14 Although planters prevented the former slaves from acquiring Crown land, the planters themselves were the primary sellers of private land to these people. 15 Many of these black peasants only worked casually or seasonally on the estates. Trinidad also recruited laborers. Over 10,000 old islanders, former slaves from other British West Indies colonies, entered the island under the bounty system (free passage) between 1839 and 1846, and probably thousands of others paid their way. 16 Many, however, only migrated seasonally while those who settled in Trinidad generally adopted the flexible work norms of the Trinidadian black Creoles.¹⁷ Some 6,500 liberated Africans from Sierra Leone and the mid-Atlantic island of St. Helena arrived as short-term contract laborers. Liberated Africans were slaves captured on the high seas by the Royal Navy. Others who were recruited included almost 900 white Portuguese-speaking contract laborers from Madeira and black Portuguese-speaking ones from the Cape Verde

- 13. De Verteuil 1884:239; Stanley Commission 1842, testimony of Church, 1134.
- 14. PP 1842 XXIX Papers Relative to the West Indies, 1841-42: Papers Relative to Trinidad, Stipendiary Magistrate Reports (SMR) 1841 in MacLeod to Russell, July 6, 1841, (p. 406), enclosure in no. 9; PP 1845 XXXI, Colonies Correspondence Relative to the Labouring Population in the West Indies, Trinidad, SMR 1844 in MacLeod to Stanley, January 6, 1845, (p. 468), enclosures 1-7 in no. 1; SMR 1845 in MacLeod to Stanley, July 24, 1845 (p. 476), enclosure in no. 6; PP 1852-53 LXVII Sugar Growing Colonies, Part III, Trinidad (p. 389), Immigration Report, January 20, 1851 in Harris to Grey, January 24, 1851 (p. 475), enclosure in no. 37.
- 15. Stanley Commission 1842, testimony of Burnley, 637; *Port of Spain Gazette*, July 16, 1841, Agriculture and Immigration Report, testimony of Huggins, 487-490; SMR 1844-45; *Trinidad Royal Gazette (TRG)*, Trinidadian Council Papers (TCP) 9, 1875, Crown Lands Office.
- 16. PRO, CO, TCOR 295/151, 1846, Agent General of Immigration Report of the return of the places from which a bounty is payable in respect of immigrants arriving in the Colony; the amount of bounty payable in each case, and the numbers for whom such bounty has been paid, made up from the 1 Jan 1839 to 20 June 1846.
- 17. PP XX 1859 Colonies, West Indies (Immigration), Part 1, Papers Relating to the West Indies Colonies and Mauritius: Trinidad, Immigration Report 1856 in Keate to Labouchere, August 6, 1857 (p. 306), enclosure 2 in no. 7; *TRG* May 4, 1859, Immigration Report (IR) 1859-60; *TRG* May 8, 1861, IR 1860.

Islands, 2,700 Chinese, and over 148,000 indentured laborers from India. ¹⁸ The Madeirans left sugar work almost immediately. Most of the Africans left the estates by 1860, and by 1870 the Chinese departed. The East Indians became the dominant and, almost only, labor source in the sugar sector.

The East Indian indentured workers were credited with stabilizing the labor supply, reducing labor costs and restoring confidence in the sugar sector. In 1835, the year following emancipation, the island was exporting some 14,500 tons of sugar. In 1860 it produced 26,500 tons, and in 1880 the island exported over 53,000 tons (Deerr 1949:202). The increase in production had little to do with technology, rather it was because of the massive clearing of abandoned or new lands. ¹⁹ The East Indians received credit for this expansion, too. In 1860, the immigration agent wrote that the East Indians "had created a labor field adapted to the habits of the Creole, where their combined actions enabled the employer to extend his operations for the benefit of all."

In reality, though, the indentured seldom comprised more than one-third of the laborers in the sugar sector.²¹ As in the pre-emancipation era, estates continued to rely on a mix of captive and free resident labor and non-resident steady, casual, and seasonal workers, although its composition changed. By 1895 indentured and free East Indians comprised over 87 percent of this labor regime.²² This was only possible because a large East Indian peasantry emerged in the sugar growing regions in the 1870s and 1880s. In 1869, commoners were able to acquire small parcels of Crown lands at low cost and, as in the past, planters were the primary sellers of private land to peasants.²³

- 18. Deerr 1950:385. There are discrepancies in the number given for East Indians: Laurence (1994:520-21) states that approximately 148,000 East Indian indentured laborers went to Trinidad, Northrup (1995:156-58) gives the number as 149,500, and Look Lai (1993:276) gives an estimate of fewer than 140,000.
- 19. PP 1847-48 XXIII Select Committee on Sugar and Coffee Planting, Fourth Report, Testimony of Marryat, 10424, 10490-494, Supplement 1 to Eighth Report, Harris to Grey, December 28, 1847, and Harris to Grey, February 21, 1848.
- 20. TRG May 8, 1861, IR 1861.
- 21. Dhanda (2000:230, 232-35, 299-301) provides a table listing the number of contract and free East Indians from 1863 to 1876. She also provides a time series analysis of the composition of the labor force in the sugar sector from 1874 to 1915. Given are the numbers of indentured, those receiving a bounty (bonus) for agreeing to one-year contracts, and free East Indian resident laborers; non-resident East Indians; resident and non-resident black Creoles, and black Creole and East Indian women. The numbers of children are also given when available.
- 22. TRG July 8, 1897, IR 1896.
- 23. Dhanda (2000:250-64) contains maps and profiles of the changing settlement patterns in Trinidad; *TRG* May 15, 1869, Rules for the Sale of Crown Lands; *TRG* January 17, 1892, Naparima Warden Report 1890; *TRG* April 12, 1893, Savana Grande Warden Report 1891; Royal Commission 1898, L, Appendix C, Part IV (311), 1898; PP 1910 XXVII Report of the Committee on Emigration from India to Crown Colonies and Protectorates (Sanderson Commission 1910), testimony of Lamont, 9326.

The economy was healthy in Trinidad from 1850 to 1880. According to the immigration agent reports, labor relations were relaxed, work was plentiful, and wages and incentives were good for free and indentured labor in Trinidad between 1850 and 1880.²⁴ In 1857, the immigration agent reported that more than half of those who completed their indentures re-engaged themselves. He said demand for labor was very high and bounties generous. This trend continued until the economy took a serious downturn in the 1880s. In 1860 the agent said that the "bulk" of the free coolies remained scattered about the estates where many had taken wives of later arrival whose industrial residence was incomplete. Many unmarried laborers also continued to live on the estates because they occasionally received higher wages than the indentured. Absenteeism and desertion also steadily decreased over time. In 1869, the indentured laborer absentee rate was only 0.02 percent. In 1859, the agent reported that less than 19 percent of the days of "wilful absence" were reclaimed by planters. He reported that in 1875 employers ignored time lost by women who did little or no work during the early periods of their indenture as long as the husbands were reasonably industrious.

These positive working conditions, in turn, created a positive investment climate. Beginning in the 1870s, some proprietors erected small central factories on their estates and were using tramroads to haul cane from fields to mills. The first sixteen-mile stretch of railway opened in 1876. In 1872 Usine St. Madeleine, the largest central factory in the British West Indies, was erected in Trinidad, financed by London investors.²⁵

By the 1880s, sugar producers felt the pressing need to dramatically change the way they did business. By 1900 they were replaced by the corporation. In 1808 there were 246 sugar estates, reduced to 206 larger ones by 1838. In 1847 there were 193 sugar estates. In 1887 there were 90 sugar estates and in 1898 there were only 39 whereby 6 enterprises owned over 30

- 24. PP LXVII 1852-53 Sugar Growing Colonies, Part III, Trinidad, Immigration Report, April 1, 1852 in Harris to Pakington, May 19, 1852 (p. 528), enclosure in no. 66; PP XX 1859 Colonies West Indies (Immigration), Part I, Papers Relating to the West Indies Colonies and Mauritius: Trinidad, Immigration Report 1856 in Keate to Labouchere, August 6, 1857 (p. 306), enclosure 2 in no. 7; 1857 in Keate to Labouchere October 7, 1857 (p. 321), enclosure in no. 12; 1857 in Keate to Labouchere February 11, 1858 (p. 329), enclosures 1 and 2 in no. 19, and June 1, 1858 in Keate to Lytton September 26, 1858 (p. 354), enclosure in no. 36; *TRG* May 4, 1859, IR; *TRG* May 9, 1860, IR 1859; *TRG* May 8, 1861, IR 1860; *TRG* May 20, 1863, IR 1862; *TRG* May 8, 1870, IR 1869; *TRG* March 19, 1873, IR 1871-72; *TRG* June 20, 1877, IR 1876; *TRG* May 29, 1878, IR 1876-77; *TRG* April 16, 1879, IR 1877-78; *TRG* June 1, 1884, IR 1883; Sanderson Commission 1910, Part II, 273.
- 25. TRG March 19, 1873, IR 1871-72; PRO, CO, TCOR, 300/83, Bluebook 1872 and 300/90, Bluebook 1879; Royal Commission 1898, L, Appendix C, Part I (29), Operations of the Colonial Company Limited.

of them. Most were British financed and controlled. Collectively all of the enterprises in business in 1898 invested an estimated £2,500,000 in their operations.²⁶

The main impetus that necessitated a massive restructuring of the sugar sector was the increasingly ruthless and spatially expanding global market. Trinidad was able to compete for three reasons. Between the mid-1800s and 1900, the island made the transition to a high-quality sugar by building large and expensive central factories equipped with vacuum pan technology.²⁷ Second, the economic restructuring was accompanied by austere labor rationalization strategies. All laborers had to work longer, harder, better, and for less pay while convictions of indentured for breach of contract escalated, reaching 20 percent in 1902.²⁸ Third, the industry became dependent on a new type of laborer that emerged, the cane farmer. In order to achieve economies of scale in the new central factories that were built, the sugar producers needed more cane to process. These producers found that it was cheaper to buy the cane than to grow it.²⁹ In 1899, central factories purchased approximately 20 percent of the cane processed from some 6,700 black Creole and East Indian peasants who had converted their holdings into cane farms. In 1916, almost 20,000 cane farmers produced over 47 percent of the cane crop.³⁰ The sugar

- 26. PRO, CO, TCOR, 295/23-24, Return of the Estates, 1808; 295/162, Ledger of Lord Harris, June 19, 1848; 298/44, Trade Statistics for 1887; 298/52, Trade and Crops Return, 1893; Royal Commission 1898, Report, Trinidad, 134.
- 27. PRO, CO, TCOR, 300 series, Trinidadian Bluebooks; 298 series, Trade Statistics. During this time, Trinidad made the transition from muscovado to a better quality centrifugal sugar and high-quality vacuum pan sugar. However, it is difficult to classify the sugar during these transitional years. Trade statistics of 1887 report that about 40 percent of the sugar was vacuum pan; however, as late as 1899, the Collector of Customs cautioned that too much reliance should not be placed on the distinction between centrifugal and vacuum pan sugar (PRO, CO, TCOR, 298/44, Trade Statistics for 1887 and 298/68, Trade Statistics for 1900). The Trinidadian annual bluebooks do not begin to differentiate between vacuum pan, centrifugal, and muscovado sugar until 1890.
- 28. Comins 1893; Royal Commission 1898, L, Appendix C, Part IV, 280, 284, 288, and 259, testimony of Mitchell, 749, 751, 761; Sanderson Commission 1910, Part II, 289, 293, and Appendix, Trinidad, enclosure 5 in no. 23 (k). This was also a period of labor unrest. Between 1882 and 1916, there were more than fifty strikes and numerous confrontations, several of which resulted in loss of life or serious injury. Protest marches to the immigration agent also became a popular weapon of labor. See, for example, Look Lai 1993:146; Laurence 1994:488; PRO, CO, TCOR, 298, Immigration Reports 1901-2, 1906-7, 1910-11, 1911-12; San Fernando Gazette, October 14, 1882; July 28, 1883; August 11, 1883; September 6, 1884; March 31, 1892; October 10, 1893; February 24, 1893.
- 29. Royal Commission 1898, L, Appendix C, Part I (34), Statement submitted by Gregor Turnbull and Co.; Appendix C, Part I (4), testimony of Lubbock, 109-11; Sanderson Commission 1910, testimony of Prentice, 3753, 3796.
- 30. Sanderson Commission 1910, Appendix, Trinidad enclosure 1 in 23 (c); PRO, CO 298, TCP 1918, 122, Agricultural Administrative Report for 1917.

sector became dependent on small-scale farmers hauling cane to sophisticated factories in little donkey carts.

Unlike Jamaica and Barbados, Trinidad attracted investment capital and radically restructured its sugar industry. This was only possible because initially it could capitalize on its mix of free and indentured labor. Later, it could capitalize on the new powerful labor mix that emerged: the cane farmer, a large pool of free and flexible labor and a highly structured but versatile assembly line worker. Trinidad differed from Barbados and Jamaica in another major way. There, the postemancipation labor solution radically altered the ethnic composition of the population. The East Indians, similar to the earlier white indentured laborers in Barbados and Jamaica, were young and spirited and came from all walks of life. Approximately one-third were women. The majority of the women came as individuals, not wives or daughters of the men.³¹ In time, these free-spirited people recreated a "miniature India" along traditional lines which, though modified, exists today.

WORLD ECONOMY

From the beginning, the British West Indian sugar economy was intricately linked to the economic and political arenas in London. This can be illustrated by appraising the credit and capital structures in place in the West Indies and the changing imperial sugar politics.

First, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad were integrated into the credit and capital mechanism differently. Initially, all used metropolitan-based commission houses. At first, commission agents frequently granted loans without security but by 1760 the mortgage security became a common practice. Traditionally, commission agents had strong personal ties with their clients; and they and the absentee planters living in England had considerable political power (Sheridan 1973). By the mid-nineteenth century, impersonal corporations replaced the traditional commission agents. These corporations invested where profits could be made and walked away from bad investment climates. They turned to places like Trinidad and shunned Jamaica.

An example of how deeply each of these three islands was entangled in this credit and capital mechanism can be seen by following the path of a large infusion of capital given to each colony. When slaves were emancipated, West Indies planters were given £20 million as slave compensation. Jamaica received over £6,100,000, Barbados received approximately £1,700,000, and Trinidad received an estimated £1,000,000. The planters were paid in interest-bearing certificates redeemable in England. De Verteuil (1884:10) writes that the greatest part of the money was used by Trinidadian planters to liquidate

31. Reddock 1993:227; Laurence 1994:111, 121; Dhanda 2000:230, 232-35, 299-301.

mortgages and other debts and that the majority entered the new era free from liabilities, many with reserve funds. In Barbados, only approximately 20 percent of investment capital came from merchants; 80 percent of its credit came from private sources. Jamaica had been deeply embedded in the web of metropolitan finance for over a hundred years. Compensation money did not resolve financial problems on the island because some 66 percent of the compensation claims went directly to the metropolitan-based commission agents. In 1854 the Crown attempted to alleviate the economic distress of the West Indies colonies. Then, the West Indies Encumbered Estates Act was introduced to help planters dispose of heavily encumbered estates. In total 148 estates were sold in Jamaica under this act. Neither Barbados nor Trinidad placed themselves under the act.³²

Second, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad had to continually adjust to changes in imperial sugar politics that steadily eroded their secure marketplace. In 1670, colonies attempted to produce a semi-refined white sugar but refiners in England pressed Parliament to adjust duties to force planters to ship low-grade muscovado. In turn, these planters received preferential treatment and a guaranteed market in Britain. After the Napoleonic Wars, the muscovado market became more competitive. Britain acquired Dominica, St. Vincent, Grenada, Tobago, and Trinidad and gave them the same duty protection as the other West Indies colonies. In 1825 Mauritius was given the same rate for muscovado as the West Indies and in 1835, that privilege was extended to the East Indies. A major shift in the sugar duty structure began in 1844. Then foreign sugar not grown by slave labor was admitted at only slightly more than that from the British colonies. By 1854, there was a single rate for all muscovado from everywhere whether grown by slaves or not. After 1874 all grades of sugar from all tropical cane sugar producing regions entered Britain duty free. By 1885 a new European competitor, Germany, producing a high-quality refined sugar manufactured from beets and well sheltered under a bounty system, began to enter Britain duty free in massive quantities. In 1840 muscovado sold for 49s (shillings) per cwt. By 1896, muscovado sugar prices had fallen as low as 10s per cwt. In 1881, refined sugar was selling for 29s per cwt. By 1896 prices fell as low as 13.3s, depending on the type.³³

These dramatic drops in sugar prices coincided with shifts in demand. In 1700, the average person in Britain was consuming only four pounds of muscovado sugar per year. Consumption doubled by 1740. By 1800 it exceeded eighteen pounds and continually climbed thereafter. By 1900, the British were consuming eighty-four pounds of sugar per person; however, by then, the

^{32.} De Verteuil 1884:9-11; Deerr 1950:306; Beachey 1957:36-37; Butler 1995.

^{33.} Deerr 1950:531; Chalmin 1984:12, 15; Curtin 1993:314-15; Royal Commission 1898, L, Appendix C, Part I (63), (48).

consumer was demanding a high-quality refined sugar. Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad faced these challenges differently. Jamaica began to produce and export more rum, made from muscovado. Barbados continued to produce muscovado and its by-product, molasses, and found new markets. Trinidad restructured its sugar industry to produce refined sugar.

TECHNOLOGY

Throughout the nineteenth century, agricultural practices in the sugar sector in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad did not change dramatically. Shovels, hoes, and cutlasses were used to plant sugar cane, groom the fields and harvest the crop, although plows, new fertilizers, and new breeds of cane were gradually introduced. Innovations in the manufacturing end of the industry, however, were truly revolutionary. Table 1 summarizes the major technological changes and is followed by a description of sugar making.

Table 1. Sugar Technology Innovations, 1800-1900

- · hoes to plows
- · new fertilizers
- new cane breeds
- · carts and animals for transport; tramways and railways link fields-factories-ports
- Animal/wind/water mills to steam power
- three-roller press to multiple milling devices
- · Open pan process to vacuum pan
- · Hand-ladling to automation
- Amount of clarifies estimated to chemical clarifiers
- Point of crystallization estimated to automation
- · Manual one-month draining of sugar to few hours in centrifugal
- Hand packed to machine packed

After land was cleared, irrigation drains and trenches were dug and "cane beds" prepared. The land was lined with pickets, cane-holes were dug, and cane was planted in each hole. Once cane was cut, it had to be crushed and the juice extracted within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. The cane was hauled to animal, wind or water mills in carts. The stalks were run through a press to extract the juices. A three-roller press became popular in the eighteenth century that gave better extraction than an earlier two-roller press. During the 1840s, steam powered mills became more common because a horizontal press with heavier rollers was designed. This press gave better extraction and could better handle the power of steam. Hydraulic attachments were added

which gave equal compression to large and small feeds. By the end of the nineteenth century, multiple milling devices were invented. Then cane automatically flowed through a series of linked crushing units.

Juices extracted from the cane crop were heated in a series of four or five open kettles that got progressively smaller. The crushed, dried, cane stalks were commonly used as fuel. The amount of lime added to promote granulation was estimated and the point of crystallization, at which time a boilerman dampened the fire, was also estimated. Sugar was hand-ladled throughout this process. Afterwards it was cooled and stored in wooden barrels called hogsheads, or in earthenware cones. Laborers had to unplug holes in the storage devices daily for three to four weeks to drain off the molasses. Then the muscovado was shipped. After the centrifugal was integrated into the production system, it was used to spin and separate the molasses from the sugar. This process only took a few hours. It also produced a much drier muscovado which could be packed in bags instead of barrels.

The most revolutionary innovation was the vacuum pan. It evaporates syrups in a closed vessel until granulation at low temperatures. This technology was coupled with the "triple effect" heating system, in which the same heat was used three times as the vapor from one cauldron was conveyed to heat two others. Automatic carriers were invented which transported fuel and dropped it directly into the furnace. The vacuum pan could burn cane stalk fuel in a wet condition, saving the labor and time formerly required to dry it. After the sugar crystallized in the vacuum pan, it was placed in a centrifugal. Although vacuum pan sugar was not as "pure" as that produced in a refinery, it was refined enough to go directly into consumption.³⁴

While Barbados and Jamaica were still producing muscovado, Trinidad was re-shaping its landscape in order to capitalize on the new technologies. Estates were consolidated and central factories emerged surrounded by large peripheries of estate-owned lands and small-scale peasant cane farms where cane was grown. Networks of roads, tramways, and railways were constructed to haul cane from fields to mills and from mills to ports.

DISCUSSION

In Table 2, I have extracted some elements in order to demonstrate how complex and convoluted economic change was in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad. These elements, however, cannot stand alone. They should be posi-

34. Royal Commission 1898, L, Appendix C, Part I (4), testimony of Lubbock, 17, 51, 56; Appendix C, Part I (6), testimony of Hogg, 710; Appendix C, Part IV (285), Memorandum of White, 4, and Report Trinidad, 134.

tioned within the appropriate historical-geographical framework in order to explain why and how each of these islands responded differently to the post-emancipation era and intensifying globalization.

Table 2.	Relationship	between l	Five In	terrelated	Elements	in	1900
Table 2.	ICHAHOHSHID	DCLWCCII	1 1 4 6 111	iciiciaicu	Licincia	111	1 ノ ひ ひ

	Jamaica	Barbados	Trinidad
Technology	Low level	Low level	High level
Capital Flow	out to Britain	internal	in from Britain
Demand	muscovado, rum	muscovado, molasses	refined
Demand Links	North America,	North America	Britain, United States,
	Germany		Britain
Labor Regimes	full-time, by job,	tenant farmers	assembly workers
	by task, casual,		cane farmers,
	seasonal,		large free, flexible labor
	contract work		-
Restructuring	minor	minor	radical

Barbados had difficulties modifying its existing production system. *Technology*: By 1850, the horizontal press was the only innovation in common use. In 1897 there were 99 estates using steam-driven mills and the remaining 341 used wind-powered mills. Muscovado was produced on 432 estates and centrifugal sugar on 8 estates. In 1897 there were no central factories. *Capital*: Barbadian planters sold estates to each other and borrowed from each other. At the turn of the twentieth century, Barbadian planters pooled their resources to built their first central factories. *Demand*: Barbadians continued to prosper by producing the low-grade muscovado. *Demand links*: They found new market niches. In 1882, 60 percent of the sugar was sent to Britain, the remainder to the United States and Canada. By 1896, their primary market was the United States. *35 Labor regimes*: Barbados capitalized on the tenant farmer.

Jamaica, too, faced many obstacles in altering its existing production system. *Technology*: In 1897 there were 140 sugar estates. Steam was used on 95 estates, water mills on 38, steam and water on 3 and cattle mills on 4. By then, the centrifugal was in use and two estates had vacuum pan technology. In 1902, the estates began to cooperate and modernize. *Capital flow*: By the mid-eighteenth century, the island was perceived as a poor investment climate and failed to attract outside investment until the twentieth century. *Demand*: Planters found a way to work around their insufficient capital, low technology, and labor structure by producing more rum and less sugar – rum is made from muscovado. *Demand links*: Jamaican sugar producers found a market

35. Royal Commission 1898, Report Barbados 216, Analysis Barbados 103, 106.

niche for their muscovado primarily in the United States. The rum was primarily marketed in Britain and, in part, in Germany.³⁶ *Labor regimes*: Jamaican planters capitalized on full-time work, work by job and by task, casual, seasonal and contract workers.

Trinidad completely modernized its sugar production system. *Technology*: In 1824, there were 8 water mills, 8 wind mills, 242 cattle-driven mills, and 18 steam engines. Between 1834 and 1840, the conversion to steam-driven mills became quite common and by 1844 almost every estate of importance had steam-engines at work.³⁷ In 1873 planters were still manufacturing sugar in old iron kettles. The vacuum pan had been introduced earlier but fell into disuse or was applied on a scale too small to prove beneficial.³⁸ Until the mid-1880s, planters produced muscovado. By 1900, they shifted to refined sugar. This transition was coupled with the emergence of large central factories, equipped with vacuum pan and centrifugal technology. Capital: Trinidadian sugar growers attracted substantial "outside" capital. Demand: Trinidad was able to serve the refined sugar market. Demand links: It established linkages with the United States during the beet bounty crisis then re-established its ties with Britain when the crisis ended.³⁹ Labor regimes: In the early postemancipation era, Trinidad capitalized on a mix of free and indentured labor. Later, it capitalized on the cane farmer, its large free and flexible labor pool and a disciplined labor core.

On all three islands, planters traditionally showed an interest in improving their technology and agricultural practices; however, many reasons blocked modernization in Jamaica and Barbados. For example, Barbados was blessed with reliable and inexpensive wind power; however, windmills did not work well in a work flow that required precise timing and pacing. Jamaica and Barbados could not easily establish central factories. Land consolidation or, at least, cooperation among neighbors was needed to support central factories which had to process yields from several thousand acres in order to achieve economies of scale. It was difficult to consolidate land in Jamaica where many estates were encumbered and in litigation. In Barbados, it would have disrupted labor patterns, land tenure, and land financing. Furthermore, a planter who owned more than one estate had them scattered throughout the island (Galloway 1989:153). In Trinidad, estates could be sold easily and large tracts of lands were available.

^{36.} Royal Commission 1898, Analysis Jamaica 393, 394, 402, 403; Beachey 1957:77; Galloway 1989.

^{37.} PRO, CO, TCOR, 295/66, General Return of Population and Crops, 1824, and 300/55, Bluebook for 1843-44; *Port of Spain Gazette*, March 31, 1848, Cane Mills.

^{38.} TRG May 8, 1870, IR 1869; TRG, March 19, 1873, IR 1871-72.

^{39.} PRO, CO, TCOR, 300 series, Bluebooks; Royal Commission, L, Part VI, Appendix C.

The entrepreneur was accepted in Barbados; however, the entrepreneur was one who intensified fertilizing and streamlined production in order to survive in the declining muscovado sugar marketplace. Throughout the nineteenth century, Trinidadian estates were consolidated and became more efficient; however, the only major technological breakthrough prior to the 1870s was the steam-driven mill. Trinidadian planters were extremely reliant on labor until they were forced to produce a refined sugar which could only be made after investing in costly technology. As Trinidadian sugar producers escalated the investment of capital in the sugar sector, they found that they had few options. They had invested far too much to turn back. Trinidad became entrapped in the new refined sugar marketplace. In Jamaica sufficient levels and types of investment that were required to make the shift to the refined market were rare and, in one noticeable instance, the entrepreneurial spirit was challenged and discouraged. The manager of the prominent Worthy Park plantation found modernization a costly and difficult task indeed. Once installed, a new mill had serious defects. A small gauge railway was built which reduced the size of oxen teams from twelve to six and replaced eight wagons, thirty laborers, and 150 cattle with eight persons and twenty-four mules but this created a serious manure shortage. The manager linked the estate railway to the public one which was expensive to use, poorly constructed and no more passable in heavy rains than the roads were. He was called to England to justify his "extravagant mismanagement" (Craton & Walvin 1970:219-23).

Vastly differing sets of attitudes, ideas, and practices were woven into the histories of each of these places. The availability of land, propensity for land ownership and perceptions of land use were very different on each island. In Jamaica, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a process of land redistribution began and many former slaves acquired small holdings. The Jamaican peasantry developed an affinity for land but, for them, land was a source of independence, self-reliance, and survival that distanced them from the elite. Many Afro-Jamaicans who found themselves with little hope of bettering themselves on the island, left to work elsewhere. On tiny Barbados, land was a premium and continually held high value. Planters did not break up estate holdings and sell to former slaves. Barbadian planters were relatively complacent and uninterested in radical change. Former slaves became tenants, and later to a lesser degree, landowners, but they continued to grow cane. Afro-Barbadians also developed a migration mentality but many returned home with "their fortunes," or sent remittances which benefited their kin. Throughout its history, Trinidad attracted a diversity of peoples. There was plenty of land for everyone, even though common people were denied access to Crown land until 1869. A large black peasantry was in existence by 1850 and a large East Indian peasantry began to emerge in the 1870s. The black peasantry gradually withdrew from working on the sugar estates; however, the East Indian peasants consistently served as a large flexible reserve labor force. The more than 148,000 East Indians that migrated there brought with them a strong cultural bias that deeply tied them to the agricultural way of life. The East Indian free and indentured laborers spurred on modernization in the sugar sector.

In conclusion, I have proposed in this article that by centering on labor's dialectical relationship with global and local economic forces, one may find a key to analyze complex economic change. I offer a strategy for sorting out the types of linkages that are suitable in this type of investigation, although I do not claim that it holds the only key that can be effectively used. I do claim, however, that in order to understand the reasons for particular adaptations in each colony, attention needs to be given to the three components proposed in this analysis: place, path dependence, and people.

It is further suggested that a focus on labor, path dependence, and place can be effectively used to investigate economic change not only in the West Indies from 1750 to 1900 but also at other times and in other places, including a contemporary age of massive labor migration, economic restructuring, and intensified globalization.

REFERENCES

AGNEW, JOHN A., 1987. Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society. Boston: Allen & Unwin.

BEACHEY, R.W., 1957. The British West Indies Sugar Industry in the Late 19th Century. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

BOLLAND, O. NIGEL, 1981. Systems of Domination after Slavery: The Control of Land and Labor in the British West Indies after 1838. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23:591-619.

BOOMGAARD, PETER & GERT J. OOSTINDIE, 1989. Changing Sugar Technology and the Labour Nexus: The Caribbean, 1750-1900. New West Indian Guide 63:3-22.

BUTLER, KATHLEEN MARY, 1995. The Economics of Emancipation: Jamaica & Barbados, 1823-1843. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

CAMPBELL, MAVIS C., 1988. The Maroons of Jamaica 1655-1796: A History of Resistance, Collaboration and Betrayal. Granby MA: Bergin & Garvey.

CARMICHAEL, A.C. 1969. Domestic Manners and Social Condition of the White, Coloured, and Negro Population of the West Indies: Five Years a Resident in St. Vincent and Trinidad. 2 vols. New York: Negro Universities Press. [Orig. 1833.]

CHALMIN, PH.G., 1984. The Important Trends in Sugar Diplomacy before 1914. *In Bill Albert & Adrian Graves (eds.)*, *Crisis and Change in the International Sugar Economy 1860-1914*. Norwich & Edinburgh: ISC Press, pp. 9-19.

COMINS, D.W.D. 1893. *Notes on Emigration from India to Trinidad*. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press.

CRATON, MICHAEL, 1982. Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- —, 1989. Commentary: The Search for a Unified Field Theory. *New West Indian Guide* 63: 135-42.
- —, 1997. Empire, Enslavement and Freedom in the Caribbean. Kingston: Ian Randle; Princeton: Markus Wiener.
- & James Walvin, 1970. A Jamaican Plantation: The History of Worthy Park, 1670-1970. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

CUNDALL, FRANK & JOSEPH L. PIETERSZ, 1919. Jamaica under the Spaniards: Abstracted from the Archives of Seville. Kingston: Institute of Jamaica.

CURTIN, PHILIP, 1993. The British Sugar Duties and West Indian Prosperity. *In Hilary Beckles & Verene Shepherd (eds.), Caribbean Freedom: Economy and Society from Emancipation to the Present.* Kingston: Ian Randle; London: James Currey, pp. 314-18.

DEERR, NOEL, 1949. History of Sugar [Vol 1]. London: Chapman & Hall.

—, 1950. History of Sugar [Vol 2]. London: Chapman & Hall.

DE VERTEUIL, L.A.A., 1884. Trinidad: Its Geography, Natural Resources, Administration, Present Condition, and Prospects. London: Cassell. [Orig. 1858.]

DHANDA, KAREN S., 2000. Indentured Labor and the Integration of Trinidad into the World Economy. Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University.

DUNN, RICHARD S., 1973. Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713. New York: Norton. [Orig. 1972.]

GALENSON, DAVID W., 1981. White Servitude in Colonial America: An Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

GALLOWAY, J.H., 1989. The Sugar Cane Industry: An Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HIGMAN, B.W., 1988. Jamaica Surveyed: Plantation Maps and Plans of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Kingston: Institute of Jamaica Publications.

JOSEPH, E.L., 1970. History of Trinidad. London: Frank Cass. [Orig. 1838.]

LAURENCE, K.O., 1994. A Question of Labour: Indentured Immigration into Trinidad and British Guiana 1875-1917. New York: St. Martin's Press.

LOOK LAI, WALTON, 1993. Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar: Chinese and Indian Migrants to the British West Indies, 1838-1918. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

MALLET, CAPTAIN F., 1802. Descriptive Account of the Island of Trinidad. London. [Orig. 1797.]

MARSHALL, WOODVILLE K., 1990. *The Post-Slavery Labour Problem Revisited*. Kingston: Department of History, The University of the West Indies.

MINTZ, SIDNEY W., 1974. Caribbean Transformations. Chicago: Aldine.

MOMSEN, JANET HENSHALL, 1995. The Marginalisation of Women Farmers: Gender and Small-scale Agriculture in Barbados, 1838-1935. *Caribbean Geography* 6:52-60.

MORENO FRAGINALS, MANUEL, 1976. The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba 1760-1860. New York: Monthly Review Press.

MULLIN, MICHAEL, 1995. Slave Economic Strategies: Food, Markets and Property. *In* Mary Turner (ed.), *From Chattel Slaves to Wage Slaves: The Dynamics of Labour Bargaining in the Americas*. London: James Currey; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 68-78.

NORTHRUP, DAVID, 1995. *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism*, 1834-1922. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'BRIEN, PATRICK KARL, 1996. Path Dependency, or Why Britain Became an Industrialized and Urbanized Economy Long before France. *Economic History Review* 49:213-49.

PARRY, J.H., P.M. SHERLOCK & A.P. MAINGOT, 1987. A Short History of the West Indies. New York: St. Martin's Press.

PATTERSON, ORLANDO, 1967. The Sociology of Slavery: An Analysis of the Origins, Development and Structure of Negro Slave Society in Jamaica. London: MacGibbon & Kee.

REDDOCK, RHODA, 1993. Indian Women and Indentureship in Trinidad and Tobago, 1845-1917: Freedom Denied. *In Hilary Beckles & Verene Shepherd (eds.)*, *Caribbean Freedom: Economy and Society from Emancipation to the Present*. Kingston: Ian Randle; London: James Currey, pp. 225-37.

RICHARDSON, BONHAM C., 1985. *Panama Money in Barbados, 1900-1920.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

ROUGHLEY, THOMAS, 1976. Jamaica Planters' Guide. *In Michael Craton, James Walvin & David Wright, Slavery, Abolition and Emancipation: Black Slaves and the British Empire. A Thematic Documentary.* London: Longman, pp. 77-86. [Orig. 1823.]

SATCHELL, VERONT M., 1995. Women, Land Transactions and Peasant Development in Jamaica, 1866-1900. *In Verene Shepherd*, Bridget Brereton & Barbara Bailey (eds.), *Engendering History: Caribbean Women in Historical Perspective*. London: James Currey; Kingston, Ian Randle, pp. 213-32.

Scott, Rebecca J., 1984. Explaining Abolition: Contradiction, Adaptation, and Challenge in Cuban Slave Society, 1860-1886. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26:83-111.

—, 1985. Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor 1860-1899. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

_

SHERIDAN, RICHARD B., 1973. Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623-1775. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

- —, 1989. Changing Sugar Technology and the Labour Nexus in the British Caribbean 1750-1900, with Special Reference to Barbados and Jamaica. *New West Indian Guide* 63:59-93.
- —,1995. Strategies of Slave Subsistence: The Jamaican Case Reconsidered. *In Mary Turner* (ed.), *From Chattel Slaves to Wage Slaves: The Dynamics of Labour Bargaining in the Americas*. London: James Currey; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 48-67

SITTERSON, J. CARLYLE, 1953. Sugar Country: The Cane Industry in the South 1753-1950. Westport CT: Greenwood Press.

WILLIAMS, ERIC, 1984. From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492-1969. New York: Vintage Books. [Orig. 1970.]

WILMOT, SWITHIN, 1993. Emancipation in Action: Workers and Wage Conflict in Jamaica, 1838-1840. *In* Hilary Beckles & Verene Shepherd (eds.), *Caribbean Freedom: Society and Economy from Emancipation to the Present*. Kingston: Ian Randle; London: James Currey, pp. 48-54.

—, 1995. "Females of Abandoned Character?" Women and Protest in Jamaica 1838-65. *In* Verene Shepherd, Bridget Brereton & Barbara Bailey (eds.), *Engendering History: Caribbean Women in Historical Perspective*. London: James Currey; Kingston: Ian Randle, pp. 279-95.

KAREN S. DHANDA 3757 Coleman Hill Road Jamesville NY 13078, U.S.A. <karendhanda@yahoo.com>

ERNA KERKHOF

THE MYTH OF THE DUMB PUERTO RICAN: CIRCULAR MIGRATION AND LANGUAGE STRUGGLE IN PUERTO RICO

INTRODUCTION

It has struck many observers that, in spite of a daily English lesson throughout elementary school and high school, most high-school graduates in Puerto Rico read, write, and speak English poorly, if at all. Even among those island Puerto Ricans who speak English well, observers often note a certain reluctance, or fear to speak English. In contrast to, for example, Dominicans, many Puerto Ricans seem to feel that by expressing themselves in English, they are somehow putting their identity at stake.

What is at issue is not the fact that language and identity are related: What I want to highlight below, is the peculiar character with which the link between language and identity has become invested in Puerto Rico, and the efforts on the part of some of today's politicians and cultural elites in Puerto Rico to inculcate what may be called a historical myth. A historical myth may be defined as a story or an oral tradition, generally a flattering one, invented and developed with respect to the history and identity of a people. In the Puerto Rican case, the myth revolves around the detrimental effect that contact with English is assumed to have on the mastery of Spanish, and on "Puerto Rican identity." I

Most historical myths were at one time generally believed. Only in hindsight did some come to be seen as fables or falsehoods. In Puerto Rico, the process of the myth-making and mystification regarding the relation between

1. The research on which this article is based focused on Puerto Rican identity, in a context of massive circular migration. It included fifteen months of fieldwork, mainly in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, during the period 1994-96 (see Kerkhof 2000). An earlier version of this article appeared as Working Paper 13 in the series Globalization and the Construction of Communal Identities, of the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO).

the mother tongue, learning English as a second language, and Puerto Rican identity is still in full swing.² This allows an exploration that addresses not only the myth-making itself, but also the reactions to it on the part of the very people in whose name the language struggle is waged.

The attempts at myth-making are interesting not only in relation to Puerto Rico's charged political climate, but also in view of the massive, long-term, and increasingly circular migration. Strikingly, migration is a non-issue in Puerto Rico. Yet, as is illustrated below, the migration dynamic plays a crucial role in both the process of myth-making and mystification regarding Puerto Rican identity, and in the reactions to it on the part of common people in Puerto Rico.

Since the key principles of nationality and citizenship – including language(s) – are taught in schools, education may be the best background against which to illustrate the case. The public-school setting highlights the often traumatic character of the encounter between return migrants and islanders, on both sides. The public-school setting also draws attention to the pivotal role of Puerto Rico's most important twentieth-century politician, Luis Muñoz Marín, founder of the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), in power between 1940 and 1968, and the driving force behind Puerto Rico's 1952 Estado Libre Asociado (ELA) or commonwealth status. Regarding migration and identity, a crucial point is that Muñoz spent more than twenty years of his life in the United States. When reviewing the post-1968 decades of struggle for political power, and the shifting ideological leanings of the PPD with respect to language and identity, the legacy of the cultural policies that emerged under this powerful return migrant governor have to be taken into account.

In sum, against a backdrop of migration and education, I address the myth-making and mystification process and the ideas of some intellectuals involved in it; the historical and political context in which the myth thrives; the reception of the myth on the part of teachers, students, and parents, and finally I give an estimate of the general effect of the language struggle on Puerto Rican identity.

^{2.} In the course of my fieldwork, I came across several bits and pieces of the myth. Most of it I learned incidentally, during informal talks with teachers and students, and from television advertisements and political speeches during the campaign for the November 1996 elections. A review of the literature dealing with the two laws on the official language(s) of Puerto Rico was also useful (see Delgado Cintrón 1993b, 1993c, 1994).

ELITES AND MYTH-MAKERS

In both traditional and modern societies, myth-makers play a crucial role. In general, myth-makers serve the interests of economic elites, who want to lower the cost of governing by promoting a group identity and a cultural hegemony. Elites therefore need storytellers to shape the cultural order they wish to promote within society. Among the key figures performing this task are intellectuals, who are eligible for elite status themselves, and teachers, who serve as the principal dissiminators of group myths (Barreto 1998:35-36). The cultural markers elites use to define their society have to be acceptable to the population at large. Moreover, they have to be traits of identity that both distinguish the group from other groups, and are susceptible to elite control. For these reasons, elites often present language as the defining quality of group identity (Hobsbawm 1990; Barreto 1998; Van den Bersselaar 1998).

A focus on language may, of course, lead to internal problems, since, contrary to popular belief, in virtually none of the world's nation-states does one find linguistic unity. As language policies are often the vehicle for political strife at all levels of society, the effect of language struggles may be devastating. The detrimental effect is not limited to such well-known cases as Belgium and Canada; since decolonization, many African and Asian countries, too, have become engaged in language struggles, in which both the status of the language of the former colonial power and the status of local vernaculars may play a part.³ In Africa, raising a single vernacular to the status of national language is inevitably arbitrary, given the genesis of many frontiers. Drawn with a ruler by the former colonial powers, they cut straight through the linguistic wealth of the continent. Some African countries, South Africa for example, have opted for a different solution, by establishing up to a dozen vernaculars as national languages.

In the Puerto Rican case, the Spanish language became a marker of Puerto Rican identity only after the 1898 U.S. invasion. The Americans set up a public school system where English served as the medium of instruction. This language policy met with mounting resistance on the part of Puerto Rican educators, teachers, and politicians. During the decades following the U.S. invasion, the regulations for language use in Puerto Rican schools were changed several times, in favor of Spanish. In 1949, Spanish officially became the language of instruction at all levels of Puerto Rican public education. But the life histories of elderly people suggest that, in practice, the policy of using English as the language of instruction had been abandoned long before that.

3. For Belgium, see Van Istendael 1993; for Canada, see Handler 1988, Taylor 1994, Barreto 1995 and 1998, Baumann 1999:107-20; for Africa, see Soyinka 1988:82-94, Davidson 1992, Van den Bersselaar 1998; for India, see Rushdie 1991:64-5.



The Big March for the Language, committee. From right to left: Milton Soltero, David Noriega, Rafael Castro Pereda, Carmelo Delgado Cintrón, José Ronaldo Jarabo, Fernando Martín, Velda González, Ruben Berríos, Luis Amauri Suárez, Zayas, Ricardo E. Alegría, Federico Torres Montalvo, Eduardo Morales Coll, Marco A. Rigau, Padre Pedro, Severo Colberg Toro, Héctor López Galarza, Carlos Vizcarrondo. Foto *El Nuevo Día*, Ismael Fernández.

The 1949 switch to Spanish was not the end of the language struggle, neither in education, nor in society at large. In the post-1949 period, three developments (which will be addressed in more detail below) stand out: the deterioration of public education, the proliferation of private schools, and the politicization of the language issue in society in general. The latter development stems from the controversy about Puerto Rico's constitutional status in a context of narrow margins between electoral victory and defeat. The first victory (in 1968) of the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) marked the transition to, in effect, an evenly-balanced two-party political system (Anderson 1988). Since 1968, with the PNP aspiring to full U.S. statehood, the other main party, the PPD, aiming for an enhanced form of autonomy, and the tiny Partido Independista Puertorriqueño (PIP) advocating sovereignty, political positions in Puerto Rico have become increasingly expressed in an idiom of culture and identity (Dávila 1997). The annexationist PNP tends to present Puerto Rico as bilingual, a position that would facilitate its incorporation into the United States. The rival parties PPD and PIP focus on Spanish.

In the 1990s, the power struggle culminated in two language laws. The first, issued by a PPD governor in 1990, and supported by both the PPD and the PIP, declared Spanish the only official language. The law made its use compulsory in all government and commercial institutions on the island. In 1992, following the electoral victory of the rival PNP, this law was abolished. Instead, both Spanish and English were established as official languages.

At the occasion of signing what its opponents called "the bilingual law," there was a large protest demonstration, organized by the *Comité del pueblo en defensa del español* (The People's Committee in Defense of Spanish). A photograph of "The Big March for the Language," as the demonstration was called, appeared in the newspaper *El Nuevo Día*. The photograph, reproduced on the facing page, shows the politicians and intellectuals who make up the leadership of the language movement. Holding the banner of "The People's Comittee in Defense of Spanish" are intellectuals heading cultural institutions in Puerto Rico, an occasional journalist, the leadership of the PIP, and the PPD and PIP legislators who authored the 1990 law that established Spanish as the only official language. As its name indicates, the movement claims to represent "the people."

Strikingly, neither of the two language laws mentions migration. Yet, migration is at the core of the question how one should define the Puerto Ricans as "a people." Today, almost half the number of ethnic Puerto Ricans live on the U.S. mainland. The mainland-based Puerto Ricans used to define themselves as Hispanics, or as Spanish-speaking. But the reality is that their skills in Spanish are often limited, in particular among the U.S.-bred generations. From the 1960s onward, the migrants started to return to Puerto Rico in numbers that practically exceeded those of migration to the mainland. In the lower-class Mayagüez neighborhood where I did fieldwork, an estimated 40

percent of my neighbors had lived on the U.S. mainland at one time in their life. Of the migrants who returned from New York to Puerto Rico in the 1990s, 40 percent were U.S.-born (Navarro 2000).

In Puerto Rico, migration is a non-issue. Yet, the migration dynamic is central to Puerto Rican identity, and to the myth-making process regarding the way language and identity are related. This can be illustrated by a song. In 1996 the singer José Nogueras brought out a CD containing the song El Nietecito (The beloved grandson). It tells the tale of a bright child whose achievements in school had earned him the nickname "Socrates." As the youngest of seven children and the only male grandchild, he is the pride of his grandfather. However, there is one subject in which the boy fails miserably: English. When subjected to el difícil (the difficult one) the boy does not do well. He becomes tongue-tied and his hair stands on end. Not knowing what else to do, the grandfather finally sends him to the United States and enrolls him "in English quarters," a situation that will force him to learn el difícil. Then a prolonged silence sets in. Seven years pass without a word from the grandson. When at last a letter arrives, the grandfather learns that his grandson still does not speak English, while, as the boy writes, his Spanish is vanishing. By return of mail, the old man summons his grandson to come home. lest he end up dumb. The song ends with a dialogue between the lead singer (the grandchild) and the chorus (the grandfather), in which the former elaborates his argument, while the latter responds by repeating the same line: "Hurry up and move back before you end up dumb!" The singer sings:

I went to New York to learn English. Now I don't know Spanish. I understand everything the other way round.

A B C D E F G! Av! I don't know! It's all the same to me!

El difícil and I don't go together, even though they sell it with sweet talk [or – the phrase has a double meaning – "for it is stuffed with poison" (si es que es con bola)]. I'm going back to my native soil and to my Spanish language.

Ay, help me, dearest granddad. I will be so happy to return to my enchanting island.

I don't know if it is *brown* or if it is *marrón*. I am having problems with my Spanish.

What you want me to do? What I say is the truth! Suavecito [gently] ... Please! Don't push me too hard!

I just don't learn English! I'm forgetting my Spanish! Send me a ticket so that I can return immediately! English is for making progress, but if I forget my roots it will move me backwards. Granddad! Here I come!⁴

4. *El Nietecito*, which was written by Peter Velázquez, is on the CD *Entegra Inmediata* (Música Estival 045), by José Nogueras, produced in 1996 in San Juan: Música Estival inc., Ascap. The translation is mine.

This song is an excellent example of the ideology of language and identity as it flourishes in Puerto Rico. In it, the argument develops from how it is impossible for a Puerto Rican child to learn English in school, via the suggestion that the resistance to learning is, in fact, an expression of intelligence – the boy perceives a hidden danger in English (si es que es con bola) – to the conclusion that the price for learning English is simply too high. It is incompatible with one's Puerto Rican roots. The migrant situation – with its nightmare scenario of losing language and identity – is at the core of the argument. From the dialogue part, one concludes that the boy shows every sign of having turned into what islanders call a *Nuyorican*. However, the song does not limit the Puerto Rican identity problem to the context of the U.S. mainland. The last line, which links learning English to both progress and forgetting one's roots, shows that this subject matter is also relevant to the situation on the island.

Before turning to the issue of identity politics in Puerto Rico, I will provide some data which could form the basis for *El Nietecito II*, for it is clear that the song stops at a convenient moment, i.e. with the announcement of return and the suggestion of a happy ending. One is left with the expectation of an emotional reunion with the loving grandfather, and a quick recovery of language and identity. However, the life stories of Neoricans who have returned to Puerto Rican soil over the last three decades belie such a happy ending.

THE NEORICANS' EXPERIENCE OF RETURNING TO PUERTO RICO

The U.S.-raised generations who returned – most of them were in their teens – met with strong rejection on the part of the island population. This was not only because of their linguistic abilities. Other aspects of identity also played – and continue to play – a part in the rejection. Schools emerge from the Neorican accounts as the most hostile environment. For some it was a brief experience. They could not stand the rejection and immediately dropped out. An example of the situations informants encountered may help to explain why, in most cases, time has not mellowed the Neoricans' memories of their first day at a Puerto Rican public school. Ivette, who returned in 1981, when she was nearly fifteen, recalled:

My mother went with me. She explained to the principal ... he called in an English teacher, who said: "Let's find out how her Spanish is." Because I said I spoke Spanish. And my mother, too: "She speaks Spanish." Because at home we spoke Spanish. And with my father and my grandmother and my aunts I spoke Spanish. And I always understood everything. But when he [the teacher] showed me a history book in Spanish, I couldn't read it. I stared at the book, and then burst into tears. And my mother said: "But Ivette, you can read!" But I was unable to read Spanish ... They lowered me a grade because I didn't know Spanish. And all the classes were in Spanish! (Ivette:2-4, emphasis in original)

The rest of the day, as teachers talked on and on, Ivette beat her brains out searching for words with which to start a conversation with her classmates. Yet, she remained silent, "Because," she said, "what was I going to say to them? Rice? Beans? I'm going to bed? I'm hungry? Mami? Papi?" For the first time she realized that in the United States she and her friends – who all saw themselves as Hispanics – used to speak English among themselves. It also began to dawn on her that she was from a particular kind of family, one in which verbal communication (which at least was in Spanish) was limited to only a few phrases. That day she came home crying: "I told my mother I wanted to go back [to the United States]. That I would not go to school anymore."

During the next few weeks in school, Ivette learned that her clothes were considered indecent – and by extension, that she was, too – because she used to wear shorts and tight jerseys. A decade later, this was a common way for high-school students in Puerto Rico to dress, but at that time the girls at her school wore, according to Ivette, high-necked dresses with skirts well below the knee. Her classmates continued to refer to her as a *Nuyorican*, even though she kept telling them that she had not lived in New York. Things started to improve a little when she became friends with two Neorican girls from a different class. However, the distance between her and the islanders remained. "They would see us as problematic youth," Ivette said, "just because of the way we talked and laughed, and because of the way we liked to dress."

Ivette's story is not an exceptional one. From the life stories of return migrants, one can conclude that the most common way to welcome Neorican children was to lower them a grade and leave them to fend for themselves. In some cases, the teachers did not even introduce them to the rest of the class. In other cases, they introduced them as an "American" girl or boy. In the stories, the lack of consideration by teachers and classmates stands out. Some felt that the teachers sided with the class, or even encouraged the class to ostracize the newcomers. They also recalled that teachers were reluctant to intervene in conflicts. For example, when a ten-year-old boy complained about the constant jeering of "Yankee go home" behind his back, the teacher simply told him to ignore it.

Neorican males quickly became associated with drugs. In some cases, this perception was right. One of the reasons behind the return flow is drug use by teenage children. Another reason why Neoricans might be more inclined to engage in drug dealing in Puerto Rico is that they value economic independence from their parents much higher than their island peers do. Since there are no after-school jobs for students in Puerto Rico, the drugs sector is virtually the only way they can obtain money. But Neoricans who had nothing to do with the drugs business were also potentially suspect, because of their different style of dress. They would also walk up and down the street with their friends, which was seen as suspect behavior.

Their linguistic behavior also made the Neoricans suspect. "In the 1970s, the simple fact of speaking in English made someone suspect in the eyes of the police," one minister stated. His four children had returned to the United States, "because of prejudice." One daughter was in her last year of high school when the family moved to Puerto Rico. The principal of the local school was unrelenting in his decision to lower her a grade. This meant that she had to go to school for an extra year, which she refused to do. It was only some months after their arrival, and with the help of an influential church connection, that they found a school willing to give her a chance. Since the school was in San Juan, she too left home. But she graduated within three or four months, as her father recalled with satisfaction.

Beléndez Soltero (1994:290-91) summarizes how most islanders see Neoricans:

They use English as their principal medium of communication, and an "incorrect" or highly accented Spanish; they eliminate the formal you (thou, *usted*) because the formal you is not used in English, perceived by the non-migrant group as disrespect and undue familiarity on their part; they are more aggressive and they have different customs and rather alien adopted values.

For the difference in communication styles, see also Rodríguez Cortés (1987) and Lorenzo (1996). Obviously, the arrival of Neoricans in Puerto Rican schools stirred up an array of feelings about language and identity among Neoricans, island students, and teachers. Teachers who are themselves return migrants hold that the encounter with mainland-raised Puerto Ricans is traumatic for their island colleagues. One reason is that the latter often feel quite uncomfortable about English. This is partly for political reasons: Most teachers oppose the idea of statehood. Next to anti-American feelings, the teachers' limited skills in English also play a role. The Neoricans confront island teachers with the latters' often bad pronunciation of English. Moreover Neoricans have a different communication style. In general, they prefer open communication and saying things straight out – an unmistakable sign of being illbred in the eyes of many island Puerto Ricans.

THE IDENTITY POLITICS OF A RETURN MIGRANT GOVERNOR

The negative reaction of island teachers toward Neorican students also has to be seen in the light of the history of the language struggle in education, and

5. A man who returned in the 1960s recalled that during an English class, he told his teacher "in the most respectful manner I could think of" that it was not pint but paint. "Are you sure?" the teacher kept asking. He paid her the respect she was entitled to, by saying that he was almost sure of it.

the subsequent politicization of the language issue by the Puerto Rican political parties. To get an idea of the issues involved, it is helpful to start with a look at Luis Muñoz Marín's policies and views. The story of Puerto Rico's foremost twentieth-century politician (he staved in power from 1940 to 1964) can be told - but in Puerto Rico never is told - as that of an incredibly successful return migrant, who used the cultural and social capital he accumulated in the United States to create a position of near absolute power in Puerto Rico. Muñoz was fourteen when he moved to the United States, and. apart from an occasional visit, he only returned in 1932, at the age of thirtythree, married to an American. 6 As is the case with most Puerto Ricans who have lived in the United States for a long time, in particular during their teens and young adulthood, a complete adaptation to the island society cannot have been feasible for Muñoz. In many aspects, he identified with the United States. Elsewhere I have argued that Muñoz's migration experience strongly reflects upon Puerto Rico's 1952 commonwealth status, and on its postwar economic development model (Kerkhof 2000:56-68). Indeed, ELA, or commonwealth, may well be seen as the very embodiment of an ambiguous return migrant identity.

Though on an individual level Muñoz derived much of his cultural baggage and political style from his U.S. education, his party's policies had to fit the island situation. Under his leadership, along with the 1952 commonwealth status and the economic development model that tied Puerto Rico's economy firmly to the United States, a policy of cultural nationalism emerged. Various scholars have pointed out that the cultural politics issued by the PPD served to counter both the mounting pro-statehood forces and the PIP separatists (Dávila 1997; Gil 1992). They were probably also meant to reconcile the PPD's own leadership with commonwealth status.

The PPD-sponsored policy to affirm, promote, and protect a distinct Puerto Rican identity was based on an essentialist definition of culture as a property that could be retained or lost, rather than as a way of life and everyday culture (Dávila 1997:4-5, 43). But the speeches and memoirs show that Muñoz's own conception of culture was more complex. He did use a more anthropological definition of culture, termed as "attitudes, habits, values" (Muñoz Marín 1953:3). Muñoz's culture-as-daily-practice policies were channeled not through the official cultural institutions, like the Instituto Puertorriqueño de Cultura, but through Muñoz's political speeches and through the Department of Education.

Muñoz's main speech in this field, "La personalidad puertorriqueña en el Estado Libre Asociado" was delivered on December 29, 1953, at the General Assembly of the Teachers' Association of Puerto Rico. This speech has become known as the "Agapito's Bar" speech. In it, Muñoz tackled the theme

^{6.} In the late 1930s, when still married to Muna Lee, Muñoz fell in love with Inés Mendoza, a teacher, who later became his second wife.

how "the personality of the Puerto Rican people" should develop under the 1952 commonwealth status. In the speech, Muñoz expressed his appreciation for both U.S. and Puerto Rican culture - but not to the same degree, it appears. While the tone of identification with the United States stood out, the way Muñoz referred to Puerto Rican culture betrays criticism: That a culture chooses to abandon "inertia" and "to adopt positive values that it does not have of its own" is not a sign of "inferiority," nor does it "depersonalize," Muñoz (1953:6) pointed out. The speech also rejected some assumptions and conceptions that were central to the island's cultural elite debate on identity. For example, although he expressed it in an implicit way, Muñoz clearly rejected the opposition between the spirituality of Hispanic "culture" and the plain materialism of U.S. "civilization." In the speech, Muñoz also stressed the importance of learning English, while he criticized the mixing of English and Spanish, as in the sign "Agapito's Bar." After he had explained his view, Muñoz Marín tackled the teachers about their responsibility to instill what he saw as the right values in the Puerto Rican people.

Interpretation of the reception of this speech, whether by the audience of the time or by later audiences, is not easy. The general adoption of "Agapito's Bar" to refer to the speech may lie at the core of the issue. According to Muñoz, language was about the only aspect of Puerto Rican culture that should remain "pure" and unchanged. Some educators must have been struck dumb with regard to the re-education tasks imposed upon them. But given the alliance of the Teachers' Association of Puerto Rico with the PPD, it was difficult for them to react. Moreover, the language struggle had created anti-American feelings among the Puerto Rican educationalists that clashed with the views expressed in the speech. Some of the audience must have taken the governor's criticism of Puerto Rico's culture as an affront. Though many may have shared Muñoz's fears that the people's personality might be lost in "an inextricable burundanga9 (mess) of which you can't make head or tail," these

- 7. An anthology of the debate about culture and identity in the social sciences in Puerto Rico by Rivera Medina and Ramírez (1985) includes the speech, but Ramírez is brief about it. He uses it to emphasize that even Muñoz was concerned about the impact of sweeping social changes on the culture, language, and personality of Puerto Ricans. López Yustos (1992:148-49) points out that the speech was one of the most conceptual ones Muñoz Marin ever gave. The speech did not receive proper attention, he adds, because everybody focused on Muñoz's funny remarks about Agapito's bar.
- 8. The Teachers' Association of Puerto Rico was founded in 1911 with the aim of undoing the imposition of English as the vehicle of education (Osuna 1949; Benítez Nazario 1989). The final battle to restore Spanish was waged between 1946 and 1948. The victory was attributed to the PPD.
- 9. Note that, while advocating the avoidance of English loanwords, Muñoz Marin uses a word of African origin. In Puerto Rico, the African and Taino linguistic legacies are generally seen as enriching. In contrast, English loanwords are seen as endangering Puerto Rico Spanish.

fears may have deepened upon hearing his ideological stance and his directives for changing "the Puerto Rican personality" (Muñoz Marín 1953:3).

Another point is that the teachers must have felt irritated with the general situation in public education. In 1949, Spanish had officially become the language of instruction, a victory that was attributed to Muñoz and his PPD. But the shift in language policy did not show at the level of daily practice. Older people in Puerto Rico recall that it took "many, many years" to replace the English text books with Spanish ones, if they were actually replaced at all (see also Eliza Colón 1989:125-26). In the beginning, there was no policy at all with regard to teaching the Spanish language and Spanish literature. While after 1949 there continued to be instructions to teach and materials for teaching the daily English class, the directives with regard to the teaching of Spanish – as defined in the annual report of the school year 1951-52 – was "to orient the teachers toward the revision of the curriculum *on their own initiative.*" 10

The stories of people who went to school in the decades after 1949 indicate that teachers may have interpreted rather freely the suggestion that they should teach Spanish as they saw fit, and that often the teaching practice continued to be shaped by the view – a legacy of the previous five decades – of English and Spanish as *competing*. Some recall that their teachers made the class complicit in their disregard for the official policies that stipulated that the daily English class should be taught in English. Others remember the English class as an exercise in "subversion," during which the importance of Spanish was highlighted. In 1965, the general supervisor of the English section of the Department of Education stated that the negative attitudes toward English was the main problem faced by his department (Hull, quoted in Eliza Colón 1989:125). The feelings about the language policies concerning Spanish and English thus remained closely tied.

IMPACT OF LANGUAGE POLICY ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EDUCATION

Edith Algren de Gutiérrez (1987), who analyzed the language policy in public schools during the period 1898-1949, cogently argues that the movement for restoring Spanish as the language of instruction in public education, turned into a movement *against* the teaching of English in Puerto Rico's schools. The image of linguistically crippled individuals became associated with teaching in English. She also remarks that there is a class interest in

^{10.} Annual Report of the Commissioner of Education 1951-52 (San Juan, 1953) quoted in Eliza Colón (1989:127), her italics.

keeping English restricted. Algren de Gutiérrez's argument brings one of the paradoxes of the Spanish-based construction of Puerto Rican identity fully into the picture. The point is that in the post-1949 period, most parents who can afford it have sent their children to private schools where English was (and in some cases, still is) the language, or one of the languages, of instruction. This preoccupation with learning a different language than the mother tongue can be found also in other contexts where a particular language – often the (former) colonial language – gives access to jobs in the government administration, see, for example, Van den Bersselaar (1998). Yet, the class that sends its children to private schools also produces the leading characters of the contemporary Puerto Rican Spanish-only ideology. Before addressing some of the latter's ideas about language and identity, it is helpful to have a closer look at public and private education.

It is commonly held in Puerto Rico that the increase in private education was largely a reaction to the general deterioration of public education. Since the 1950s, several commissions – both Puerto Rican and foreign – have defined Puerto Rican public education as "in crisis." These commissions attributed the crisis to the rapid increase in school enrollment, coupled with a shortage of schools, materials, and qualified teachers, and the lack of a clear educational philosophy (for an overview see Eliza Colón 1989:43-92). Recent literature indicates the continued relevance of these factors (Benítez Nazario 1989; Lebrón de Oliva 1991; Solís 1994). While in 1940 less than 4 percent of all Puerto Rican children went to a private school, the figure in 1960 was over 10 percent, and from 1975 to the mid-1990s it was around 15 percent (Torruellas 1990; López Yustos 1992). A retired school inspector I interviewed in 1996 summarized the trend: "As public education deteriorated, people sent their children to private schools. It was because of the quality of education. It was not for reasons of prestige."

Strikingly, the rapid growth of private education ran parallel to the disappearance of English as the language of instruction in public schools. As Muntaner (1990:246) has pointed out, "It was not until Spanish was decreed the medium of instruction in the public school system that non-public schools began to sprout." Given the value many parents attached to English, it is

11. The growth of private education may also be seen in relation to the industrialization effort, which had attracted many non-Puerto Ricans, often on a temporary basis. Foreign couples as well as Puerto Ricans who had married a foreigner usually preferred to send their children to schools where English was used. This group might also see religion as a problem. Most private schools were Catholic. For example, when the bilingual school of the Inter-American University in San Germán closed its doors in the early 1970s, a parent group started a non-religious private school where English was – and still is – the language of instruction. The school, which is called Seso (Brain), is now one of the most prestigious in the region, the monthly fee is US\$ 200.

likely that the switch to Spanish as the language of instruction was itself seen as a deterioration of the quality of public schools. 12 The retired school inspector quoted above holds that parents believe it is crucial for their children to master the English language. His own daughters went to public school during the 1950s and 1960s. "Like the majority of public-school students." he recalled, "they graduated from high school without being able to read, write. or speak English," even though their public school had special programs for talented students. One day he caught his daughter, who was in the special program for English literature, with a book by Shakespeare translated into Spanish. "But in school we discuss it in Spanish," she said. When he reported the incident to his superior, the latter told him: "Hands off!" The professional maneuvering space for school inspectors was limited: "One could supervise the materials, but not the quality of the teachers, nor the way the classes were given." When asked whether he saw a solution to the problems of public education, he said: "I am pessimistic. I have seen so many innovations. In fact, it would require the de-politicization of Puerto Rico."

Most studies also relate the prolonged crisis in education to the political context. Under Muñoz the pro-American ideology of the public school curriculum remained unchanged, with the only difference that after 1949 the message was transmitted in Spanish (Benítez Nazario 1989; Eliza Colón 1989; Solís 1994). In the post-Muñoz decades, education became a battlefield of the rival political parties. Because of the constant changes, the effect of the various educational reforms that have taken place since the 1950s – if they were actually put into practice – can hardly be assessed (Eliza Colón 1989:43-92). What also stands out is the demoralizing effect of all the subsequent plans and policies on public-school teachers (Benítez Nazario 1989). With the structural crisis of public education, the rate of bilingualism declined in Puerto Rico. In 1970, about half the island's inhabitants were able to speak English (Education Board, quoted in Eliza Colón 1989:64). Despite an exponential increase in school enrollment, twenty-five years later the proportion of bilinguals had diminished to less than 20 percent.

Private schools have been much less subject to political influences. The Department of Education has traditionally avoided getting involved in language planning activities carried out by the private sector. Traditionally, most private schools used to be administered by religious congregations. The teachers used to be U.S. nuns and brothers. Today's teachers are mostly Spanish speaking, but private schools generally do offer some form of bilin-

12. The writer Ana Lydia Vega (1994:11) confirms such concerns. In 1952, her parents sent her to a Catholic elementary school run by Irish-American nuns. English was the language of instruction. The choice of school was not inspired by religious feelings – her father was decidedly anti-clerical – but by the conviction that she had to learn English well.

gual program, to attract upper-class students (Muntaner 1990:49-50). Some private schools train students specifically for further study at a U.S. university, where as many as 80 percent of their students end up. In other private schools, a much smaller percentage of students continue their education in the United States. These schools train students for a university education in Puerto Rico, for which more passive English skills (reading) are seen as sufficient, or as the maximum realistic proposition (Torruellas 1990). Although the quality of both public and private schools may vary, the overall score of private education is much better. Over 75 percent of all students admitted to the University of Puerto Rico between 1965 and 1986 came from private schools (Rivera McDowell quoted in Torruellas 1990:2).

POST-MUÑOZ POLITICS AND THE APPROPRIATION OF A PRECURSOR

Muñoz Marín's retreat from politics – he retired as governor in 1964, and as senator in 1970 – practically coincided with the first electoral victory of the PNP. A change in the political idiom accompanied the changing power balance. Culture and identity became the key concepts for marking the distinct positions of the rival political parties (Dávila 1997). ¹³ The change to a culture-focused political idiom does, of course, not mean that cultural issues were considered the most important ones, by either the politicians or the electorate. Economic issues, for example, have remained key themes in political discourse. An interesting question is how the now prevailing political idiom of culture and identity has become linked to such issues as economics, citizenship, and language.

Regarding language policy, the most striking development is the major shift of the PPD. In the post-Muñoz setting, the PPD has dropped the policy of promoting bilingualism and has committed itself instead to the defense of Spanish. The PPD's language policy reflects the need to distinguish itself from its rival, which has also assumed the cultural nationalist stance. The PNP promotes the concept of *jibaro* statehood, i.e. the idea that becoming a state of the United States would not affect Puerto Rico's language, culture, or identity. PNP politicians argue that the Spanish language is not on the table when it comes to negotiations with Congress about statehood. In view of the rhetorical consensus about Spanish, the position with respect to the status of English in Puerto Rico has become the marker of the respective PPD and PNP

13. Dávila shows how the cultural nationalism of the PPD led to an inward-oriented, folkloric view of culture. The party's political rivals became associated with a more open, universalist idea of culture. She remarks that the "two dominant parties ... have, at different times, deployed both similar and divergent views of culture to further their political interests." (Dávila 1997:253).

positions regarding language. While the PNP prefers to present Puerto Rico as a bilingual country – a position that would favor incorporation into the United States – the PPD policies seem to be inspired by the idea of keeping bilingualism restricted.

Since the 1970s, the PPD has adopted an increasingly nationalist and anti-American stance, moving away from the Muñocista legacy, Apparently, its political rival is willing to fill the gap. During the campaign for the November 1996 elections, it struck me that the PNP leaders presented Luis Muñoz Marín as a key precursor and example. This appropriation of a precursor goes beyond mere political rhetoric aimed at the lower-class segment of the electorate, which cherishes the memory of Muñoz. The dominant themes in the 1996 speeches of the pro-statehood Governor Pedro Rosselló resembled Muñoz Marín's speeches of the 1950s and 1960s (see Muñoz Marín 1992). Only such issues as migration and overpopulation were missing. All the other main themes were reviewed: The stressing of economic growth as a key goal. the importance of U.S. citizenship, the issue of having permanent ties with the United States, and the importance of a good education. The optimistic tone was similar too. The only difference was that the 1996 PNP politicians linked sound economic development and a future of progress to the option of full U.S. statehood, whereas Muñoz used to present this as the promise of the commonwealth status.

With the statehood advocates taking over the rhetoric of cultural nationalism as well as the Muñocista development discourse, and ending up tying dignity to both "jibaro statehood" and "decent income levels," the PPD has become cornered in the defense of language, culture, and identity. The PPD's narrow focus on "Puerto Rican culture and identity" enables the PNP to present itself as the actual heir of the Muñocista ideals. There is certainly something to say for it, because in retrospect, against the backdrop of the now prevailing political idiom of Puerto Rican culture and identity, Luis Muñoz Marín, and Luis Ferré (the founder of the PNP) look more like peers than adversaries. They shared, at least, a universalistic outlook, a definition of culture as a dynamic process of change, a preference for close ties with the United States, cherishing U.S. citizenship, and a view of bilingualism as both culturally enriching and an advantage in terms of economic competition.

THE HEROIC STRUGGLE OF A PEOPLE

The bills in favor of Spanish of the last decades have often been a joint venture of the PPD and the *independentistas* of the PIP (for an overview of the language legislation, see Delgado Cintrón 1993a,1993b, 1994). The PPD's Spanish-based identity politics culminated in the 1991 law that made Spanish the only official language of Puerto Rico. It abolished a 1902 regulation that did not say anything

explicit about official languages. The 1902 arrangement said that Spanish and English could "indistinctly be used" in government agencies. ¹⁴ From different sides it was argued that there were political motives behind what opponents labeled the "Spanish Only" law. ¹⁵ However, according to Governor Hernández Colón (PPD), the aim of the 1991 law was to affirm Puerto Rican identity: "With this law we declare our mother tongue to be the most precious sign of our identity" (Estrada Resto 1991).

In the very year that Spanish became Puerto Rico's only official language, the jury of the prestigious Spanish language and literature prize, the *Premio Príncipe de Asturias de Letras*, decided to award the prize to "the people of Puerto Rico" for their strong defense of Spanish. ¹⁶ In a solemn ceremony in October 1991, Crown Prince Felipe de Borbón handed over the prize to the Puerto Rican governor. By that time, the list of those seeking exemption from the requirement to conduct their affairs in Spanish included the Governor's Office, eleven of the sixteen departments, and a wide range of public corporations and agencies. ¹⁷ The PNP campaigned for the 1992 elections with the promise to abolish the "Spanish Only" law. Indeed, the first thing Governor Rosselló (PNP) did after taking office was to declare Spanish and English the two official languages of Puerto Rico.

During my fieldwork, the public debate and the mass demonstrations in support of, or in protest against, the respective language laws were still on the minds of most people. Views on the topic were expressed instantly. Most people from the lower-income groups immediately tied the language legislation to politics and education. Comments often took the form of criticism of the PIP separatists – criticism in which class identity resonated strongly. People would jeer: "Their children go to private schools, and then they go to the United States to study. They all speak English." It seems, then, that while the PPD has moved up in the nationalist direction, the PIP separatists serve as the scapegoats, carrying the blame for cultural policies which are perceived as harmful by PPD supporters.

- 14. Ley con respecto al idioma que ha de emplearse en los departementos, tribunales y oficinas del gobierno insular, February 21, 1902.
- 15. The law project developed simultaneously with preparations for a referendum (the first since 1967) on the future status of the island, which, after much delay, finally took place in 1993. One newspaper wrote that the PPD legislative majority had aimed "to drive a wedge between Puerto Rico and the United States at a time when the island was kneedeep in the plebiscite process" (Editorial, *San Juan Star*, January 6, 1993). For a detailed account of the 1991 law and the general mood in Puerto Rico at the time, see Morris 1995: 57-61.
- 16. Acta de concesión del Premio Príncipe de Asturias, Madrid, April 20, 1991, p. VII.
- 17. See Delgado Cintrón 1994:616-21.

Tropes of language are powerful. As metaphors, they mobilize people for political purposes, and as myths they provide both explanations and legitimations of policies. In Puerto Rico, the focus on the defense of Spanish provides nationalists of all kinds – from cultural nationalists to political separatists – with the image of a determined and victorious people. A people who, by sticking stubbornly to Spanish, have triumphed over the United States – the most powerful nation in the world.

With the 1992 law that established both Spanish and English as national languages, this image of a victorious people crumbled. The PIP and PPD opponents called the 1993 law "the bilingual law." Among people who oppose statehood, the term "bilingual" may have a negative connotation, because in this group one can find the idea that learning English as a second language is a political move toward statehood. Even researchers may see learning English as a political issue, which is clearly connected to "the past and present efforts of American and Puerto Rican leaders ... to make the Puerto Rican people bilingual." ¹⁸

In the 1996 election campaign, it was not the PIP, but the PPD which fomented the anti-English feelings. The PPD instills and exploits the fear that the Spanish language will disappear from Puerto Rico. For example, a 1996 campaign spot for the PPD showed a girl speaking who suddenly had her mouth taped with plasters. While addressing a lower-class audience, a local PPD candidate referred to this ad: "If you don't want to end up like that girl in the ad, vote for us." This example makes clear that the PPD policies designed to counter the pro-statehood forces evoke not only the heroic struggle of a people, but also the image of a people without language – the image of a dumb Puerto Rican.

CULTURAL ELITES AND MYTH-MAKING

As was argued above, intellectuals used to play a key role in the creation and elaboration of identity myths. In the Puerto Rican case, there are several factors restricting the creation of stories of group identity. Among the most important factors are: The different political ideals regarding U.S. citizenship and the ties with the United States, the fact that, in many aspects, Puerto Rico's material culture has become rather similar to that of the United States, and the migration dynamic. Against this background, island-based cultural elites have come to see the Spanish language as the most important base from

^{18.} Eliza Colón 1989:145-46. For her argument against compulsory teaching of English in Puerto Rican public schools, see pp. 111-46.

^{19.} Political campaign speech (PPD) by Fernando Bayrón Toro, in the neighborhood El Seco, Mayagüez, October 15, 1996.

which to fabricate identity stories. As a cultural marker, the Spanish language transcends political differences. The focus on Spanish enables the cultural elite to neglect other aspects of Puerto Rican identity. For instance, a point often neglected is that identity has an economic dimension. A focus on economic issues would confront the elites with the question how Puerto Rico's material culture reflects upon identity, and how, both in the island society and among Puerto Rican migrants in the United States, social mobility is closely connected to the mastery of the English language. The choice of Spanish as a marker of Puerto Rican identity also reflects a blindness to the linguistic consequences of a long-term mass migration that has acquired an increasingly circular character.

Both the Puerto Rican myth-making process and the political and cultural actors involved in it may be illustrated by having a look at the "Committee of the People in Defense of Spanish." As the photograph shown above reveals, the movement's leadership consists of PIP and PPD politicians and intellectuals heading cultural institutions. The movement's efforts to promote Spanish in all areas of Puerto Rican life are embedded in a cultural nationalism that builds on the tradition of the victorious language struggle in public education (See Delgado Cintrón 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1994; Castro Pereda 1993).

The political motives underlying the language struggle have been outlined above. In the following I address some of the ideas put forward by two intellectuals who belong to the movement's leadership. One of them is Carmelo Delgado Cintrón, a law specialist, who was also one of the instigators of the 1991 law that declared Spanish the only official language. In 1993 he became head of the Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña (ICP). The other is Rafael Castro Pereda, a journalist, who is author of a book on the idea of the centrality of language in the creation of a national identity.

From their writings, one concludes that these two see the 1949 victory of the Spanish language as a landmark on the long road toward defeating English. After the law that declared Spanish the official language was signed, Delgado Cintrón (1993a:51) wrote:

Although, with the law of April 5, 1991, which declares Spanish the only official language, we have won this new phase in the language struggle, *bilingualism*, which is a many-headed hydra, continues to exercise its reprehensible effect, for instance in the linguistic ghetto of the Federal Court.²⁰ The point is not to put down other languages, like the English language. The latter will continue to be present in the social life of the Puerto Ricans. What is at issue is the defense of our cultural heritage, of that which constitutes our cultural raison d'être.²¹

- 20. The Federal Court of Justice is, in effect, a U.S. court, where the language spoken is English.
- 21. The translation and italics are mine.

276 Erna Kerkhof

Delgado Cintrón, like many who defend Spanish, stresses the importance of learning English for any individual. But the hydra metaphor makes it clear that the actual struggle of *the people* is against the many-headed monster called "bilingualism." The example seems to reflect the views of a large part of the island's academics and students. According to observers, when in 1992 a conference on bilingualism was held at the University of Puerto Rico, the big surprise for the Puerto Rican student population was that all foreign speakers considered bilingualism to be something positive.²² In contrast, during the 1990s, among cultural elites in Puerto Rico, the meanings, causes, and effects of *bilingüismo* and *pseudo-bilingüismo* were hotly debated.²³

One of the key contributions to the Puerto Rican debate about bilingualism was Rafael Castro Pereda's book *Idioma*, historia, y nación. In one of the book's essays. Castro Pereda provides an interpretation of the available education statistics, which is interesting for the arguments presented here because given the close connection between cultural and political elites in Puerto Rico, the arguments that influential intellectuals put forward may well come to guide policy makers. The essay in question is entitled "Acabemos con el nulingüismo" (Let's stop the zero-lingualism). In it, Castro Pereda links the poor grades of Puerto Rican students in Spanish, English, and mathematics to the low scores on Spanish among Puerto Rican students (see also Eliza Colón 1989:69-70; Muntaner 1990). The argument is that teaching English over a period of twelve years (i.e. in primary and high school) does not leave enough time to teach Spanish properly. Castro Pereda links the assumption that the educational system neglects Spanish to the poor overall scores of Puerto Rican students, with the remark that without sufficient mastery of language, abstract thinking is not possible. Thus, a relation between the poor scores in Spanish, English, and mathematics is established and the cause defined: The result of teaching both languages is that Puerto Rican children are left without any language. They have become "zero-lingual." Along this line of thought, in order to become a "dumb Puerto Rican." one need not leave Puerto Rican soil at all.

The literature of the language struggle is saturated with comparable, and equally untenable ideas and conclusions. One can trace some of these to the pedagogical concerns voiced during the first half of the twentieth century. These arguments were quite valid when used for the situation they justly

- 22. Regarding bilingualism there is otherwise a marked difference between technicians and those who work in the humanities and social sciences. Technicians generally have no problem with the fact that English is the lingua franca of their academic discipline or their career in civil society.
- 23. See Duchesne Winter 1991; Castro Pereda 1993; Delgado Cintrón 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Díaz Quiñones 1993. See also the transcripts of the hearings about the language law projects in Delgado Cintrón 1993b and 1994.

sought to correct. Yet, when taken out of context and shaped to fit or to resist present political positions, arguments against teaching English as a second language are far from convincing.

It is possible that many Puerto Rican intellectuals reject the myth-making and mystification which form part of the language struggle. Yet, it is significant that some of them have found it necessary to make explicit their worries about the language policy with regard to teaching English.²⁴ The dilemma for Puerto Rico's cultural elites is clear: Given the traditional monolingualism of the United Sates, the fears of Puerto Rican intellectuals and political leaders that Spanish will be neglected under statehood are by no means unfounded.²⁵ However, the defense of Spanish in the given politicized context inevitably creates an impossible climate for teaching English. Even though intellectuals separate the defense of Spanish from the importance of learning English, Puerto Rican political leaders may explicitly link the two.

While some Puerto Rican cultural elites nurture identity myths for political reasons, the Puerto Rican case suggests that in a context of massive and circular migration, the reception of such myths by the different social groups is quite uneven. To make this final point, a brief return to the Neoricans and to public education in the mid-1990s, may help to show that, and why, public school teachers may be particularly receptive to the myth, while parents and students are much less receptive to it.

Public Education in the 1990s

Education was a key topic in the 1996 election campaign because an education reform, a project of the incumbent PNP administration, was in progress. The idea was to turn all schools into community schools in which the parents had a say (Solís 1994). However, not everyone welcomed the education reform. A spokesman for the Teachers' Association of Puerto Rico (which is officially associated with the PPD) told me that the association opposes "Rosselló's community school project," which "amounts to the privatization of public education." The association fears that the salaries of public-school teachers will fall to the level of teachers of private schools. In the community-setting, fringe benefits may be lost, too. Only headmasters of public

- 24. Vega (1994:18) for instance states: "As a teacher of French, I am profoundly worried by the educational policy with regard to English in our country" (my translation).
- 25. An example may help to make the point. In 1996, an informant who ran a bilingual children's library in Mayagüez (all volunteer work) visited the then recently opened new public library in San Francisco (California). It shocked her that there was only one small shelf of children's books written in Spanish.

schools receive a larger salary, as an incentive to turn their school into a community school.

From the way teachers were welcomed back to work at the start of the 1996-97 school year, one can conclude that the crisis in public education was still full-blown. "We're going back to school! Good luck! School year 1996-97." The picture under the headline of *Asoma* – the journal of the Teachers' Association of Puerto Rico – shows four laughing children in neat school uniforms. But the message of the association's president on the next page was in a somber spirit:

Happy return to the place of our mission and effort. Every day we are convinced that our profession is worthy of praise and recognition. The teacher faces challenges we can qualify as *mystical*. He (she) has to grasp the dilemma of these generations which grow up in a complete state of solitude. The children who attend our schools are from dysfunctional families. We are confronted with children without a father or mother, raised by grandparents or close relatives, lacking values and the love of school. Therefore, the teacher has to become a special and exemplary person, in whom the schoolchild may see an example to follow.²⁶

Perhaps the word "mystical" best captures how teachers are at a loss when it comes to the question how to do their work. Admittedly, the circumstances were – and still are – extremely difficult. Newspapers and studies define public schools as a no man's land, in which drug-dealing, armed violence, vandalism, and crime flourish.²⁷ The constant pressure of real and imagined dangers has created a climate of fear that favors scapegoating. Virtually everybody is looking for someone to blame. The president of the Teachers' Association (quoted above) blames problem families. Yet, though problem families are certainly over-represented in the one-parent family setting, most Puerto Rican families – whether nuclear or extended – do not fit his description. It is simply not true that all public-school children (i.e. more than 85 percent of all children in Puerto Rico) live in a dysfunctional family.

Most parents in the lower-income groups would laugh at the suggestion that teachers are the moral role model for their children. Among them, the opinion that teachers fail is widespread. Teachers arrive late, are ill, or have a workshop to attend. Since there are no substitute teachers, classes are suspended almost daily. If teachers do finally turn up, they fail to do their job, parents maintain. Then parents are expected to make up for all that lost time by teaching their children at home, they pointed out, referring to the amount of homework children have. A point that contributes to the criticism of teachers is that parents felt that their children are not safe at school. In a drugs-rid-

^{26.} José Eligio Vélez Torres in *Asoma*, August 1996. The translation and italics are my own.

^{27.} See, for example, El Nuevo Día, March 31, 1996.

den environment, one cannot leave children – who are ideal drug couriers – unsupervised in the schoolyard, as is customary in Puerto Rican public schools.

When confronted with the general low opinion of parents, one elementary-school teacher shrugged and said: "They're babysitting clubs, schools in Puerto Rico." She holds that parents have absolutely no esteem for teachers. Nor do they take the schedule seriously: They simply drop their children off at school and pick them up again when it suits them. Sometimes children do not show up for days, or even weeks, and some move to the United States. Other informants commented that many lower-class parents do not care about matters concerning school, and that this attitude sometimes rubs off on their children.

At the high-school level, the picture of structural crisis is similar. Strikingly, among high-school teachers the image of Neoricans has changed considerably. When asked in what way Neoricans are different, several teachers replied that they are better students. They said that Neoricans are more serious, disciplined, responsible, and interested than the average island-bred high-school student. Indeed, the only Puerto Rican teenager I ever caught doing homework was Helen, a cheerful, U.S.-bred fifteen-vear-old. One afternoon I dropped in and found her with a schoolbook open on her knees. She gestured at it and said: "At school they say I am a nerd – a nerdo like they say here. Nerdo! Isn't that ridiculous?" Then she added: "Okay, I am a nerd. That's because I don't want to end up like my mother." According to Helen, her mother had been on welfare for twenty-three years. "If you're on welfare for so long, you become lazy," Helen said. Since she argued a lot with her mother, Helen went to live with her grandmother in Puerto Rico. In school they did not lower her a grade. In comparison to other students of her age, she is ahead in nearly all subjects. In the United States she had studied Spanish as a second language. She speaks it properly, though now and then she cannot find the word she wants.

Helen has discovered that not speaking Spanish perfectly is not taken lightly in Puerto Rico. "Look at what happened to me today," she continued. "Something happened to me today, and I can't believe it really happened." That morning, the math teacher had been talking about *jinetes* (horsemen) and *caballos* (horses). Since the teacher pointed at the numerator and the denominator of the fraction, Helen could follow the class without a problem. Yet, it bothered her that she did not know the meaning of the word *jinete*. So she asked: "What is a *jinete*?" Her classmates reacted to this with howls of deri-

28. This contrasts sharply with an observation by Benítez Nazario (1989:7) – based on a report on drop-outs by the Department of Public Instruction – who in his study of elementary schools writes that "drop-outs cannot be counted anymore because school administrators are absent too often to maintain an up-to-date record of it."

sion. How could someone ask such a stupid question? Helen recalled that at first she was perplexed by their reaction. Then she countered:

Okay, all you boys! Now listen to me! If you think *that* was a stupid question, the next time the teacher asks how much twenty-five times one is and all of you keep silent, *I* will be the one who has a good laugh. For, to me, *it is really stupid* not to know an answer to such a simple question as that!

She concluded, with satisfaction: "Well, that silenced them."

Helen's story provides various new ways to interpret "the dumb Puerto Rican." She commented that the climate in school is not at all competitive, and the tests are so easy that a five-year-old could pass them. She had also noticed that if you speak English in Puerto Rico, people consider you a genius. To Helen, the English class at school is of no use. "In the United States, I was reading Shakespeare. Here it's all little-baby stuff." Another main difference from the United States is that in Puerto Rico, students have more responsibility, as Helen put it. She explained this by adding that the decision to attend classes or not is left to the students. Often hours are free, because teachers are ill or pregnant, or absent for other reasons. Another difference is that students go home for lunch, and many do not bother to return for the two afternoon classes.

Several other recently returned Neoricans told similar stories. One of them was a university student who had come to do a technical study in Puerto Rico. It struck him that during their first year in college, virtually all island-raised students enroll in an English course. "They could choose something more challenging," he commented dryly. Though he, too, noted that a person who speaks English well is considered a genius in Puerto Rico, he was unaware that for his peers, the biggest challenge may be to learn English.

From this picture of public education in the 1990s, two conclusions relevant to the argument presented here may be drawn. First, against this background, it is futile to discuss the influence of teaching English on the mastery of Spanish. Such factors as absenteeism, the lack of books and proper teaching methods, and the demoralized state of teachers, students, and parents, provide a far more plausible explanation for the poor test results of Puerto Rican children. The second conclusion is that public-school teachers may be expected to be particularly receptive to the language-identity myth, for the obvious reason that this myth explains and legitimates failure in a way that keeps the blame from the teachers' shoulders.

RECEPTION OF THE MYTH

The structural crisis of public education and the charged political climate provide a fertile breeding ground for myth-making. During my fieldwork, I

found on all levels of Puerto Rican public education the idea that learning English will badly affect one's ability to speak Spanish. Even some university teachers discouraged students from enrolling in an English course, by warning them of the negative effect it would have on their Spanish. Underlying the assumption that learning English will destroy one's capacity to speak one's mother tongue is the objectified conception of "national culture" as a property that can be lost. Commonly held views among teachers are that it is impossible to learn English as a second language in a Spanish-speaking environment, and that children can learn English only if it is used as the language of instruction in school. Pseudo-scientific theories are popular, too. One teacher said: "Puerto Ricans have a genetic inclination to reject English."

The statement concerning the genetic disposition of the Puerto Rican people shows that efforts by teachers to explain why Puerto Rican students fail to learn English may further contribute to the language-identity myth. The teachers are, admittedly, in a difficult position. Whether teaching history, Spanish, geography, or English, teachers have to come to terms with the way they themselves were educated during the Muñocista era. They also have to take a stance with regard to the views expressed in the materials they currently use, and to defend their way of teaching vis-à-vis the students' parents, who may have different political leanings.

It is hard to estimate the position of teachers who are themselves return migrants. Some appear to be frustrated and spiteful about their experiences with bilingual education in the United States. This perspective may strengthen convictions that learning a second language is not possible. In contrast, others were not at all receptive to the idea that exposing Puerto Rican children to a daily English class is a form of psychological torture. A colleague of the teacher who coined the "genetic disposition" theory is a math teacher who worked in the United States for more than a decade. He remarked that teaching children from a wide range of cultural and linguistic backgrounds had been one of the most beautiful experiences he had ever had. When the topic "teaching English" was brought up, he immediately interrupted with the statement: "I bet the rest of my life's salary that if I get six-year-olds and they give me a free hand with them, they will leave high school fully bilingual." He then added, with a shrug, that he is not qualified to teach English.

Puerto Rico's university teachers of English, who face the task of giving a remedial course which has to make up for many lost years, are also outspoken. When referring to the responsibility of the Puerto Rican state with regard to public instruction, one of them said: "It's a *crime* not to teach Puerto Rican children English." It often deprives them of a college education. "Of the large majority that never make it to that level," she added, "many will end up in the United States."

In general, the views of parents – both islanders and return migrants – contrast sharply with the mythical and mystical ways in which some of their com-

282 Erna Kerkhof

patriots from the teaching profession voice the problem of teaching children English as a second language. People from the lower social strata angrily compare public education with the education they themselves received, with private education, or with public schools in the United States. Return migrants are more outspoken about education than those who have never left Puerto Rico. When asked about the differences between the United States and Puerto Rico, virtually all female returnees with school-going children said that public education was much better in the United States. The migration experience may also shape the feelings about the education they themselves received in Puerto Rico. When asked what it was like to be instructed in English at school, one woman said: "I will tell you one thing. *You learn it.*"

Since return migrants desperately want their children to learn English, they are hardly susceptible to the myth which connects language acquisition to identity loss. But they do believe that one should learn English as a child. The general belief is that adults are incapable of acquiring a second language. Another widespread perception is that the best, or only, way to learn English is to make it the vehicle of instruction. Several parents referred to bilingual education in the United States. They "took their children out of bilingual" because they had failed to learn English, they said. Evidently, return migrants think that children only learn English when it is used as the language of instruction also in the Puerto Rican context. In fact, many island-bred parents share this view. One reason for this is that in the 1930s and 1940s, when English was still the vehicle of instruction, Puerto Rican public schools did produce high-school graduates who mastered English. An additional point among lower-class people is the comparison with the situation (real or imagined) in private education. When asked to name the best private schools in the area, people stressed those that teach in English. In their eyes, it marked the quality of education.

Although both return migrants and island-bred lower-class parents seem to be less susceptible to the myth than teachers, there are some points complicating the people's views about the way language and identity are related. A key point is that people know that language skills can be lost. Islanders see that the U.S.-bred children of relatives and neighbors often speak a highly deficient form of Spanish. This may confirm existing fears on the part of the island population that in Puerto Rico, too, the Spanish mother tongue may easily be lost. In contrast, return migrants see their children, who arrive in Puerto Rico as English speakers, quickly become Spanish monolinguals. Since children are rigidly conformist, even Neoricans who had arrived when they were twelve or thirteen had "lost" their English. However, the return migrants blamed this on the deficient education. "Here they teach only a few words, but not English as a language," they said. Or: "They teach it because they have to. But they put no effort into it." All in all, return migrants are less susceptible to the myth than islanders.

Return migrants from the professional middle class, whose children go to private schools, are not that susceptible to the myth either. Though the majority of the upper-class people vote for the pro-statehood party, for this group the issue whether or not children should learn English is not really a political one. At this class level, it is simply beyond question that one should learn English. It is seen as an indispensable part of one's general education. Often the expectation is that their children will go to a U.S. university. In general, upper-class people consider the access to the non-Hispanic world, which English gave them, as enriching. Even so, as a consequence of the ideological climate in Puerto Rico, some upper-class Puerto Ricans may feel uneasy in situations where they have to speak English. Otherwise, among the upper-class parent group, the criticism of Puerto Rican public education stood out, too. "In the United States one can send one's children to public school," they said. "Here we have to pay a lot of taxes and we get nothing in return. On top of the tax-load, we have to pay private school fees."

Interestingly, even parents who support the PIP (generally upper-class people) may send their children to schools where English is used as the language of instruction. The argument I heard in one such case (a local PIP leader) was twofold: The school in question was the only one in the region with a non-religious educational philosophy, and that in a globalizing world, it is important to learn English.

Conclusion

As the Puerto Rican case shows, a context of continued constitutional ties, globalization, and circular mass migration reduces the appeal of language-based identity myths. While the language struggle has historical roots in public education, over the course of the twentieth century, the backdrop has changed rapidly. The native language of most people in Puerto Rico is Spanish, but many Puerto Rican migrants in the United States use English as their first language. In the meantime, English has become a crucial language in Puerto Rico, too. In this context, policies to restrict the teaching of English are bound to meet with protest on the part of the population. This resistance started in the upper classes during the 1940s, and has now spread to the lower social classes.

The segregation of the upper and lower classes into private and public education, respectively, set in when English began to disappear as the medium of instruction in public schools, first in the lower grades, and then at high-school level. The final step, the 1949 official shift to Spanish, took place under Muñoz. The identification of the Spanish language with Puerto Rican identity was a key part of the policy of cultural nationalism the PPD promoted. It is likely that, having spent most of his formative years in the United

States, the Spanish language was actually one of the few traits of Puerto Rican culture that Muñoz himself could wholly identify with. Strikingly, the pro-American ideology in public schools remained unchanged during Muñoz's leadership. In the post-Muñoz decades both the PPD and its rival, the PNP, have moved up in the cultural nationalist direction. The PPD developed a narrow focus on the Spanish language, while dropping its earlier policy of promoting bilingualism. In the PPD and PIP political rhetoric, bilingualism became associated with the statehood advocates, and with losing one's "Puerto Rican identity." In contrast, speaking Spanish became a symbol of the heroic struggle of a people against "Americanization."

In this charged political context, Neorican children and adolescents started to arrive, in ever larger numbers. Upon arrival many of the lower-class returnees spoke a code-switching mixture of English and Spanish. This must have confirmed the fears of, in particular, the island teachers, who seem to be rather susceptible to the language-identity myth, that in Puerto Rico, too, the Spanish mother tongue may easily be lost. Moreover, since the Neoricans resented the derogative term "Spanglish" with which islanders brand their speech, they defined themselves as "bilinguals."

Although one can find some uneasiness about the language question among the common people in Puerto Rico, the irony of the effect of the post-1949 politicization of the language struggle is inescapable. Fifty years after Spanish was restored as the language of instruction in public education, some children of the higher social strata still receive their entire education in English. The prestige that English-language private schools have constitutes one reason why such an education is seen as attractive also by the lower classes. The migration experience plays a key role in the parents' desire for their children to learn English. But today, even lower-class parents who have never left Puerto Rico see English as the most important measure of a good education.

The myth that learning English affects one's "Puerto Rican identity" is one of the effects of the local politicization of the language issue. It also reflects the refusal on the part of some of Puerto Rico's cultural and political elites to face the realities of circular migration. Obviously, the anti-English ideology is harmful for the Puerto Ricans, who, because of the prolonged mass migration, have become a linguistically divided people. Puerto Rican fiction is already split into a Spanish and an English part, and the two are isolated from each other. But it is particularly when one realizes that the linguistic division cuts across virtually every Puerto Rican family, that the question arises what some of today's political and cultural elites in Puerto Rico are doing to the Puerto Rican people, by stressing and reinforcing language as boundary of identity. Monolingualism adds to the friction within migrant families, in particular in the lower social classes, where families serve as a migration channel.

Perhaps the most striking point is the overwhelming pragmatism of the population, in contrast to the ideological fervor one finds among some politicians and intellectuals. Most lower-class people are not susceptible to the myth-making. They are also quite aware that the deterioration of public education, and the consequent rise of private education, has greatly reinforced class boundaries. The private schools serve as a constant reminder that Puerto Rican children are perfectly capable of learning English without losing their Spanish. Moreover, in comparison with public education in the U.S. mainland, Puerto Rican public schools score poorly, according to return migrants. In sum, the migration dynamic seems to lead to a growing tension between the politically inspired views on education on the part of some of the local elites, and the more practice-oriented views of a highly mobile population that is increasingly focussed on life on the U.S. mainland.

Obviously, the massive circular migration calls for a different approach to constructions of identity, ethnicity, and national identity. For example, the now prevailing language-based identity construction in Puerto Rico contributes to the stereotyping of Neoricans as non-Puerto Ricans. But of course, stereotyping is often mutual. The stories of recently returned Neorican teenagers suggest that the low quality of public education is one of the factors underlying the Neorican view of island Puerto Ricans as immature, inert, and dumb.

Most Puerto Rican studies about language policies and education are written from the viewpoint of continued colonialism, and this is also the position of the intellectuals who are active in the language movement. It is a framework that does not make an analysis of the language question any easier. As Salman Rushdie (1991:64) has pointed out, it is not always necessary to take up the anti-colonial or post-colonial cudgels against English. The English language ceased to be the possession solely of the English some time ago, he observes. By now, English is the world language because of "linguistic neo-colonialism, or just plain pragmatism on the part of many of the world's governments and educationists, according to your point of view."

The crucial emotional point is that, in the Puerto Rican case, the colonial language has become a kind of "inner boundary" of Puerto Rican identity. The challenge for the twenty-first century is obvious: To make the "dumb" Puerto Rican speak again, in both Spanish and English. Given the complexities and sensitivities of the historical and the contemporary political context, this will be a hard job. A crucial step with regard to teaching English as a second language in Puerto Rico, is that island Puerto Ricans must accept and appropriate English as a language that, in terms of native speakers, has become one of the two Puerto Rican languages.

REFERENCES

ALGREN DE GUTIÉRREZ, EDITH, 1987. The Movement against Teaching English in Schools of Puerto Rico. Lanham MD: University Press of America.

ANDERSON, ROBERT W., 1988. Political Parties and the Politics of Status. *Caribbean Studies* 21 (1/2):1-43.

BARRETO, AMÍLCAR ANTONIO, 1995. Nationalism, Linguistic Security, and Language Legislation in Quebec and Puerto Rico. Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York.

—, 1998. Language, Elites, and the State: Nationalism in Puerto Rico and Quebec. Westport CT: Praeger.

BAUMANN, GERD, 1999. The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic, and Religious Identities. New York: Routledge.

BELÉNDEZ SOLTERO, PILAR, 1994. Issues in Educating the Return Migrant in Puerto Rico. *In* Carlos Antonio Torre, Hugo Rodríguez Vecchini & William Burgos (eds.), *The Commuter Nation: Perspectives on Puerto Rican Migration*. Río Piedras: Ed. de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, pp. 289-310.

BENÍTEZ NAZARIO, JORGE ALBERTO, 1989. Teachers and Politics: A Case Study on Compliance and Resistance. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

BERSSELAAR, DMITRI VAN DEN, 1998. In Search of Igbo Identity: Language, Culture and Politics in Nigeria, 1900-1966. Ph.D Dissertation, Leiden University.

CASTRO PEREDA, RAFAEL, 1993. Idioma, historia y nación: Ensayos de Rafael Castro Pereda y documentos históricos sobre la Ley del Idioma. Puerto Rico: Ed. Talleres.

DAVIDSON, BASIL, 1992. The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State. New York: Times Books.

DÁVILA, ARLENE M., 1997. Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

DELGADO CINTRÓN, CARMELO, 1993a. Del verbo se trata: Idioma nacional y periodismo en Rafael Castro Pereda. In Rafael Castro Pereda, Idioma, historia y nación: Ensayos de Rafael Castro Pereda y documentos históricos sobre la Ley del Idioma. Puerto Rico: Ed. Talleres, pp. 9-55.

- —,1993b. História de las luchas por el español in Puerto Rico: Estudio introductorio al debate legislativo sobre las leyes del idioma de 1991 y 1993. *In* Carmelo Delgado Cintrón (ed.), El debate legislativo sobre las leyes del idioma en Puerto Rico. *Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico* 54 (3/4), pp. 5-44.
- —, (ed.), 1993c. El debate legislativo sobre las leyes del idioma en Puerto Rico. Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico 54 (3/4).
- —, (ed.), 1994. El debate legislativo sobre las leyes del idioma en Puerto Rico. *Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico* 55 (1).

DIAZ QUIÑONES, ARCADIO, 1993. Cultura, emigración, asimilación? *In* Arcadio Díaz Ouiñones. *La memoria rota*. Río Piedras: Huracán. pp. 95-98.

DUCHESNE WINTER, JUAN, 1991. Retórica de la memoria: Arcadio Díaz Quiñones y el idioma. Claridad. June 21.

ELIZA COLÓN, SYLVIA MARIA, 1989. Colonialism and Education in Puerto Rico: Appraisal of the Public Schools during the Commonwealth Period – 1952 to 1986. Ph.D. Dissertation. Washington University.

ESTRADA RESTO, NILKA, 1991. De gala el idioma español. El Nuevo Día, April 6, p. 4.

GARCÍA BLANCO, ANA MARIA & JOSÉ JAVIER COLÓN MORERA, 1993. A Community-Based Approach to Educational Reform in Puerto Rico. *In* Edwin Meléndez & Edgardo Meléndez (eds.), *Colonial Dilemma*: *Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Puerto Rico* Boston MA: South End Press, pp. 157-69.

GIL, CARLOS, 1992. Subjetividad nacional y dispositivo cultural de estado: La legislación cultural puertorriqueña. *In* Carmen I. Rafucci, Silvia Alvarez Curbelo & Fernando Picó (eds.), *Senado de Puerto Rico*, 1917-1992: Ensayos de historia institucional. Río Piedras: Huracán, pp. 373-404.

HANDLER, RICHARD, 1984. On Sociocultural Discontinuity: Nationalism and Cultural Objectification in Quebec. *Current Anthropology* 25:55-64.

—, 1988. Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

HOBSBAWM, ERIC J., 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ISTENDAEL, GEERT VAN, 1993. Het Belgisch labyrint: Wakker worden in een ander land. Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers. [Orig. 1989.]

KERKHOF, ERNA, 2000. Contested Belonging: Circular Migration and Puerto Rican Identity. Ph.D. Dissertation, Utrecht University.

LEBRÓN DE OLIVA, CARMEN, 1991. Retos y problemas en la educación en Puerto Rico en la década 1990-2000. San Germán: Centro de investigaciones del Caribe y América Latina, Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico.

LÓPEZ YUSTOS, ALFONSO, 1992. Historia documental de la educación en Puerto Rico 1503-1970. San Juan: Publicaciones Puertorriqueñas. [Orig. 1984.]

LORENZO, JOSÉ, 1996. Nuyoricans in Puerto Rico: A Study of Social Categorization. Ph.D. Dissertation, City University of New York.

MORRIS, NANCY, 1995. Puerto Rico: Culture, Politics and Identity. Westport CT: Praeger.

Muñoz Marín, Luis, 1953. La personalidad puertorriqueña en el Estado Libre Asociado. Speech delivered at the Asamblea General de la Asociación de Maestros, December 29.

—, 1992. *Memorias*. San Germán: Centro de Publicaciones de la Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico.

MUNTANER, ADA, 1990. The Language Question in Puerto Rico: 1898-1988. Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York.

NAVARRO, MIREYA, 2000. Puerto Rican Presence Wanes in New York. *New York Times*, February 28.

OSUNA, JUAN JOSÉ 1949. A History of Education in Puerto Rico. Río Piedras: Ed. de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. [Orig. 1923.]

RIVERA MEDINA, EDUARDO & RAFAEL L. RAMÍREZ (eds.), 1985. Del cañaveral a la fábrica: Cambio social in Puerto Rico. Río Piedras: Ed. Huracán.

RODRÍGUEZ CORTÉS, CARMEN, 1987. Social Practices of Ethnic Identity among Puerto Rican Students. Ph.D. Dissertation, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.

RUSHDIE, SALMAN, 1991. "Commonwealth Literature" Does Not Exist. *In* Salman Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991*. London: Granta, pp. 61-70.

SOLÍS, JOSÉ, 1994. Public School Reform in Puerto Rico: Sustaining Colonial Models of Development. Westport CT: Greenwood Press.

SOYINKA, WOLE, 1988. Language as Boundary. In Wole Soyinka, Art, Dialogue, and Outrage: Essays on Literature and Culture. Ibadan: New Horn Press, pp. 82-94.

TAYLOR, CHARLES, 1994. The Politics of Recognition. In Charles Taylor & Amy Gutmann (eds.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 25-74.

TORRUELLAS, ROSA M., 1990. Learning English in Three Private Schools in Puerto Rico: Issues of Class, Identity and Ideology. Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University.

VEGA, ANA LYDIA, 1994. Pulseando con el difícil. In Ana Lydia Vega, Esperando a Loló y otros delirios generacionales. San Juan: Ed. de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, pp. 11-20.

VÉLEZ TORRES, JOSÉ ELIGIO, 1996. Mensaje del Presidente. Asoma, 23 (79).

ERNA KERKHOF J.B. Bakemakade 104 3071 ME Rotterdam The Netherlands <erna.kerkhof@planet.nl>

WILLIAM O. WALKER III

SECURITY, INSECURITY, AND THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN

Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba. Peter Kornbluh (ed.). New York: The New Press, 1998. viii + 339 pp. (Paper US\$ 17.95)

Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda. JON ELLISTON (ed.). Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1999. 320 pp. (Paper US\$ 21.95)

Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. James G. Blight & David A. Welch (eds.), London: Frank Cass, 1998, x + 234 pp. (Cloth US\$ 47.50)

Live by the Sword: The Secret War Against Castro and the Death of JFK. Gus Russo. Baltimore MD: Bancroft Press, 1998. xvi + 619 pp. (Cloth US\$ 26.95)

From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment. MICHAEL C. DESCH, JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ & ANDRÉS SERBIN (eds.). Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. viii + 161 pp. (Paper US\$ 19.95)

Cuba, the Caribbean, and the United States have been frequently and intimately linked for more than a century. Because of the status of the United States as a global power, viewing their common histories from the vantage point of the United States is understandable. Such a perspective consigns the Caribbean, and to a lesser extent Cuba, to the role of passive actors in the making of much of their own histories. Several recent publications, though written for very different purposes, permit us to ask whether Cuba and the Caribbean have not been more active participants in their recent histories than U.S. predominance in the region would seem to allow.

290

Four of the books under review here deal with the United States and Cuba mostly in the early years of the era of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution. Bay of Pigs Declassified and Psywar on Cuba present selected declassified documents that broaden what is already known about how the United States sought to compromise Castro's stature among the people of Cuba and, indeed, tried time and again to remove him from power by means ranging from ridicule to assassination. Those efforts, the author of Live by the Sword contends, moved Lee Harvey Oswald to take the life of President John F. Kennedy. The Blight and Welch book on intelligence and the Cuban missile crisis makes an important contribution to the literature on the missile crisis.

Peter Kornbluh's Bay of Pigs Declassified makes accessible two internal Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents that were written shortly after the fact in order to evaluate the Agency's role in the failure at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. The first document, a report on the Bay of Pigs by Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick, offers a stinging critique of how the Agency planned and implemented the operation. Completed in October 1961, the report asserts that the fundamental problem with Operation Zapata was that it evolved from a covert, relatively small operation into a larger and, hence, unwieldy military exercise. Knowledge about the operation could not be confined either to a limited number of people within the Agency or to its participants in south Florida and beyond. Kirkpatrick laments, "The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial, it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability" (p. 99). Means were therefore not commensurate with changing ends. The Agency, he further charges, "failed to keep the national policy-makers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success" (p. 99).

In Kornbluh's second important document, Deputy Director for Plans Richard M. Bissell, Jr. responds in January 1962 that Kirkpatrick's analysis "gives a black picture of the Agency's role" in the ill-fated operation (p. 133). Fearing the consequences of the Inspector General's report for the future of clandestine activities, Bissell blames the failure in Cuba not on the CIA, but on the contradictory goals of the Kennedy administration. The dilemma was how to overthrow, if not eliminate Castro without impairing "the political and moral posture of the United States before the world at large" (p. 141).

Bissell, who along with other key Agency personnel was a holdover from the 1950s, charged the Kennedy White House with conducting an operation "without having also made the decision to use whatever force is needed to achieve success" (pp. 145-46). Why, he wondered, was the operation not called off if the president entertained doubts about the prospects for success? Bissell's criticism of the White House reflected much more than a bureaucratic struggle, though it did that as well. Bissell recognized that covert operations could have world-shaking consequences whatever their outcome. It

was therefore important to ask who held ultimate responsibility for failure. What would failure mean for the CIA's role as something more than an intelligence-gathering entity?

Kennedy aide Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has long held the Agency responsible for failing to apprise Kennedy that a catastrophe was at hand in April 1961. Jacob Esterline, chief of the Cuba Task Force which ran the operation, admitted that the president needed more time to study the plan before implementing it. Why he did not have enough time apparently was Bissell's fault. "I put that [idea] forward to Bissell in writing and I got nowhere," Esterline told Kornbluh in October 1996 (p. 261). At the end of the interview Esterline seemed to contradict himself: Operation Zapata "failed, I guess, primarily because starting at the top of government nobody wanted to do it so badly that they were prepared to take the steps to ensure success" (p. 266). Failure ultimately would therefore rest with Kennedy, not with Dulles, Bissell, and their compatriots at the Agency.

We know that the operation had been compromised in many ways by planners and participants, as a Cuban state historian, Juan Carlos Rodríguez, recalls (1999). In a volatile environment in which control of information was critical, propaganda played an exceptionally important role. How important it was to Washington's ideological conflict with Castro's Cuba is the subject of Jon Elliston's *Psywar on Cuba*, published by Ocean Press, a publisher sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution. Elliston's collection of documents makes for interesting reading. One key document is illustrative of the Schlesinger-CIA dispute. Schlesinger observed on the eve of the invasion of Cuba that "nothing should be done to jeopardize" Kennedy's "character and repute," that when "lies must be told, they should be told by subordinate officials" (p. 42). Presumably, the CIA would form part of this protective umbrella. If that was the case, Bissell's defense of the Agency becomes more explicable. The U.S. government was not just engaged in a war with Cuba; it was at odds with itself.

Psywar on Cuba has limited utility for readers who might want to examine the selections in greater detail. Elliston tried "to track down every publicly available document on anti-Castro propaganda operations" (p. 4), but this collection would have been more useful if he had provided sources for its fifty-two documents, which range from the late 1950s through the mid-1990s. Despite this, the book is sometimes riveting, particularly when it evokes the obsession of the United States with Fidel Castro and Cuba. "The purpose of the program outlined herein," intones one document, "is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention" (p. 16). Who did the CIA and the White House think should receive credit if Castro were to fall from power? Even more important, who should take the blame if an anti-Castro operation

failed? If the answer, particularly to the latter question, pointed to the exile community located primarily in Miami and New Orleans in the early 1960s, the cynicism inherent in superpower politics is exposed. Neither the documents nor the annotations adequately address the question of blame. Nor does Elliston really explain the reduction in virulence of U.S. psychological warfare that came about after the mid-1960s.

Washington's psychological warfare against Cuba may have had an unexpected consequence at a crucial time in world history, October 1962. Whether consciously or not, propaganda plays a significant role in creating perceptions between and among adversaries. In times of crisis, information, in the form of intelligence, can mean the difference between life and death. James Blight and David Welch's Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis examines the strengths and weaknesses of intelligence collection and its usage by U.S., Soviet, and Cuban analysts during the crisis. One contributor to the volume, Beth A. Fischer, finds that all intelligence systems are susceptible to error: mistakes "may well have been rooted in perfectly normal decision-making processes" (p. 166). It is the "needs and motives" of officials that lead to errors of perception and policy. For the United States, the need to employ propaganda against Castro in the early 1960s led "political leaders ... more ... than professional intelligence analysts to commit motivated errors" (p. 167). Thus, it is possible that the U.S. intelligence community operated effectively in the fall of 1962, even as the world neared the nuclear precipice.

But did intelligence-gathering result in sound policy? The Soviet system was inherently limited because of its marginal participation in the policy process. The chapter by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali concludes that Soviet analysts were predisposed to do no more than convey information, because "Nikita Khrushchev was his own intelligence analyst" (p. 65). Domingo Amuchastegui contends that "Cuban intelligence was for the most part able to collect the information necessary to help Cuban leaders make sound political decisions" at the time of the missile crisis (p. 89). How well that information was used is another question altogether. Castro's own perceptions of U.S. objectives and Soviet interests emerge as key factors in that regard. Cuban analysts, in the eighteen months following the Bay of Pigs, doubted that a second invasion would occur. Their Soviet counterparts, however, concluded otherwise "so as to increase the likelihood that Castro would agree to a nuclear deployment whose primary purpose was to challenge American nuclear supremacy, not to deter an American invasion of Cuba" (p. 109). Raymond L. Garthoff argues that, in the case of the United States, "full intelligence information [about the presence of nuclear weapons in Cubal could have made resolution of the crisis much more difficult" (p. 53). Kennedy might not have had sufficient time to make life-and-death decisions. In other words, intelligence – the collection and analysis of which is always

less than ideal – is only as good as the motivations of the officials who put it to use. How well intelligence serves policy is accordingly difficult to judge.

Like propaganda, intelligence collection and dissemination is never free from political pressures. The intensity of the early efforts to displace Castro, which made intelligence and its usage indistinguishable from propaganda, makes Russo's book, *Live by the Sword*, impossible to put down. The statutory activities of the CIA served the interests of John and Robert Kennedy by getting the Agency to participate in the crusade against Fidel Castro. Accordingly, the Agency could not refuse to go after Castro when Robert Kennedy's desire to vanquish the threat posed by Castro to U.S. interests became an Ahab-like obsession. The tragic result, Russo deduces, was that Lee Harvey Oswald beat the Kennedys and the CIA at their own game. In November 1963 he dramatically eliminated the greatest thorn in the side of the Cuban Revolution.

Whether Oswald did so at the behest of the Cuban government is another question, one that available sources may never be able to answer with certainty. Russo believes that Castro would have found it difficult to discourage an effort to kill the U.S. president. The Cuban leader's fingerprints would have been far enough removed from the act so as to give him plausible deniability, precisely what Schlesinger and others had sought for Kennedy during the Bay of Pigs.

It is clear that Russo wants somehow to hold Castro culpable for Oswald's action. He argues at one point that if, as suspected, Castro knew as early as October 1963 about Oswald's intentions, he "allowed Oswald to proceed without warning U.S. authorities" (p. 224). Given what Castro had endured at the hands of the United States for four years, one wonders what the inducement to sound the alarm would have been. In failing to address that question, Russo partly vitiates the value of his meticulous investigation and judicious conclusions. For Russo, not only is Castro a villain for not wanting to prevent the assassination, so, too, is the CIA suspect for trying to downplay the degree to which it got caught up, however unwillingly, in the Kennedy brothers' obsession with Cuba. It seems fair to ask Schlesinger and other defenders of the Kennedy legacy what choice the CIA had other than to follow the wishes of the president and attorney general.

The U.S. focus on Castro and Cuba as a potential security threat in the Americas continued in a less intense form as a propaganda battle for decades following the death of Kennedy and the 1964 order by Johnson to end the attempts on Castro's life. One of the objectives of that endeavor was to prevent the rise elsewhere of Castro-like or Castro-influenced challenges to U.S. dominance. *From Pirates to Drug Lords* provides a brief, though insightful analysis of some of the security-related issues in the Caribbean since the end of the cold war.

Jorge I. Domínguez observes that the "most common sources of insecurity in the Caribbean affect the quotidian experiences of ordinary people" (p. 2). That is true whether the issue at hand is environmental health, the value and volume of trade, the political capacity of Caribbean leaders, or the role of the region in global activities such as drug trafficking. James N. Rosenau, admittedly not an expert on the region, asserts that despite being composed of ostensibly small, weak states, the Caribbean has not easily or entirely fallen prey to outside influences because they cannot "erase the grip that culture and habit have over its peoples" (p. 13). As true as that observation may be, Anthony T. Bryan is surely right in concluding that in recent years "the vulnerability of Caribbean states [and their people] has increased" (p. 34). The uncertainty of democracy as a reliable process and the continuation of exten-

sive migration into and out of the region reflect that vulnerability.

Andrés Serbin rightly questions whether the creation in 1994 of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) was an effective response "to the aspirations of the Caribbean societies" (p. 62). The prevalence of drug trafficking in the region, to take one example, suggests the existence of competing. illegal ways to meet those aspirations. As Ivelaw L. Griffith notes, "Most of the structures and networks [involved in trafficking and money laundering] could not exist without the collusion of people in government and private agencies ... especially in places with poor salaries specifically or economic deprivation generally" (p. 114). Who then will provide for security in the post-cold war Caribbean? Richard J. Bloomfield, longtime director of the World Peace Foundation, observes that collective security may be difficult to achieve in the region. Nevertheless, a security regime built on the idea of defending democracy might be possible, particularly since proximity to the United States and "interpenetration" of North America and the region "means that continuing U.S. involvement in the affairs of those countries is inevitable" (p. 131).

We now return to a question raised at the outset of this essay: Is U.S. hegemony and its shadow as certain as Bloomfield suggests for the Caribbean (and Cuba) in the future? The books under review here make it possible to imagine less one-sided configurations of power than those that have existed in the past. Four of them would never have appeared were it not for the strength of the Cuban Revolution. Additional testimony to Cuba's importance as a historical actor was evident at a conference held there to mark the fortieth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion. If Cuba's struggle to shape history on its own terms is better known than similar efforts throughout the

^{1.} Some documents from the conference are located on the National Security Archive website (http://www.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/).

Caribbean, events and developments of the last decade there demonstrate that the making of Caribbean regional history is not necessarily a U.S. dominated enterprise.

REFERENCE

RODRÍGUEZ, JUAN CARLOS, 1999. *The Bay of Pigs and the CIA*. Melbourne: Ocean Press. [Translated by Mary Todd.]

WILLIAM O. WALKER III
Departments of History and International Relations
Florida International University
Miami FL 33199, U.S.A.
<walkerw@fiu.edu>

BOOK REVIEWS

Capitalism and Slavery Fifty Years Later: Eric Eustace Williams – A Reassessment of the Man and His Work. Heather Cateau & S.H.H. Carrington (eds.). New York: Peter Lang, 2000. xvii + 247 pp. (Cloth US\$ 49.95)

STANLEY L. ENGERMAN
Departments of Economics and History
University of Rochester
Rochester NY 14627-0156, U.S.A.
<enge@troi.cc.rochester.edu>

This collection of interesting and useful essays on Eric Williams and British West Indian history was first presented at a conference held at the St. Augustine Campus of the University of the West Indies in September 1996. The purpose was to honor the fiftieth anniversary of the publication (in 1944) of Eric Williams's landmark work on *Capitalism and Slavery*, a book of great significance not only for its role in the historiography of slavery and abolition but also for its contribution to the then-emerging sense of Caribbean nationalism (making appropriate the brief introductory remarks by Michael Manley, former prime minister of Jamaica.)

After an introduction by the co-editors, which provides a summary of the volume and describes the many intellectual lives of Williams's book, there are three essays on Williams's personal background and his intellectual legacy. John Hope Franklin, a colleague at Howard University in 1947, describes the distinguished faculty there and how Williams fit in as a person and a scholar. The novelist George Lamming describes Williams as a "teacher, turned politician" and a "politician, in the truly moral sense of politician, turned teacher" (p. 29) and notes his role in shaping Caribbean political developments. Colin Palmer discusses the intellectual legacy of Williams, as a scholar-politician who wanted "colonized peoples to emancipate themselves from an externally

imposed and pernicious definition of themselves" (p. 37) and to learn a positive form of racial pride. Palmer argues that by turning "the prevailing imperial-centred scholarship on its head" (p. 41), Williams had an impact on intellectual as well as political life, an impact that, as the next essays demonstrate, has been enduring.

The essays on West Indian history are all quite interesting. While sometimes dealing with old questions, they also serve to raise some important new ones. Most of the authors, somewhere in their presentations, claim that Eric Williams was right and his various critics were wrong, but since they generally make these claims based on new points, new data, and for different time periods, it is possible to wonder if Eric Williams would accept their contentions. Undoubtedly he would be pleased to hear that he was right (as would anyone) but it is less obvious whether he would recognize exactly why he is considered to have been right and whether these claims were really his main arguments.

A long essay by Joseph Inikori does an excellent job in placing the shifting attitudes towards *Capitalism and Slavery* in context. In reviewing the literature on the British Industrial Revolution, he points to alternating periods, based upon current conditions, of first, a belief in the major role of international trade, then a turn to the importance of the home market and internal economic conditions, but, more recently, a return to an emphasis on overseas trade. Thus the changing fortunes of Williams reflect the changing belief in the role of international trade. While pointing to its role in attacking "the moral basis of capitalism and Western civilization," Inikori states that "the history of *Capitalism and Slavery* owes more to the timing of its publication than anything else" (p. 74).

Seymour Drescher's contribution is an update of his 1987 paper on Capitalism and Slavery. While denying most of the economic arguments made by Williams, Drescher suggests that Capitalism and Slavery pioneered in urging the integration of a multi-geographical economic perspective into the history of slavery. Andrew O'Shaughnessy's discussion emphasizes Williams's reliance on contemporary literary accounts, considering this as a strength of his approach. He deals less with one of Williams's important rhetorical triumphs – drawing upon people that you are in fundamental disagreement with to make your case. This meant, of course, that the argument drew upon slave traders arguing their importance to Britain, since they needed to fight off legislation that would have limited their profitability. O'Shaughnessy's essay deals with various issues for the last quarter of the eighteenth century, opening up some new questions for further analysis.

Ibrahim Sundiata's focus is on the slave trade squadrons of the nineteenth century, which unlike many other scholars he argues were somewhat successful in reducing slave exports. To Sundiata the greatest achievement of *Capitalism and Slavery* is "its moral agenda" and its being "informed by a palpable moral indignation" (p. 134), points which certainly help to explain

its continuing interest. William Darity presents an analysis of some of the questions asked as part of the 1789 parliamentary study of the African slave trade, particularly the information on the numbers of slaves shipped and their prices, which he uses to estimate rates of profits and their trends over time. David Ryden presents an interesting two-part paper based on Jamaican records at the Public Record Office and in Parliamentary Papers. The first part argues for a rise in slave prices and an increase in productivity in Jamaica from the 1730s to 1807, claiming that these led to or were the result of changes in slave management. The analysis of manumission, based on deed books, points to a rising number of manumissions by self-purchase over the second half of the eighteenth century, which Ryden claims was due to increased "opportunities in the cash economy" (p. 163), leading to accumulations of wealth by slaves, topics worth more examination.

In an analysis centered on the years 1793-1806, a period of wars and revolution in both the French and the British Caribbean, Claudius Fergus points to a "large-scale conscription of slaves in active military service" (p. 177) and tells the new story of the British West India Regiments. Fergus discusses the 1797 capture of Trinidad and the attitudes taken toward its settlement by the British Colonial Office and by the abolitionists. It is Fergus's desire, partly to complement Williams, and partly to correct a mistake, to shift the discussion of abolition "to the dialectics of slave-master relations and the changing circumstances of imperial economic forces" (p. 191). The final, and longest essay in the volume, "'Globalization': Reality or Ideology?" by Kari Levitt, has relatively little to do with the work of Eric Williams, giving him only a few references. It is an attack on some current views regarding the world economy, particularly those favoring free trade and leading to U.S. hegemony. Levitt argues for inward-looking policies of restricted trade and limitations on capital movements for the developing world. It concludes with a call, following Eric Williams in his capacity as a political figure, for the peoples of the Caribbean "to unite to defend Caribbean sovereignty" (p. 227).

These essays contain important contributions to the study of Caribbean economic history for the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century. They represent a fitting tribute to Eric Williams, not only because they present new evidence on the specific questions he dealt with, but also because they deal intelligently with a range of different issues that he, no doubt, would have become concerned with.

REFERENCE

Drescher, Seymour, 1987. Eric Williams: British Capitalism and British Slavery. *History and Theory* 26:180-96.

Writing West Indian Histories. B.W. HIGMAN. London: Macmillan Caribbean, 1999. xiv + 289 pp. (Paper £14.95)

PHILIP D. MORGAN Department of History Johns Hopkins University Baltimore MD 21218, U.S.A. <pmorgan3@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu>

The distinguished Warwick University Caribbean Studies series could not have chosen a more knowledgeable scholar than Barry Higman to write their first historiographical volume. Higman needs no introduction; his pathbreaking monographs on early nineteenth-century slavery, which, as he notes, followed a "firmly empirical, quantitative approach" (p. xii), have established him as the pre-eminent historian of the British West Indies. Higman has always been open to interdisciplinary approaches: in addition to his demographic and economic analyses of slavery, he has cultivated a sophisticated spatial awareness (after all, he has a Ph.D. in geography as well as in history), which was perhaps most evident in his Jamaica Surveyed, a superb study of plantation maps. His most recent book, *Montpelier Jamaica*, which combines all his previously displayed talents but adds to them an interest in material culture and archaeology, is perhaps his finest work. Writing West Indian Histories displays some new interests and surprises: a sympathetic interest in popular representations of the past, a willingness to engage with the philosophy of history, and even some autobiographical revelations.

A reticent – perhaps even tacitum (in the nicest possible way) – Australian, Higman almost unbuttons himself in his preface, not because he wants to engage in confession, but because he wishes us to locate him in time and place, just as he tries to connect the personal and the contextual for the many historians of the West Indies who have preceded him and who are the subject of this book. Higman began living in Jamaica in 1967 and for the next thirty years or so it was his home; he was the second person to be awarded a doctoral degree in History at the University of the West Indies; he married a Jamaican; and from 1983 to 1996 he was Professor of History at the Mona campus. Although he has traveled extensively throughout the British Caribbean, his perspective is shaped by his long residence on this one island; as he notes, "Another historian, writing from another site and another life would have seen it differently" (p. xiii). Having now returned to his native Australia where he is the William Keith Hancock Chair of History at the Australian National University, Higman writes from the perspective of an outsider to the region in which he has lived for most of his professional life.

What he offers in this book are reflections on the "development of historywriting in the so-called English-speaking Caribbean, looking particularly at the complex interaction between popular and professional understandings of the past" (p. x). The first two chapters of the book lay out the groundwork for the study: the rationale for confining attention to the English-speaking Caribbean, the distinction between amateur and professional, modes of representing the past, and the assembling of a historical record through the work of archives, museums, and libraries. The next three chapters are the most substantive. The first explores West Indian historiography down to the mid-1930s. It focuses on local amateur historians - from Edward Long to Frank Cundall among whites, from John Jacob Thomas to Norman Eustace Cameron among blacks - and the first professionals, all of whom were foreigners, largely American (such as Frank Wesley Pitman or Lowell Ragatz) or British (such as Vincent Harlow or Richard Pares). The second examines the emergence of a colonial elite, tracing the story from the foundational year of 1938, when Eric Williams became the first West Indian to gain a Ph.D. in history and C.L.R. James published The Black Jacobins, to the early 1960s. This chapter, among other things, includes a lengthy section on the institutional development of the University College of the West Indies and the role of historians as varied as John Parry, Elsa Goveia, and Douglas Hall. A final chapter of this part of the book grapples with issues of political independence and global interdependence - the growth of an indigenous group of professional historians, the production of doctoral dissertations in West Indian universities, the rise of local journals, and disputes that arose among professionals and that served to alienate them from a wider world.

The last four chapters do not so much survey historians as the models, metaphors, and concepts they generally employ. One chapter probes the tendency to employ a good/bad times view of the past – a pre-Columbian paradise, for example; or a golden or silver age of sugar planting; or the rise and decline narrative, whether the subject be planters, slavery, or plantations. Another chapter examines a range of biological, anthropomorphic, and mechanical metaphors in modern historical writing about the region: King Sugar, or Darwinian-like struggles for power, or graphical thinking that depends on circles (economic cycles, cores and peripheries) or triangles (Atlantic trade, pyramidal social structures). For Higman's historiographical exploration of another mechanical metaphor, see his "The Sugar Revolution" (2000). A third explores emotional approaches to the past, whether the debunking of Columbus or the search for national heroes, the degree to which guilt and forgiveness have been and should be part of historical writing, even the controversial issue of reparations. A short last chapter sketches some future possibilities: more inclusive regional works, more comparative research, histories of particular territories and groupings in larger imperial, Atlantic, and global contexts, and more innovative ways of representing the past.

This work is certainly the most comprehensive historiographical treatment of the British West Indies yet available. It supplants D.A.G. Waddell's "The British

West Indies," although readers will want to consult Elsa V. Goveia's A Study on the Historiography of the British West Indies to the End of the Nineteenth Century, which is still unsurpassed for the period before 1900. The UNESCO General History of the Caribbean volume on methodology and historiography. edited by Barry Higman, which covers the region at large, is also fairly up-todate

My major criticism of Writing West Indian Histories is that it is too anodyne: it lacks a cutting edge. Historians of modest talents get much the same coverage as the undisputed giants of the field. The work of Richard Pares – most notably his War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 – is discussed most intensively on less than two pages (pp. 79-80). Perhaps his best book, A West-India Fortune, as well as his Yankees and Creoles, and Merchants and Planters, rate barely a mention (p. 110). Readers of this work might easily think that, say, William Laurence Burn is as important a historian of the British Caribbean as Pares. Even Eric Williams, to whom Higman devotes many pages, is not put under the microscope. Surely readers would have liked to read Higman's interpretation of Williams's seminal Capitalism and Slavery, but this book does not provide it. Or, to take one last example, what does Higman think of Seymour Drescher's *Econocide*? He briefly describes its argument and mentions various critics (p. 164), but readers will not know whether Higman is more inclined to believe Drescher or his Tobagonian critic, Selwyn Carrington. In short, this book could have been even better had Higman fully unbuttoned himself, cast off some of his native reticence, and told us what he really thinks about all of the many books and historians he treats in this work. Then Writing West Indian Histories might have been a classic rather than what it is: a valuable survey.

References

GOVEIA, ELSA V., 1956. A Study on the Historiography of the British West Indies to the End of the Nineteenth Century. Mexico City: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia.

HIGMAN, B.W., 1988. Jamaica Surveyed: Plantation Maps and Plans of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Kingston: Institute of Jamaica Publications.

- —, 1998. Montpelier Jamaica: A Plantation Community in Slavery and Freedom, 1739-1912. Kingston: The Press University of the West Indies.
- -, (ed.), 1999. General History of the Caribbean, vol. VI: Methodology and Historiography of the Caribbean. London: UNESCO; Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- —, 2000. The Sugar Revolution. *The Economic History Review* 53:213-36.

JAMES, C.L.R., 1938. The Black Jacobins. New York: The Dial Press.

WADDELL, D.A.G., 1966. The British West Indies. *In* Robin W. Winks (ed.), *The Historiography of the British Empire-Commonwealth: Trends, Interpretations and Resources*. Durham NC: Duke University Press, pp. 344-56.

WILLIAMS, ERIC, 1944. *Capitalism and Slavery*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World. ALISON GAMES. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. xiii + 322 pp. (Cloth US\$ 45.00)

Daniel Vickers
Department of History
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla CA 92093-0104, U.S.A.
<dvickers@ucsd.edu>

Alison Games's new study of seventeenth-century transatlantic migration is source-driven history with a vengeance. At the core of her research is a single folio volume, the London Port Register of 1635, which she has used in combination with many other contemporary sources to compose what amounts to a snapshot of the English Atlantic world in the midst of its early formation. With many other source-driven projects the book shares the advantages of close research, and like many snapshots it reveals aspects of experience that an artist might choose to overlook. A single photograph, however, is not easily set in motion, and it functions ineffectively as a tool for the explanation of change. Games uses her research to test others' characterizations and explanations of the "great migration," asking in effect whether or not they predict the results she has obtained for this particular cohort of migrants – often with interesting and useful results. But the focus on a single year prevents her from treating more directly the larger questions of historical change with which the best books contend, and in the end this weakens the argumentative unity of her study.

The registry itself contains the names, ages, origins, destinations, and often the occupations of about five thousand individuals who embarked in 1635 from London on fifty-three different vessels bound for England's different Atlantic colonies. These records provide Games with some general demographic data, which she analyzes in the first two chapters of the book. Not surprisingly, she discovers that these migrants, taken as a group, were overwhelmingly male (82 percent), decidedly young (with an average age of twenty to twenty-four years, depending on their destination), and generally servant (except in New England).

The London Register confirms the familiar distinction between family-based migration to New England and servant-based migration to the plantation colonies, although Games's research has uncovered more New England-bound servants than any other study hitherto (probably because London was the port of embarkation), and she plainly wishes to emphasize the importance of single, young men to the great migration as a whole.

In a prodigious feat of collective biography, Games has searched colonial records, local histories, and genealogies to discover what happened to these five thousand colonial migrants, and this research supports the balance of the book. She uses this database of her own creation to investigate a number of issues, and her results tend to confirm the now conventional view that the English colonial world was an integrated socioeconomic system, in which it was "impossible for any part ... to evolve in isolation" (p. 191). In this environment, migration came close to defining what these societies were: exotic, heterogeneous, multiracial, and unstable.

First, her research confirms the exotic character of these early colonies. The appalling mortality, the predominance of single, young men, and the enormity of labor, especially skilled labor, demanded by colonization forced all of these into radical institutional innovations – reorganizing household structures to deal with the absence of families, redoubling labor discipline to compensate for the scarcity of laborers, and so forth. Second, she investigates in three different plantation colonies the prospects for social advancement these migrants enjoyed. As one might expect, the answer depended on region and timing. Virginia and Bermuda already possessed established class structures by 1635, and as a consequence, few of the migrants of that year were able to make much of themselves socially. Barbados, by contrast was on the verge of launching itself on the transition to sugar and slavery, and some of the 1635 cohort did quite well for themselves. Third, Games turns her attention to New England and there delves into a different set of issues relating predictably to Puritanism. The 1635 migrants prove an interesting group in this regard, since they left England at exactly the time when Archbishop Laud began to reinforce Anglican orthodoxy and persecute religious radicals. Accordingly, this cohort of migrants were possessed of a zealotry that embroiled the communities where they settled in constant controversies that Games believes were generally characteristic of the "Puritan Diaspora" in the New World (pp. 160-61). Finally, she examines the patterns of removal for colonists after migration - focusing on New England where the records are strongest – and discovers that persistence patterns in America closely resembled those in the mother country. About 50 percent of the 1635 immigrants departed the first town in which they settled within twenty-five years, just as roughly half the householders in many English towns might move on across a ten-year period. Games admits that persistence rates cannot stand up to strict comparison since the size of towns being compared, the length of period under analysis, and the definition of who should be counted varies considerably from town to town.

Still, the general truth that Englishmen were a mobile lot, no matter what side of the Atlantic they lived upon, is difficult to dispute.

In most of its major contentions, this book is fair-minded and thoughtful. Its dependence on data from a single year, however, prevents it from addressing effectively some of the most interesting questions involving change over time. How did social mobility change? By what process did the Puritan diaspora acquire more stability? When the great migration ended, did New England towns grow any more stable? Games touches on questions such as these, but her database is not well equipped to answer them. Ultimately, to know that 1635 was a good year to move to Barbados or a bad year for puritan radicals has limited significance. When such findings are compared to results of others' research in different times and places, as Games does throughout the book, her work becomes more meaningful, but her overall strategy constantly draws us back into the 1635 source, not out into the arguments of history.

An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. xviii + 357 pp (Cloth US\$ 55.00, Paper US\$ 22.50)

CHRISTOPHER L. BROWN
Department of History
Rutgers University
New Brunswick NJ 08903, U.S.A.
<101775.530@compuserve.com>

Why did the British West Indian colonies accede to imperial authority during the American Revolution? How did the Revolutionary war affect life and politics in the British Caribbean? Others have considered these questions before. But in this important new study of West Indian planters in the late eighteenth century, Andrew O'Shaughnessy brings a fresh, if slightly old-fashioned, approach. In a field dominated by social and economic history, he offers a much-needed history of politics, of the character, interests, and agendas of West Indians seeking to protect the sugar economy in an age of imperial crisis. The ruling elite of the British Caribbean emerge from this generously illustrated study as politicians, as well as slaveholders and planters. As politicians, O'Shaughnessy argues, their decisions should be seen in an Atlantic perspective, within the context of the very different choices made by politicians in North America.

An Empire Divided is a study of loyalism, of the ties between the British West Indies and the metropole on the eve of American independence. Never before have those ties been so well detailed. Lecturers teaching the origins of the American Revolution will draw upon O'Shaughnessy's analysis for years to come. British Caribbean planters, he shows, could not afford independence. Less expensive French sugar and molasses dominated European and North American markets. Without a monopoly over the extensive market in the British Isles, the West Indian planters might have lacked customers entirely. Economic dependence, though, was only part of the story. The planters relied upon Britain for soldiers, as well as for consumers. Surrounded by European rivals, vastly outnumbered by maroons, Caribs, and their own slaves, they needed his majesty's forces for security and defense. Far from agitating against a standing army, as North Americans did, they helped subsidize the local regiments. This pragmatic attachment to empire was reinforced by affective ties. Unlike their North American peers, many West Indian planters spent much of their lives in Britain. Sojourners far more than settlers, they returned "home" for schooling, to marry, to spend. The most savvy found seats in parliament and a place within the aristocracy. Between 1760 and 1776, the crown awarded baronetcies to nineteen West Indians. North Americans received only three. The ruling elite of the British Caribbean thought of themselves as a distinct interest, but could not imagine themselves, O'Shaughnessy suggests, as a separate nation.

Many scholars, O'Shaughnessy observes, have detected sympathy for the American Revolution among the West Indian elite. It is true, he shows, that hostility to the Stamp Acts was widespread. Riots broke out in Nevis and St. Kitts. In St. Kitts and Grenada subscription societies emerged to assist the English radical John Wilkes. However, West Indian protests against imperial policy, he shows, need to be understood as attempts to satisfy American patriots, as efforts to prevent punitive boycotts by North American merchants wanting to punish the islands for acceding to imperial authority. On balance, he argues, support for the American Revolution in the British West Indies was minimal. Not only did the sugar colonies choose not to rebel. After the repeal of the Stamp Act, they refused to aid North American resistance through lobbying, petitioning, or pamphleteering. The disaffection that did exist was ephemeral. Although the West Indian legislatures guarded their prerogatives jealously, they accepted the principle of imperial sovereignty. The reigning oligarchies in the Caribbean feared the collapse of an imperial system that served them well, while white artisans and small landowners were too few and too powerless to push forward a competing political agenda.

Thus, "the British West Indies stood to gain nothing from the American Revolutionary War" (p. 160). Indeed, they had a good deal to lose. Without access to North American provisions, and without the customary ease of shipping to the British Isles, the sugar colonies faced starvation and bankruptcy. Mortality rates skyrocketed, particularly among the enslaved. One-fifth of

Antiguan slaves, for example, perished from famine and disease between 1778 and 1781. The resulting labor shortages conspired with the rising cost of manufactured goods, an increase in import duties, a squeeze on credit, higher insurance rates, and the predations of American and French privateers to reduce the profits and slash the value of Caribbean estates. To protect the islands, planters recruited blacks, both slave and free, "on [such] an unprecedented scale" (p. 174). Anticipating these developments, the West Indian interest had petitioned ardently for peace before the war commenced. After the Declaration of Independence, they threw their weight behind the cause of empire by collecting subscriptions to assist the war and addressing the crown with professions of loyalty. During the last years of the Revolution, ministers made defense of the sugar colonies a priority, exposing British forces in North America to defeat as a consequence. The sugar colonies emerged from the years of crisis intact, but divorced from their North American source of provisions and stigmatized by abolitionists and metropolitan economic interests inclined to reform and reorganize empire after the war. O'Shaughnessy, thus, resurrects, in somewhat different form, the well-known decline thesis, but recasts decline as the loss of political influence, rather than the loss of profits as Lowell Joseph Ragatz and Eric Williams famously argued many years ago.

The outline of this story will be a familiar one to students of Caribbean history. O'Shaughnessy, however, brings to these topics a wealth of detail and a mountain of new research. The volume of material consulted and absorbed is astonishing. No recent work has explored the planter class in the British West Indies more thoroughly. O'Shaughnessy's reach is impressively broad. Although he analyzes the region as a unit, he keeps clear the ways political developments in Barbados, Jamaica, and the Leeward and Windward Islands varied. The faults of the study are few. The interpretation loses force as it shifts from political to military history in the final chapters. Indeed, in those pages, tensions present throughout the book become most apparent. The two primary audiences for An Empire Divided will approach it with competing expectations. O'Shaughnessy's evidence yields a rich picture of the British planter class at its eighteenth-century zenith. His argument, however, is pitched to shed new light on problems central to the historiography of the American Revolution. That focus may well have the salutary effect of persuading scholars of North America to take West Indian history more seriously. But it also may leave Caribbean historians wishing for more nuanced commentary on the great deal of new information O'Shaughnessy unearths on the political culture of the West Indies, the relationship between soldiers and civilians, and the character of the Caribbean press, among other topics. O'Shaughnessy rightly describes the book as, in some respects, an "overview" (p. xvi). On the many subjects it takes up, An Empire Divided may not be the last word. For some time, though, it will be much the best, and the touchstone for future research.

The Indigenous People of the Caribbean. SAMUEL M. WILSON (ed.). Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997. xiv + 253 pp. (Cloth US\$ 49.95, Paper US\$ 19.95)

LENNOX HONYCHURCH P.O. Box 1889 Roseau, Dominica <lennoxh@cwdom.dm>

Compiling a book out of the proceedings of a commemorative conference is usually a precarious business. To stitch together various levels of academic interest and expertise, presented to a general audience, into a coherent whole, can test even the very best of editors. *The Indigenous People of the Caribbean*, and featuring nineteen authors, is just such a book. It was born out of a conference organized by the Virgin Islands Humanities Council to observe the passage of five hundred years since the second voyage of Columbus brought his fleet to St. Croix. The papers focused attention on the people who were living in the Caribbean at the time of his arrival.

The conference reportedly consisted of "an exciting series of public lectures," which attempted to "fit all the separate pieces of information and evidence into as complete as possible a picture of indigenous people of the Caribbean" (p. xiii). This volume attempts to do the same thing. To a great extent it succeeds in this endeavor, although the patchwork is in places uneven. In some instances, largely rejected theories on indigenous life, particularly in the Carib sections, lie within the same covers as the latest revisionist research and ideas. In spite of fine articles on maritime trade and adaptations to island environments by David Watters and James Petersen respectively, the book still has not broken the mental barrier which falsely separates the islands from the mainland. It does not sufficiently convey the cultural fluidity of the Lesser Antilles and the continuous movement, which was going on back and forth between the mainland and the islands. The role of the occupants of the Lesser Antilles as gobetweens linking the eastern Greater Antilles to the South American mainland remains largely unexplored. The static vision of arrival and set stages of settlement is enforced by diagrammatic arrows, which always deceptively point in one direction: from the Orinoco northwards.

Once firmly on the islands, however, a good background to the archaeology and ethnohistory is presented at the outset by Ricardo Alegría and Louis Allaire, veterans in the field. Allaire's piece on the Lesser Antilles faces up to the ticklish and still disputed question of the last indigenous ceramic period on these islands. He is confident that the Suazey culture is by all accounts the last truly prehistoric assemblage yet identified in the Lesser Antilles, while he notes that the "Cayo"

style of pottery, unique to St. Vincent, clearly dates to the historical period because of its association with glass and metal artifacts. The analysis of contact and culture exchange is explored biologically by Richard Cunningham. The loss of West Indian fauna, the impact of introduced animals and the two-way flow of flora and fauna reflects what was also happening to the humanity of the region. Cunningham confirms that the continuing legacy of the Columbus encounter is not just historical and cultural but is, and always will be, biological.

Birgit Faber Morse reveals the findings at the excavation of the Salt River site on St. Croix as an example of a settlement at the time of the encounter. Alissandra Cummins assesses the European view of such aboriginal populations in their pictures and texts at the time, providing the flip side to the archaeologists' interpretation of ceramics, art and material culture, religious beliefs, and the important issue of maritime trade. Jay Haviser lays out a detailed island-by-island review of settlement strategies in the early ceramic age which sets the stage for the population explosion during the post-Saladoid period. The well-established scholarship on the Taino culture of the Greater Antilles gets good treatment by six other authors here, giving a comprehensive overview to students of the subject.

As the book moves south among the "Caribs," the contributors find themselves in far more academically disputed territory. Allaire is on the scene again to give a careful appraisal. He admits that "not only is there confusion surrounding these issues, but the emotionally charged debate about their identity and origins must also be taken into account" (p. 179). Vincent Cooper battles away in the snake pit of "the Carib language" which is really Arawakan. Here one questions our heavy dependence on the missionary texts as firm evidence of a language or combination of languages that had already faced one hundred and fifty years of contact by the time it was recorded. The ghosts of the reverend fathers Breton, Du Tertre, and Labat loom heavy over our scholarship as we regurgitate their Gallic interpretation of the not-so-New World, which they described. But as many would say, they are what we have to work with. The interpretative skill of the ethnohistorians, with their scraps of texts, and the archaeologists, with their shards and flints, is what is being woven together here.

The book ends on the subject of indigenous resistance and survival. Nancie Gonzalez crosses the Caribbean Sea from Belize to St. Vincent to find that the Garifuna "Black Caribs" of Belize have maintained a cultural time capsule of eighteenth-century St. Vincent, which those remaining on the island, after a mass deportation in 1797, have lost. Samuel Wilson looks at the legacy of the indigenous Caribbean as a whole, while the current Carib chief of Dominica, Garnette Joseph, provides a coda on the present state of affairs. This volume gives a valuable overview, grouping together the main issues in one place in the form of a comprehensive reader. But in charting what, for many students, is new territory, be aware that it is not without the odd detail which will be challenged and revised in the years ahead.

The Maroon Story: The Authentic and Original History of the Maroons in the History of Jamaica 1490-1880. BEV CAREY. St. Andrew, Jamaica: Agouti Press, 1997. xvi + 656 pp. (Paper US\$ 48.00)

KENNETH BILBY **Bard College** Annandale-on-Hudson NY 12504-5000, U.S.A.
<bilby@bard.edu>

The subtitle of this weighty tome speaks volumes. Rarely do authors profess the "authenticity" and "originality" of their work as baldly as does Bev Carey on the front cover of this book (the assumption, at least in the academic world, being that such judgments are best left to one's professional peers and other readers). But the author of this intriguing study (who characterizes herself as an "amateur researcher") apparently feels no need for outside validation. She herself, we are constantly reminded, is "a descendant of the 'first time' Maroons" (as stated on the cover), and the story of the Maroons is her story.

And a remarkable story it is. In twenty-seven long and cluttered chapters, Carey recounts, often in excruciating detail, what more than three decades of research and personal engagement with the Jamaican Maroon epic have taught her. The first seven chapters treat the Spanish period and examine (with a notable lack of scholarly rigor) the controversial question of Amerindian origins. The following eight chapters span the period from the English conquest of Jamaica through the military campaigns of the 1730s, with a special emphasis on the battles fought over the Maroon citadel of Nanny Town in the eastern part of the island. Chapters 16-22 are devoted to a close analysis of the two treaties made by Maroons with the British colonial government in 1739, a number of post-treaty developments, and the Second Maroon War of 1795. The last five chapters concern the years leading up to and following emancipation, giving special attention to relations between Maroons and the wider population, and ending with a lengthy discussion of the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865, which Maroons from Moore Town and Hayfield helped to suppress.

Although Carey draws on an impressive array of archival materials, few of the primary sources she cites will be new to area specialists; most have been used by professional historians and other scholars (e.g., Orlando Patterson, Barbara Kopytoff, Mavis Campbell, Richard Hart, Michael Craton) in previous publications. But here they are presented and discussed at much greater length. While this allows the author to include many valuable details that will no doubt be welcomed by researchers focusing on Maroons, it proves taxing for the general reader.

What really sets this book apart from previous histories of the Jamaican Maroons is Carey's frequent recourse to what she terms "Maroon oral history." Throughout the text, various oral traditions (as well as other kinds of data collected from present-day Maroons) provide a pretext for interpretive polemics opposing "the Maroon perspective" to the historical distortions produced by outside observers and the colonial bias of the written records they have left. Such corrective measures are clearly necessary and long overdue; in a number of well-known works by Richard Price (of which Carey seems to be unaware), they have led to entirely new understandings of "first-time" Maroons in another colonial setting. In *The Maroon Story*, however, the pursuit of an indigenous past is compromised by a lack of discipline. Particularly worrying is her inconsistency in documenting oral sources. Many of the ostensible Maroon oral traditions to which she refers in the main body of the text are presented without citations. (Yet, mysteriously, in many other instances she attributes oral testimony to specific, named informants.) The same problem appears in the notes; at least fifteen endnotes meant to support important sections of the text consist merely of vague attributions such as "oral history of the Maroons," "oral archives of the Eastern Maroons," or "interviews by author." This vagueness leaves too much to good faith; worse yet, it deprives future scholars of the means to position and interpret much of this orally-transmitted knowledge within its social and temporal context. Without more careful contextualization, proper evaluation of the significance, not to mention historical validity, of these oral traditions may be impossible.

Viewed as a social artifact rather than a contribution to Maroon historiography, The Maroon Story is fascinating. As much as anything, the book might be read as a paean to the process of self-invention. Not far below the surface lurks a complex and murky story of contested identity and political ambition. Although the book contains considerable biographical information, the reader would need to know much more about the author than is revealed here to begin to be able to grasp the forces that shaped this work. One would need to know, for instance, that she was raised and educated outside of Moore Town, the Maroon community to which she claims affiliation, and in fact has never lived for an extended period in any of the existing Maroon towns; that her identification with "her people" is based more on the genealogical fact of partial Maroon descent than on her exposure to actual Maroon social contexts (which began, in any case, only after – as an adult – she had embarked on her quest for self-discovery); that, indeed, despite the fact that she has managed on occasion to have herself appointed to official positions within various Maroon councils, many Maroons today continue to question, if not reject outright, the authenticity of her claims to Maroon identity.

More importantly, Carey's controversial incursions into the internal political affairs of various Maroons communities, especially Moore Town, have left a profound mark not only on these communities themselves, but on the

research on which this book is based. Few readers are likely to be aware of the complex parts she has played in a number of local political vendettas over the last few decades. So strong were the sentiments aroused by her behind-thescenes maneuvering that former Maroon leader C.L.G. Harris, whom Carev grudgingly portrays as the dominant political figure of twentieth-century Moore Town (p. 527), was moved to publish a book-length diatribe detailing the treachery of which a number of Maroons in that community accuse her (Harris & Aarons 1988; Harris 1995). (Not surprisingly, she relies on the leader of another Maroon community, Colonel Noel Prehay of Scott's Hall, to provide The Maroon Story with an authenticating preface.) More important than the accusations leveled against her by disgruntled Maroons are the implications of her delicate political position for her research findings. Because of her estrangement from the governing council of Moore Town, Carey was forced to rely on a small coterie composed of Colonel Harris's political opponents for her information. Readers lacking an intimate acquaintance with Moore Town's political landscape will have no way of knowing it, but most of the informants mentioned by name in her book belong to this relatively small faction. This alone is enough to raise serious questions about the representativeness, not to mention completeness, of "the Maroon perspective" expressed in the book.

An example of the limitations of Carey's research can be found in her discussion of the aftermath of the Second Maroon War of 1795, where she notes with evident surprise that, relatively late in her research (1996), she was able to record a particular Maroon oral tradition, certain details of which can be related unambiguously to actual, documented events that occurred some two hundred years ago (p. 492). Yet the oral tradition she references is one of the most widely known in Moore Town; it is hard to imagine that anyone with more than a passing acquaintance with the Maroon (Kromanti) religious system in which much of the oral historical knowledge of Moore Town is embedded could remain unfamiliar with this oral tradition and the sacred song associated with it for long. Indeed, more than fifteen years ago, the present reviewer published a detailed analysis of the same oral tradition, based on multiple versions recorded in the late 1970s (Bilby 1984) - one of many relevant published sources ignored by Carey in her book. (It is worth noting that the article, though published in a European journal, is readily available in major libraries and research institutions in Jamaica.)

That all historical knowledge is perspectival is no news to anthropologists and others with an interest in the past. Nor does the realization that such knowledge is frequently tied to considerations of power and authority raise many eyebrows these days. What is somewhat troubling about Carey's book is not its author's attempt to claim a past as her own, but the fact that she seems unprepared to allow for multiple voices in the writing of Maroon history. Indeed, she has on occasion used the Jamaican press (an option available to few of the inhabitants of present-day Maroon communities) in ways that suggest a desire not only to own and control the Maroon past, but to do so by excluding other voices (see Evans 1994).

As impressive an achievement as *The Maroon Story* is in some ways, its claims to authority are suspect. To borrow a common Rastafarian locution: at least some knowledgeable Maroons are likely to perceive Bev Carey's "authentic and original history" as more "herstory" than "theirstory."

REFERENCES

BILBY, KENNETH, 1984. The Treacherous Feast: A Jamaican Maroon Historical Myth. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 140:1-31.

EVANS, VIVIENE, 1994. Maroons Attack "Rape" of Their Heritage. *The Jamaica Observer*, July 22-24:47.

HARRIS, COLONEL C.L.G., 1995. On My Honour (A Tale of the Maroons), revised edition. Kingston: Published by the Author.

HARRIS, COLONEL C.L.G. & MAJOR CHARLES AARONS, 1988. On My Honour (A Tale of the Maroons). Kingston: Published by the Authors.

Slavery in the Caribbean Francophone World: Distant Voices, Forgotten Acts, Forged Identities. DORIS Y. KADISH (ed.). Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2000. xxiii + 247 pp. (Cloth US\$ 35.00)

Bernard Mortt History Department Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond VA 23284, U.S.A.

dit@atlas.vcu.edu>

The aim of the twelve interdisciplinary essays in this book is to bring slaves in the Francophone Caribbean and those associated with them – whites and mixed-race individuals – out of anonymity by employing the themes of "voice, agency, and identity" (p. xii). Thus they seek to "listen to the participants themselves, to take seriously the recorded material that has been largely unnoticed and undervalued in the past, and to contextualize those voices in the specific locations and conditions in which they were produced" (p. xiii). By agency is meant "the actions that whites and blacks performed in

response to Francophone slavery and the effects that their actions had at the time" (p. xv). Identity is defined as the ways in which "various white, mulatto, and black participants in the drama of Francophone slavery forged a racial, ethnic, collective, or personal sense of self" (p. xviii).

After a good introductory historical overview of slavery in the French colonies, the book is divided into four parts that explore the three themes, with special emphasis on the consequences of the Saint Domingue revolution. The first part deals with France from the 1790s to 1847, the second with the United States, mainly during the age of revolution, the third with the French Caribbean during slavery, and the fourth with the legacies of slavery.

Given the paucity of works in English on slavery in the French Caribbean, almost any published study on the subject would be a welcome addition to the literature. Fortunately, Slavery in the Caribbean Francophone World is not just any study. In spite of the scarcity of primary source material that scholars working on French Caribbean slavery face, the authors have written informative and insightful pieces. Doris Kadish's fine introduction notwithstanding, however, there is too much emphasis on how ideas coming from France shaped the thinking and actions of blacks, and too tenuous and tangential a connection to French Caribbean slavery in many of the essays. Consequently, it is difficult to hear the voices of the slaves, much less picture them in action. Indeed, it is ironic that it is generally the voice of others that is heard above that of the slaves. In John Claiborne Isbell's "Voices Lost? Staël and Slavery, 1786-1830," we learn more about Anne-Louise Germaine de Staël than the slaves. Similarly, a comparison of the discourse of the Société des Amis des Noirs and that of slaves in Martinique in the 1790s is analyzed from the perspective of French abolitionists. In this same vein, Gabriel Moyal's use of the French political daily, Le Constitutionnel, brings a littleknown source, if not the actions of the slaves, to light.

Two solid essays that link slavery in the Francophone Caribbean with the United States are worthy of mention. In the first, Douglas Egerton reveals that hundreds of destitute whites boarded vessels bound for Virginia and the Carolinas in June 1791, and brought slaves from the French Caribbean with them who subsequently had a revolutionary impact on mainland slaves in areas such as Richmond and Norfolk. Also, French attitudes and actions on slavery mitigated the relationship between France and the Southern whites. They renounced their support of France after the French Convention declared the abolition of slavery in 1794. Egerton further argues that "Blacks throughout the western hemisphere regarded the very word *France* as synonymous with liberty and equality, while whites ... saw only chaos and racial genocide in the term." "For oppressed people around the Atlantic basin," he continues, "France had become the very symbol of freedom" (pp. 100-1). However, the view from the slave yards was different, as evidenced by slave resistance throughout the 1790s.

The second essay, by Kimberly S. Hanger, makes a link between the actions of free blacks in Louisiana, the ideals of radicals in France, and the example set by rebellious free blacks in the French colonies. It shows how under Spanish rule (around 1789) blacks viewed their former masters – the French – as exploiters who made no provisions for their freedom, and accorded them little respect as free citizens. Some slaves sued their owners to secure their freedom; others to retrieve stolen belongings. The push for radical action against discrimination by free blacks in Louisiana is viewed as parallel to the aims of the *gens de couleur* of Saint-Domingue. Though limited in its connection to the French Caribbean, Hanger's contribution is important for it shows that slaves litigated, and that women slaves, in particular, used the law ingeniously.

Albert Valdman's "Creole, the Language of Slavery" offers direct access to the voices of the slaves in the French Caribbean. But his emphasis is on the generalized use of creole which became the "colonial vernacular" (p. 157), rather than on the slaves' use of it. An analysis of the language used by the slaves in Saint Domingue during the Bois-Caïman ceremony that launched the revolution would have been greatly appreciated here, especially because African languages were also used in the colonies.

In examining the view of slavery in contemporary fictional works on the French Caribbean by prominent authors, Marie-José N'Zengou-Tayo and Doris Kadish have written two good essays that best connect with the overall themes in the book. This is particularly the case with the analysis of Patrick Chamoiseau's *Texaco* and two works by Maryse Condé – a novel, *Tituba*, and a play, *An tan revolisyon* (*In the Time of Revolution*). Thus despite the weaknesses outlined above, *Slavery in the Caribbean Francophone World* will appeal to a general audience with an interest in slavery. Everyone will find something useful in it.

Slaves and Slaveholders in Bermuda, 1616-1782. VIRGINIA BERNHARD. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999. xviii + 316 pp. (Cloth US\$ 37.50)

MICHAEL J. GUASCO
Department of History
Davidson College
Davidson NC 28036, U.S.A.
<miguasco@davidson.edu>

Bermuda's small size and remote location have typically relegated it to the margins of mainstream scholarship. Indeed, in spite of the current academic trends that have raised questions about the Atlantic world and the recent resurgence in British history, Bermuda still regularly suffers from a lack of sustained consideration. But, as Virginia Bernhard ably demonstrates, it was precisely these characteristics that promoted the articulation of a distinctive system of slavery in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-Atlantic world. With an eye toward an audience more familiar with the histories of the British West Indies and, especially, mainland North America, Bernhard argues that the Bermudian past provides a fresh avenue to explore a number of contemporary historiographical minefields. For example, she mines the island's rich archival records to suggest that, unlike many other places, there was very little racial tension in early Bermuda, that slave rebelliousness declined rather than increased over time, and that there was a significant level of social integration between whites and blacks on the island.

Although the domestic sources for Bermuda are exceptionally detailed, this is a book that is almost entirely conditioned by the author's preoccupation with the familiar question: Which came first, racism or slavery? Like numerous scholars who have obsessed over this problem in the Chesapeake, Bernhard concerns herself in the first part of the book with establishing that seventeenth-century Bermuda was not a world in which slavery entirely defined the lives of African peoples. As she argues, not all Africans in Bermuda were slaves and many of them were valued by Anglo-Bermudians as friends, neighbors, coreligionists, and even family members in the island's close-knit society. Bernhard's explanation for this rests on her characterization of Bermuda as a place unlike any other in the Anglo-Atlantic world. Bermuda had neither a wealth of land (as in mainland British North America) nor a viable cash-crop (as in the West Indies, Chesapeake, and Lower South colonies), yet there were numerous slaves. Bermuda's African population was therefore channeled into other tasks, none of which was more important to Bermudian society and culture than maritime commerce and its related industries. By the eighteenth century, then, male Bermudians took to the sea, regardless of their skin color or legal condition. As a result, Bermudian slaves circulated throughout the Atlantic world in large numbers, serving as conduits of information at sea and agents of social change at home. The mutual dependence between white and black Bermudians involved in maritime endeavors pervaded Bermudian slavery. Herein lies Bernhard's explanation for the island's remarkably stable slave system, as demonstrated in particular by her interest in evidence concerning increasing levels of social integration and declining manifestations of slave rebelliousness over time.

This is a book containing tremendous details, yet there are at least two troubling conceptual issues. First, Bernhard repeatedly asserts throughout the first half of the book that Bermudians avoided the word "slave" in reference to the local African population and that "negro was not synonymous with slave until the late seventeenth century" (p. 49). Certainly she is correct in identifying a reluctance on the part of Anglo-Bermudians to label African servants initially as "slaves," but she never explores or explains the meaning of slavery to seventeenth-century Bermudians. It has become customary for scholars to question the meaning of race in the early modern era, or at least to assert that race was, and is, a social construction. Bermuda's unique path into human bondage would seem to offer a perfect opportunity to extend that logic to "slavery," perhaps even to address its social and ideological implications for Anglo-Bermudians. It was here, after all, that the transition from servitude to slavery involved the common practice of selling Africans, and indigenous Americans, as bondmen with ninety-nine-year indentures - a legal fiction that certainly reveals something about a society just as willing to enslave other human beings as it was eager to avoid controversial terminology.

Perhaps even more problematic to the future treatment of Bermudian slavery in academic circles is Bernhard's unwillingness to conceptualize the island's history in the context of either the Atlantic world or the larger history of the West Indies. While she pays greater attention to England's other island possessions in the Americas in the second half of the book, her Bermuda is typically treated either in isolation or in the context of mainland North America's unique history and historiographical problems. Moreover, although she has something to say about the relationship between racism and slavery in British North America, the most intriguing parts of Bermuda's history are to be found elsewhere. For example, she contends throughout that Bermuda's unique circumstances, which allowed for the emergence of a healthy, self-reproducing slave population that was not needed for plantation agriculture, minimized the level of racism. Yet, one wonders how the domestic situation which Bernhard generally conceptualizes as a social and cultural isolate was influenced by Bermudians' extensive contacts and interaction with the rest of Britain's Atlantic community. In other words, what seems to

make Bermuda unique has relatively little to do with whether or not racism was important, but a great deal to do with the island's fascinating history as an intensely interconnected maritime community – perhaps the most "Atlantic" of all colonies in the Anglo-Atlantic world.

The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands, ROGER C. SMITH, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. xxii + 230 pp. (Cloth \$49.95)

MICHAEL J. JARVIS Department of History University of Rochester Rochester NY 14627, U.S.A. <irvs@mail.rochester.edu>

In The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands, nautical archaeologist Roger Smith blends historical and archaeological sources to document the rapidly fading maritime past of the Cayman Islands. In recent decades, the island's economy has shifted toward tourism and international finance, ending centuries-old patterns of seafaring and altering the relationship between modern-day islanders and the sea. Smith's pursuit of the island's history is impressive; he supplements two decades of fieldwork identifying and investigating more than seventy shipwrecks and terrestrial sites with extensive documentary material drawn from British, French, Dutch, and Spanish archives and oral histories taken from elderly islanders who remember the twilight years of shipbuilding, turtling, and wrecking to produce a concise account of the island's maritime pursuits through four centuries. Smith adds considerably to our knowledge of this historiographically neglected corner of the Caribbean and his assertion that the inhabitants of the Cayman Islands are "a uniquely seafaring people ... distinctly renowned for long-range nautical pursuits" is well supported (p. 51).

As someone who works on the British colony of Bermuda, I was surprised to find an island even smaller and arguably more intensely maritime than my own. In reading Smith's account, I was struck by the extensive parallels between the two British colonies: Both lacked a Native American population, and both were remote from land but strategically located astride major shipping lanes in the Caribbean Sea and North Atlantic in the age of sail. Spain neglected to colonize both islands in the sixteenth century, allowing them to become bases for English and French privateers. Both colonies were initially supportive off-shoots of other colonial ventures: Cayman turtle harvesting in the 1650s fed Cromwell's armies in Jamaica, while the Virginia Company envisioned Bermuda as a closer source

of food for Virginia. The permanent English settlers of both colonies dabbled in agriculture but primarily relied upon the sea for their prosperity; in the three Cayman Islands (Grand Cayman, Little Cayman, and Cayman Brac), turtling dominated, supplemented by fishing and marine salvage while intercolonial shipping and, to a lesser extent, whaling were Bermuda's mainstays. Geographically, both sets of low-lying islands had suddenly shoaling and extensive reefs, making them graveyards for ships and rich hunting grounds for local wreckers. Nautical terms pepper the place names, geography, and vocabulary of both islands and insularity, endogamous intermarriage, and maritime mortality put their stamp on the respective populations. Less immediately obvious is the way in which both islands drew upon the wider Atlantic world as an economic hinterland. Caymanians initially undertook turtling in local waters but when green and hawksbill turtle populations declined, they followed them first to southern Cuba and then to the Miskito Coast, which "rangers" seasonally colonized to gather turtles for transshipment to the Caymans and, eventually, to markets in Kingston and Key West. Bermudians similarly seasonally settled the Turks and Caicos Islands to rake salt. Although both islands were periodically hammered by hurricanes, the proximity of the Caymans to hostile Spanish territories and pirate cruising grounds added a human element of destruction that Bermuda avoided. And as both colonies now link their future prosperity to cultural tourism, they increasingly turn to their maritime past to "sell" their islands to prospective visitors.

If this book has a fault, it is in substituting heritage for history. Heritage is traditional, celebratory, selective, and comfortable, privileging how people want their past to be over how it actually was. As presented, Smith's intrepid and heroic Caymanians endure hurricanes and raids, battle against the elements, struggle against market forces beyond their control, and creatively salvage wrecks thrown upon their shores. His book verges on promotional in its glorification of the island's rugged past, at times reading more like tourist brochure than history. Chapter 4, in which Smith suggests that the island's pirates and crocodiles make the Caymans the "Never-Neverland" of Peter Pan, is little more than an excuse to write about all the pirates he could tangentially associate with the Caymans, seemingly generated more from the need for modern-day Caymanians to claim a pirate past than from any substantive impact on the islands' settled history. Smith is clearly more comfortable addressing objects than people, devoting more detail to the form and construction of catboats, schooners, and individual wrecks than to the men who operated them. Class and race are almost entirely absent from this book; Smith's brief mention of the debt peonage system that governed turtling operations (p. 77) is exceptional in a generally "feel good" narrative that entirely neglects slavery. The 1802 census Smith includes but does not analyze (pp. 192-96) reveals that slaves composed nearly 60 percent of the inhabitants, that 83 percent of white households owned slaves, and that there was a substantial free colored population. Slaves presumably figured prominently in shipbuilding, fishing, wrecking, and turtling, but their experiences are left unconsidered. Smith's archaeological findings and archival gleanings have expanded considerably what we know about the Cayman Islands but his book implicitly raises far more questions than it answers and underscores our need for an analytical maritime *history* of these fascinating islands, yet to be written.

Patterns of Pillage: A Geography of Caribbean-based Piracy in Spanish America, 1536-1718. Peter R. Galvin. New York: Peter Lang, 1999. xiv + 271 pp. (Cloth US\$ 48.95)

PAUL E. HOFFMAN Department of History Louisiana State University Baton Rouge LA 70803-3601, U.S.A. <hyhoff@lsu.edu>

Pirates have been a "hot topic" lately in gender studies. Moreover, the great seventeenth-century figures continue to command attention, primarily because Alexandre Olivier Exquemelin's account has never gone out of print. Occasionally a writer like Peter Earle adds new information to the familiar story (see *The Sack* of Panamá). However, no author had examined the geography of Caribbean piracy during the period covered by Patterns of Pillage, nor commented at any length on the geographical works that former pirates wrote. Galvin does both.

The first three chapters provide a historical introduction. Mediterranean traditions of piracy and early and later piracy (ca. 1580s to 1718) in the Caribbean each receive a chapter. Chapters 4 and 5 are a geographic analysis of where pirates hung out and why. Tortuga receives a chapter to itself (Chapter 5). A final chapter discusses the maps and writings of men like Exquemelin and William Dampier, to name but two better known of the numerous examples provided. A topical bibliography of suggestions for further reading precedes the listing of primary and secondary sources.

All sailors in the Caribbean are constrained by its wind and current patterns and their relationships to the islands and mainland coasts. Pirates (corsairs to the Spaniards) needed bases remote enough that they could not be easily surprised by Spanish attackers but close enough to the shipping lanes and Spanish towns that they could ply their trade. How particular pirates or groups of them worked out these calculations is the substance of this work of historical geography.

Like too many studies of piracy in the Caribbean, this book makes only limited use of Spanish sources, relying instead on English ones, and to a lesser extent French published materials. The research in English sources is well done and seems to be comprehensive, as is Galvin's command of the secondary literature. The picture that emerges is better in its historical depth than many similarly handicapped studies and interesting for the geographer's focus on place. But there is still a missing dimension. The Bay Islands off Honduras, for example, receive a good deal of attention but the islands and estuaries on the Darien coast get little. Nor are we given Spanish perspectives on Tortuga. Another problem is that, surprisingly, the maps are so crowded with information that they are almost unreadable.

That said, this book is a useful addition to the scholarly (in contrast to popular) literature on Caribbean piracy. Historians will find the geographer's perspective interesting, perhaps even challenging. Non-historical geographers will learn a bit of history. Almost any reader will find things of interest and can use the suggestions for further reading.

REFERENCE

EARLE, PETER, 1982. The Sack of Panamá: Sir Henry Morgan's Adventures on the Spanish Main. New York: Viking Press.

Cadenas de esclavitud ... y de solidaridad: Esclavos y libertos en San Juan, siglo XIX. RAÚL MAYO SANTANA, MARIANO NEGRÓN PORTILLO & MANUEL MAYO LÓPEZ. Río Piedras: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1997. 204 pp. (Paper n.p.)

DAVID M. STARK History Department Grand Valley State University Allendale MI 49401, U.S.A. <starkd@gvsu.edu>

Cadenas de esclavitud compares the family life, participation in the labor force, and efforts to forge an identity among slaves in San Juan's pre-emancipation (1846 and 1872) and post-emancipation (1873-76) society. Through their use of the 1846 census of the barrio of Santo Domingo in San Juan, the 1872 Registro central of slaves, and the 1873-76 Libro de contratos de libertos, which contain information on the name, age, sex, color, place of birth and occupation of slaves (and, in the case of the Libro de contratos, former slaves), the authors debunk

long-standing notions of Puerto Rican slavery as *alegre* or *suave*, along with perceptions of the island as a racial democracy. Slavery was not more benevolent in Puerto Rico than in other areas of the Caribbean; nor did it lead to less discrimination and racial prejudice toward slaves and former slaves following emancipation.

The book is divided into three chapters; the first two, though previously published, have been revised and contain new data, and the third consists of new material. Chapter 1 opens with a succinct overview of arguments refuting the once-commonly held belief that slave families were traditionally matrifocal or that familial ties were destroyed by slavery. Evidence obtained from the 1846 census of the barrio of Santo Domingo clearly shows this to have been true of San Juan, as the authors observed that two-thirds of the slave children under the age of sixteen lived with a woman who was at least fifteen years older and could have been their mother, while one-third of the children under the age of eleven lived with two slaves of different sex at least fifteen years older. Although the proportion of children living with their parent(s) apparently declined in the years leading up to abolition, as documented by the 1872 Registro central, slaves were nevertheless able to maintain some semblance of familial cohesion. Perhaps the most important finding is the extent to which slaves who were once separated from family members sought to reunite themselves following abolition, as observed in the 1873-76 Libro de contratos de libertos. Newly freed slaves were obligated to establish wage labor contracts with planters and frequently sought out contracts with the former owners of family members from whom they had been separated. In this way many slave families were reunited, showing that the bonds of solidarity were stronger than the chains of slavery.

Chapter 2 examines the occupation of slaves and former slaves according to age and sex. Through a comparison of their labor force participation, we acquire a better understanding of slaves' roles in the urban economy and former slaves' adaptation and integration into post-emancipation society. Slaves generally worked in the same occupations as the lower classes of the free population. According to the 1846 census of the barrio of Santo Domingo, a majority of slaves (especially women) were engaged in domestic labor. However, a number of men and women also worked in specialized occupations or as artisans. One of the more interesting findings was the identification of a possible correlation between a larger family size and women's employment in occupations requiring greater skill. With greater opportunities for generating income, women in specialized occupations such as cooks or seamstresses could afford to provide for a larger family. While the proportion of slaves engaged in specialized occupations or as artisans remained steady from 1846 to 1872, it increased in the years 1873 through 1876. Contrary to popular belief, urban slaves were not employed solely as domestics, but rather were active participants in San Juan's urban economy.

The third chapter, which compares the racial categories and terminology used to describe slaves in the years prior to abolition with those used for former slaves

in the postemancipation period, broadens our understanding of racial prejudice on the island. A generation of scholars such as Luis Díaz Soler, Tomás Blanco, Eugenio Fernández Méndez, and Labor Gómez Acevedo have either denied that racism existed or claimed that it was $\tilde{n}o\tilde{n}o$, or lacking in substance. They argued that the island's small slave population, in combination with the high incidence of miscegenation, facilitated the assimilation of former slaves into mainstream society. Accordingly, the notion of a racial democracy has its origins in the historical evolution of slavery on the island and manifested itself in the variety of phenotypical descriptions used to describe slaves and former slaves. *Cadenas de esclavitud* discredits the myth that the island was a racial democracy. While the authors acknowledge that race relations in the Hispanic Caribbean, including Puerto Rico, were different from those in the non-Hispanic Caribbean, this did not mean that the resulting societies were less racist. Miscegenation did not bring about the emergence of a racial democracy; rather, it fostered the creation of a caste society in which racial prejudice and discrimination intensified.

Cadenas de esclavitud is not without its flaws. In making the claim that slaves during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not inclined toward marriage, the authors fall victim to the same generalizations that plagued the work of a previous generation of scholars. Parish registers prior to the nineteenth century amply document slaves' efforts to marry and form families despite the obstacles they faced. To deny that slaves were inclined to marry is to suggest that the chains of slavery are stronger than the bonds of solidarity. Notwithstanding, Cadenas de esclavitud is a welcome addition to the growing body of scholarship concerning slavery in Puerto Rico.

Changing History: Afro-Cuban Cabildos and Societies of Color in the Nineteenth Century. PHILIP A. HOWARD. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998. xxii + 227 pp. (Cloth US\$ 35.00)

ADA FERRER
Department of History
New York University
New York NY 10003, U.S.A.
<ada.ferrer@nyu.edu>

The subject of black voluntary associations in nineteenth-century Cuba is a rich and promising area for study. The combination of Spanish colonial policies (which allowed for and carefully monitored such organizations) and the length and lateness of the African slave trade (which was active through the

mid-1860s) resulted in a significant number and wide array of associations for people of color. While the subject has received some attention by Cuban historians, there is no English-language monograph on the subject. There is clearly a need for one, not only to deepen our understanding of colonial Cuban history, but also to help place the history of African ethnicity and culture in Cuba within the larger framework of the African Diaspora. Philip Howard's *Changing History* represents an attempt to fill this obvious gap in the scholarship.

The book is organized into two broad sections. The first, roughly comprising Chapters 1 through 3, provides the general framework and background for the study. Howard begins with a broad consideration of the place of people of color in colonial society and then proceeds to the heart of the study in Chapters 2 and 3. Here, he analyzes the organization, composition, and function of African ethnic societies, called *cabildos de nación*. Especially interesting is his discussion of the overlap in the secular and sacred activities of the *cabildos*. He stresses, convincingly, the ethnic diversity of Cuba's African population and the role of these societies in preserving and transmitting African cultures on the island. Beginning in Chapter 4, the focus becomes more strictly chronological. Howard traces the involvement of these organizations (and their successors) in the struggles for independence from Spain, for the abolition of slavery, and for postemancipation civil rights.

The underlying argument throughout is that there was, over the course of the nineteenth century, a transition from African ethnic societies to what Howard refers to as "pan-Afro-Cuban" societies. These societies were not organized around African ethnicity but comprised members from different groups. They emphasized unity among Cubans of color and mobilized, not to preserve African culture, but rather to win political and social rights from the colonial state, or simply to help secure their own economic and social well-being.

This argument is important but not entirely effective. First, as Howard's own evidence and discussion suggest, there was not always a hard and fast distinction between *cabildo*-style organizations and the ethnically inclusive mutual aid societies that emerged later. African societies often performed mutual aid functions and, while they clearly aided in the transmission of African cultures, they also, as Howard himself argues, allowed for syncretism among African groups, as well as the adoption of European forms, and sometimes the inclusion of European members. Second, while it is indisputable that *cabildos* gradually gave way to pan-Afro-Cuban societies, the reasons behind that transformation, and the meanings of it, are never fully explored. Clearly, one motivation for the change rested in colonial policy and the authorities' desire to limit the influence of African culture on the island. But the extent to which Cubans of color themselves sought, resisted, understood, or experienced such changes is left unexamined. Finally, the argument about

the transition from African ethnic organizations to pan-Afro-Cuban ones cries out for contextualization. Questions of African and Creole ethnicity and identity have been central in the literature of the African diaspora in New World slave societies. Yet that literature and those debates are noticeably absent here.

For non-specialists and English-language readers, the book will be a welcome and useful introduction to an important topic. For specialists, the book will reveal continuing gaps in our understanding of these organizations and perhaps suggest further questions and areas for future research.

Anatomy of Resistance: Anti-Colonialism in Guyana 1823-1966. MAURICE St. Pierre. London: Macmillan, 1999. x + 214 pp. (Paper £15.50)

ALVIN O. THOMPSON
Department of History
University of the West Indies
Cave Hill Campus, Barbados
<aivetoro@sunbeach.net>

This study is a substantial revision of Maurice St. Pierre's Ph.D. dissertation. It incorporates recent research and newly-released documents on the subject, and has been expanded to embrace the last years of slavery, which the author regards as the "foundation stage" of resistance to colonialism (p. 6). The work, however, remains essentially a study of the period from the 1930s onwards, about three-quarters of it being devoted to that period.

St. Pierre utilizes a wide range of manuscript sources for his study in Guyana, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He makes good use particularly of the recently-released confidential documents (largely letters) written by the governors in Guyana, the politicians in Westminster, and the leading government officials in the United States. Although some of this information was utilized by several previous scholars, St. Pierre adds a new intimacy and sensitivity to the subject by careful selection of quotations that bring out in striking detail the conflicts between the British and the American officials as to the best course to pursue in the decolonization process.

The concerns of the United States over the pro-communist proclivities of the People's Progressive Party (PPP) under Dr. Cheddi Jagan are well known. However, St. Pierre argues that "the British were more concerned [than the United States] with adhering to the principles of democracy as a way of dealing with the 'problem'" (p. 190). This is surprising, for in several other

instances in Africa, for example, the British were not averse to manipulating the situation in the same way as the United States to achieve a particular result. Their attitude in the Guyana situation might have been due to one or more of five circumstances: first, they resented the anti-colonial stance of the United States in international fora and their level of interference in the Guyana situation; second, they regarded Burnham as less competent and trustworthy than Jagan; third, they had less conviction than the United States that Jagan was an out-and-out communist; fourth, they seem to have believed that the growth of the East Indian population would ensure that Jagan would eventually return to power and they wanted to hand over power with at least a modicum of goodwill in the eyes of Jagan; and finally, the British politicians of the early 1960s might well have been more "democratically minded" than their predecessors.

In spite of this, the British eventually found a veneer to oust Jagan while maintaining the façade of democracy, by introducing the Proportional Representative (PR) system. St. Pierre has done a good job in delineating this process of conflict, conviction, and change in relation to the British-U.S. "problem."

St. Pierre offers a very balanced view of the ethnic conflict between the Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese. He also documents clearly the shifting allegiances and alliances of the main actors on the stage, a number of them moving from one party to the other as their perception of the situation changed. What emerges is a group of politicians who, with few exceptions, were concerned more about their own status within the system than the wider interests of the Guyanese population.

There is therefore much for which to commend this study. However, as in most studies, there are a few weaknesses. St. Pierre is aware of one of these, for he notes that he might be criticized for engaging in such a long chronological sweep that forces him to take "leaps in history" (p. viii). However, he makes it clear that he is looking at three stages in the history of the country, that the first two (1823 to ca.1850, and ca.1850 to the early 1940s) are foundational, and that the study's main focus is on the last period (1940s to 1966). While this is understandable, it remains unclear why the first stage did not start with the 1763 revolt in Berbice – a larger revolt than that in 1823, and one that aimed to destroy both slavery and the colonial state, unlike the 1823 revolt that at best only sought to overthrow slavery.

St. Pierre also fails to show clearly that the various societies and clubs that emerged from the early twentieth century (cooperative societies, friendly and burial societies, lodges, etc.) had a recognized political profile (pp. 67-73). We must remember that the book is about "resistance" to the colonial system. The author defines "resistance" as "beliefs, ideas, and actions on the part of the colonised that are inherently political and that are designed to disarrange the power structure" (p. 6). However, he does not demonstrate how these societies helped to do so, nor does he indicate that any of the leaders were members of political parties or political pressure groups. The only aspect that seems to link them to the resistance struggle is the observation of the Public Affairs Committee (an anti-colonial organization) that the cooperatives could become an important tool in the struggle to "free the working people from the bonds of capitalist oppression" (cited by the author, p. 69). My remarks do not contest that such clubs and societies, especially lodges and cooperatives, have historically played political roles in anti-colonial struggles.

In spite of the shortcomings noted above, St. Pierre's work constitutes an important contribution to our understanding of the anti-colonial struggle in Guyana. It is especially strong on the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s. It demonstrates an intimate knowledge of the subject and of the processes that eventually led to the achievement of independence in 1966. Scholars should therefore find it a worthwhile addition to their libraries.

Guyana: Microcosm of Sustainable Development Challenges. BARRY MUNSLOW. Aldershot, U.K. and Brookfield VT: Ashgate, 1998. x + 130 pp. (Cloth US\$ 54.95)

LINDA PEAKE
Division of Social Science
York University
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3
<|peake@yorku.ca>

Barry Munslow states that the purpose of this book is to investigate two of Guyana's sustainable development challenges, to wit, the conservation and management of its tropical forest and of its coastal zones. Indeed, these two issues geographically encompass over 90 percent of Guyana's landmass. The bulk of the country consists of Amazonian tropical forest, which to the south encompasses the Rupununi, the world's largest tropical savannah. The population and settlements, however, are concentrated along the coast where much land is below sea level and is extremely susceptible to global warming and rises in sea levels. Munslow claims that a case study of Guyana's experiences of trying to achieve sustainable development in relation to the forest and the coast is of particular interest because the country's natural resource base is still relatively intact (largely due to decades of neglect as opposed to pro-environmental policies) meaning that there is still time for effective man-

agement strategies to be put in place. What does Munslow have to tell us about the possibility of this happening?

Rather than focus specifically on the two issues at hand, the first half of the book simply describes a number of sectors (mining, forestry, agriculture, fishing, human settlements, industry, tourism, and so on), examining their operations and effects upon the environment, and in some cases describing measures that could be taken to alleviate the problems faced. Some chapters are only a couple of pages. Amerindians and land rights, surely issues at the center of any notion of sustainable development and particularly in relation to the forest, are discussed primarily in relation to biodiversity and ecotourism and are given less attention in regard to mining and forestry. Yet, as Munslow reminds readers (p. 69), a greater acreage in land titles has been awarded to timber concessions (most of them transnational organizations) than to Amerindians (900,000 vs. 800,000 hectares).

The second half of the book brings together the social and institutional elements of each sector in a discussion of the challenges facing the elaboration of a national strategy for sustainable development. This is mostly a listing of the various national agencies concerned with the environment, but Munslow does open up for analysis the major blockages that Guyana faces in its attempts at institutional strengthening and rightly identifies the lack of human resources as being the most significant. The scarcity of functional infrastructure, serious time delays of many years between planning and implementation, an absence of legislation, and a lack of clarity over institutional areas of responsibility (p. 89) are other serious concerns.

For those with little or no knowledge of Guyana this book – largely descriptive and utilizing only secondary sources – provides a timely overview of the resource issues facing the country. There is still no coordination of coastal zone management in the country, either at the level of government or of the international aid community. Powerful external groups such as the international mining companies have more resources to suppress the development of environmental regulations than the government has resources to implement them. Policy inertia affects all sectors. Environmental awareness is low, as is the political clout of Amerindians. The donor community plays an insufficient role in encouraging the integration of the environment and development interests, and concerns with monitoring and control need to be replaced with those of education and coordination (p.103).

Those with slightly more knowledge, or a different view of what constitutes development, may well be dissatisfied with the lack of in-depth analysis and the narrow range of issues covered. There is, for example, no discussion of sustainable development as a donor-driven agenda. Nor is there any recognition of the role played by the smuggling out of the country of cocaine, gold, and immigrants, arguably *the* sectors underpinning processes of "development" in Guyana. Rather than a focus on supposed experiments with social-

ism (or, more accurately, what was the nationalization of the economy for the benefit of a small political and business elite), why not pay more attention to the intransigence of the racialized ethnic divides that have characterized the development process throughout independence? Indeed, it is race and racism that lie at the center of the human resources problem facing Guyana, which Munslow very early in the text (p. 7) recognizes as the greatest resource problem of all, yet to which he pays scant attention. Finally, although he also recognizes that coping with poverty (and, I would argue, social justice) is the focus of most people's concerns (p. 99), no discussion is given over to the success of environmental initiatives being dependent upon incorporating this fact. In light of these various omissions, all that can be known for certain is that environmental disasters – such as the Omai mine disaster and the coastal flooding that took place in the mid 1990s – are set to continue littering Guyana's attempts at sustainable development.

Bacchanal! The Carnival Culture of Trinidad. PETER MASON. Philadelphia PA: Temple University Press, 1998. 191 pp. (Cloth US\$ 49.95, Paper US\$ 19.95)

STEPHEN STUEMPFLE
Historical Museum of Southern Florida
Miami FL 33130, U.S.A.
<history@historical-museum.org>

Bacchanal! is one of the latest additions to the ever-growing literature on Trinidad's famous pre-Lenten Carnival. Though published by an academic press, the book is a journalistic study, aimed primarily at the increasing number of visitors to Trinidad during the Carnival season. Mason lists numerous books on Carnival in his bibliography but does not address the contribution of his own text to this body of work. In fact, he discloses nothing about his research process. One can glean from the book that he visited Trinidad repeatedly during the 1990s, engaged in participant-observation of the Carnival, conducted some interviews, and reviewed contemporary newspapers, as well as Carnival scholarship and several Trinidadian novels. His effort has resulted in a vivid description of this immensely complicated festival, but little in the way of new analytical perspectives.

Those not familiar with the Trinidad Carnival will find here a broad introduction to the range of expressive practices that occur during this festive season, which begins after Christmas and extends to Ash Wednesday. The first

three chapters are devoted to the primary Carnival art forms: calypso, steel pan, and mas (masquerade). The final three chapters are thematically organized and examine such topics as tourism, local criticism of the festival, gender relations, and the development of Trinidadian-based Carnivals in other countries. Mason's primary goal is to provide a sense of the contemporary Carnival experience and recent trends, with only occasional glances to the history of its component traditions. Periodically he punctuates his discussion with edited excerpts of interviews with festival participants, ranging from well-known calypsonians (Sparrow and Denyse Plummer) to a masquerader and a food vendor. The book would have benefited from the inclusion of more of these voices: the rich and contentious dialogue about Carnival in Trinidad reveals much about the festival's deeper significance.

Mason begins his chapter on calypso with a description of the Calypso Revue "tent," one of several halls that opens each year for the Carnival season, with a house band and a roster of calypsonians. He captures the tent atmosphere: the hundreds of people packed into folding chairs, the Carib beer and bubbling corn soup, the mood of anticipation, and the eventual appearance of the emcee, who, like the calypsonians themselves, is a master of social criticism, wit, insults, and innuendoes. Mason also examines how the social commentary calypso that thrives in the tents is being increasingly challenged by "party songs" – the soca variety of calypso that is characterized by a heavier electronic texture and a lyrical focus on such topics as "jamming and wining" (Trinidadian dance movements). Soca is the dominant musical form at fetes (parties), on the radio, and in the street processions during the two days of the Carnival itself. While some critics condemn this form as a corruption of the traditional calypso, others note that revelers have been enjoying celebratory songs on the streets since the nineteenth century. Moreover, calypsonians have discovered that they can reach international markets more effectively through party songs, which have fewer specific references to Trinidadian society.

Unfortunately, Mason's chapter on steel pan is much less effective than his overview of calypso. His comments are riddled with factual errors that could have been easily avoided by more attention to the existing literature on pan, some of which he lists in his bibliography. Only a sample of the mistakes can be noted here. Spree Simon is not "popularly credited" with discovering how to tune multiple notes on pans (p. 58), there were no pans with eight notes in 1940 (p. 59), steelbands emerged in the Port of Spain neighborhoods of Woodbrook and Belmont in the early years of the movement (1940s) rather than in the 1960s (p. 61), large steelband sponsorship began with Shell in 1960, not with Amoco in 1971 (p. 61), pans were first put on wheels in the 1950s, not the 1960s (p. 64), and "pan-around-the-neck" ensembles did not begin to fade in the 1970s, but were revived then (p. 64). The summary of the pans used in contemporary steelbands (p. 62) is thoroughly confused as well.

In his examination of mas, Mason covers the challenges of costume design and production, the staged competitions of the masquerade bands' kings and queens, and the spectacular processions of bands on the streets during Carnival Monday and Tuesday. Over the years, the festival has been increasingly dominated by massive bands that tend to feature bikini-style costumes. Interrelated with the rise of these bands has been growing middle-class participation and the overwhelming percentage of female masqueraders (approximately 80 percent by 1988). Mason, like other commentators, argues that Carnival reflects women's increasing status in the society and provides an opportunity for unrestrained expression in the public sphere. The big band orientation of Carnival is also linked to the growing importance of tourism: the number of visitors who arrived for the 1997 Carnival season is estimated at 100,000, of whom approximately 40 percent were returning Trinidadians. Clearly, the Trinidadian Carnival is now a transnational industry.

General readers will find this book of value in that it provides, for the most part, a lucid and lively overview of the main components of Carnival. Undergraduate students might also find it appealing, though they will not gain a sense of the depth of current Carnival scholarship. The book will be of use to specialists primarily as a source of descriptions of Carnival during the 1990s. In addition, it contains a series of excellent color photographs of mas, calypso, and pan performance.

Corps, jardins, mémoires: Anthropologie du corps et de l'espace à la Guadeloupe. Catherine Benoît. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2000. 309 pp. (Paper 190.00 FF)

CHRISTINE CHIVALLON
TIDE-CNRS, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme d'Aquitaine
Esplanade des Antilles
33 607 PESSAC cedex, France
<christine.chivallon@msha.u-bordeaux.fr>

In this six-chapter book, Catherine Benoît returns to the results of her 1986-87 ethnographic research on popular healing practices in Guadeloupe and the underlying knowledge of the body that they reflect. The first part of the book describes the theoretical aims on which data collection and subsequent data analysis were based. After examining the theories of several authors on creolization processes in Caribbean societies (Melville Herskovits, Roger Bastide, Sidney Mintz, Richard Price, M.G. Smith, Orlando Patterson, and

Thomas Hylland Eriksen), she clearly sets out the study's methodological and theoretical framework, first examining the place of medical pluralism in a multiethnic situation. For four population groups (Blancs Pays, Blancs-Matignon, blacks, and Indians), she argues, following Orlando Patterson, that there is such a thing as "synthetic creolization," which, for the purposes of this study, is a knowledge of the body which cuts across all healing practices. However, as soon as the etiology begins to be explained by supernatural causes, with the intervention of witchcraft, this "creolization" becomes "segmented," and specific behaviors emerge within the groups. Benoît does not, however, return to all four "major groups," but concerns herself only with blacks and Indians; it is regrettable that she should suggest such a widely shared knowledge when her fieldwork focuses so closely on only two target groups. Similarly, she alludes to a classification of theories of creolization, but then brings it up again in the rest of the book only in fragmented form, almost as if she had abandoned the theoretical part of the project half way through.

The remaining five chapters form the true body of this work. If Benoît's aims were simply to reconstruct the worldview of the people she interviewed, this book would have been beyond reproach; the ethnographic content on this subject is very rich indeed. She introduces the subject in a chapter devoted to a description of a concept based on the body's "fluid hydraulics," in which two humors - blood and "seed" - are considered to be "the source of life." The body's equilibrium then depends on the proper circulation of these fluids, in association with the influence of cosmic elements (mainly the moon) and the mastery of the "hot and cold" properties of various elements in the environment that come in contact with the body. The result is that illness is explained in terms of a bipolar system - one pole being focused on "natural" causes and the other on witchcraft. One or the other always assigns an external origin to the illness, which leads to preventative and protective behaviors that are "the foundation of the entire healing edifice" (p. 66). We are first introduced to these sorts of behavior through techniques intended to "cleanse" the body or "strengthen" or "close up" the corporal envelope, whether by baths or massages given by the matrone ("matron"), the traditional expert on the female body, or by the frotteur, a masseur who works mainly on athletes.

Chapter 4 provides a detailed description of kitchen gardens and this, together with the previous chapter's erudite exposé on the history of slave gardens, provides insight into the behaviors that involve intimate relationships with the natural environment. Benoît bases her interpretation of the role of the gardens on the symbolism of the "envelope" and, like Gaston Bachelard before her, believes that they represent a succession of protective "shells" which, from the walls of the house right out to the limits of the inhabited area, form a sequence of protective barriers for the body. She provides, for a sample of eight gardens, a detailed list of plants and their uses, and shows how the spatial organization of the plants can help maintain or restore a person's state of equilibrium.

The final two chapters address the religious significance with which the healing domain is invested. Most prominent are examples of pagan Christianity and Hinduism. For these two systems of representations, Benoît suggests that there is a common central core of belief in the eternity of the soul, which has the power to intervene for good or evil in the world of the living, although in the case of Hinduism this seems to vary according to the followers' knowledge of a more orthodox form of the religion. The tales recounted in these chapters are the strong point of the book. The story of Venus, as a gadèdzafè (expert in the supernatural), sets out the logic behind funeral rituals intended to ensure a good "resting place for the soul." The complexity of the pantheon of saints is also revealed, where the anthropologist is able to discern a process of creolization transforming the "European signifier" into a "Creole signified." Other tales reveal how the healer acquires the necessary healing qualities, based on the possession of a "gift" coupled with a knowledge of "secrets." This investigation into pagan Christianity closes with a detailed account of a divination seance and shows how religious knowledge can be used for practical ends relating to the body. Benoît's study of Hinduism, much briefer, explores the importance of votive religions in which certain Indian divinities are worshiped. "Ceremonies" form the keystone of this religion, and are normally aimed at thanking the divinities for granting requests. In some cases, such as the ceremony Benoît describes, it may be to ask the help of the gods. Hinduism, most of whose adherents are Catholic, is thus situated in a context that is closely linked with pagan Catholicism.

This intertwining of systems of representations allows Benoît to conclude with the idea of an "accumulation" of references which is facilitated by the presence of medical pluralism; the search for an effective solution calls on the whole range of healing techniques. Rich in ethnographic testimony, this book does, however, invite readers to ask a vital question which remains unanswered. Arguing for the existence of worldviews that are "specific to each individual, even to each ethnic group" (which could confirm the idea of a "nebula" which Benoît suggests in her theoretical discussion, but does not take up again), the book also ends by proposing that "the Indian cosmogony" offers a "peaceful experience of the world of the dead" in contrast with "the persecuting world" of pagan Christianity. Such a conclusion puts in perspective the details of the itineraries that Benoît had previously given of her interviewees' experiences (pp. 142-44). Living in a situation of social rupture and rejected by the surrounding community, these healers formulate a vision of the world as being "oppressive," which leads the anthropologist to characterize the medical systems in question as "forging the destruction of social links" (p. 145). What, therefore, is the social significance of this knowledge which, far from being integrating, marginalizes those who possess it? Does this knowledge, which seems isolated, hark back to traces of a former oppression in slavery, which would thus be specific only to blacks? Does it express the paradoxical disintegration of an all-pervasive yet often inaccessible modernity? Does it form a minute corner of the "nebula," or is it the very cornerstone, ever topical as it is, of popular practices in Guadeloupe?

Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. MARY C. WATERS. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. xvii + 413 pp. (Cloth US\$ 35.00)

KATHERINE E. BROWNE
Department of Anthropology
Colorado State University
Fort Collins CO 80523-1787, U.S.A.
kate.browne@colostate.edu

Black Identities aims at exploring how the personal identities of West Indians interact with, and are changed by, the lived realities of race, culture, ethnicity, and immigration. Waters, a sociologist, adopts a comparative frame of analysis that puts in compelling relief the insidious grip of racism directed at blacks in the United States and clarifies the sober implications these social realities hold for the children and grandchildren of West Indian immigrants.

The book makes a useful sequel to Philip Kasinitz's Caribbean New York, which focuses on how the public identities of West Indians have evolved. But where Kasinitz focuses on the role of public figures in shaping public identities, Waters looks instead to the personal and professional lives of informants and the ways their private identities are shaped by perceptions of themselves, black Americans, their work environment, and the society at large. Waters asks a web of interrelated questions: Why do African Americans form oppositional identities based on "race" when West Indians promote ethnic-based identities? Why do West Indians share with white Americans such negative views of American blacks? Why do some second generation West Indians prefer to identify as African Americans, while others hold dearly to the ethnic identities of their parents?

The strength of Waters's conclusions rises from a methodological tour de force. Her sample of 202 informants in New York City is drawn largely from middle- and working-class West Indian immigrants and includes more than eighty adolescent children of immigrants. She interviews middle-class teachers in two New York public high schools, working-class informants in a food service

industry, and both black and white Americans who also work in these same settings. Her interviews elicit data on self-identity, cultural values, work attitudes, experiences with racism, and perceptions of different ethnic groups. Waters provides breadth through census and immigration data and depth through reviews of historical patterns of slavery and colonization that differentiate legacies in the West Indies from those in the United States.

Through her cross-ethnic, double-generation, and cross-class sample of informants, Waters presents multiple perspectives of class, race, ethnicity, and generational constraints. For example, she paints a relational portrait of race relations among whites, blacks, and West Indian immigrants, traces the process of identity transformation between generations, and documents the distinct trajectories available to more affluent West Indians and their children. Her data from white employers validates West Indians' own perception that, as blacks, they are better off in this society to be identified as West Indian than American.

Waters is careful to use her data to inform theory, rather than the reverse. This approach requires her to dismiss formulaic theory and instead search a broad terrain for explanatory concepts associated with assimilation and with the construction of identities. To this end, she moves well beyond sociological ideas to draw strategically from anthropology, psychology, economics, and urban studies. Her ideas defy facile labeling. For example, at the same time that she asserts that West Indian immigrants are heterogeneous and emphasize different identities depending on the context, she also rejects postmodern notions that these immigrants constitute "transnational" or "diasporic" populations. Another effort to forge useful theoretical ideas is apparent in her attempt to explain the economic success of West Indian immigrants, particularly in relation to African Americans. Is it culture, she asks, or structure? For Waters, it is the interaction of structure and culture that makes sense of this phenomenon.

Reductionist concepts of culture suggest that the "strong work ethic" of West Indians' "culture" accounts for their success in the United States. If they can succeed, the argument goes, then low-achieving African Americans simply share a victim mentality which exaggerates the phenomenon of racism. But as Waters points out, these arguments ignore a number of structural realities: that West Indian immigrants are a self-selected pool of ambitious and optimistic individuals; that these West Indians are treated differently from African Americans by white employers; and that barriers such as occupational segregation by race and discriminatory hiring practices affect African Americans disproportionately.

The significance of structural variables in explaining West Indian success, however, must be paired with a thoughtful grasp of cultural variables. For Waters, the powerful role of culture shapes ambitions and expectations of life in another society. Because African-descended peoples overwhelmingly dominate the populations of West Indian societies, West Indians see people like themselves becoming professors, artists, and leaders in government and business. Their own experience of possibilities translates into assumptions that cross the water and

lead them to face the challenges they confront in optimistic and demanding ways. However, without the distinctive West Indian accent of their parents, the children of these immigrants are perceived as simply black and American. Waters documents how this second-generation reality, riddled with racism, automatically limits opportunities for success and upward mobility.

Black Identities works successfully for many reasons. The book is highly readable. It draws on a robust set of data, insightful analyses, and persuasive connections to other studies and to broader social concerns. The theoretical arguments are well mapped and follow clearly from ethnographic data. Drawbacks of this work amount to little more than quibbles. At times, informant quotes seem redundant and the variable of gender is virtually unexplored.

Mary Waters engages the reader in a close consideration of arguments that too few studies bring to bear on their data. In so doing, she offers general readers an exceptionally solid foundation for understanding the pragmatic costs and benefits of claiming an identity in a society where racism remains pervasive. In my view, her work stands as a model of contemporary scholarship – anchored to the details of everyday life, and organically bound to the larger questions we most need answered.

REFERENCE

KASINITZ, PHILIP, 1992. Caribbean New York: Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Los Estados Unidos y Trujillo - Los días finales: 1960-61. Colección de documentos del Departamento de Estado, la CIA y los archivos del Palacio Nacional Dominicano, BERNARDO VEGA, Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1999, xx + 783 pp. (Paper US\$ 45.00)

ERIC PAUL ROORDA Department of History Bellarmine University Louisville KY 40205-0671, U.S.A. <eroorda@bellarmine.edu>

Bernardo Vega has served many important functions for the Dominican Republic, including head of the national bank and ambassador to the United States, but his service as historian and publisher is unique. In the United States, two institutions are of salient importance in the process of bringing the record of the past, including its darkest secrets, to public light. They are the series of bound volumes culled from the declassified files of the State Department, *The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, published by the government, and the National Security Archive, an independent historical gadfly organization based at George Washington University, which uses the Freedom of Information Act to pry documents from the classified holdings of the National Archives. Bernardo Vega and the Fundación Cultural Dominicana, his archive and publishing house, are to the Dominican Republic what *FRUS* and the National Security Archive together are to the United States.

Vega specializes in the Rafael Trujillo regime (1930-61), publishing two dozen hefty tomes on the subject in the last two decades. He methodically collects information about the *trujillato* from a wide variety of sources, mainly from public collections in the United States, such as the National Archives and the presidential libraries, but also from the press, private collections, and even the closely held Archives of the National Palace in Santo Domingo, to which few researchers have had access. His books are giant compendia of documentation on the regime and its foreign relations. They are indispensable for students of the "era of Trujillo" and its long shadow, but more than that, they constitute a kind of national institution for the Dominican Republic, systematically exposing the complex relationship between the dictator and the United States.

Los Estados Unidos y Trujillo: Los días finales is the most important and interesting book on Vega's long list of publications. The reference to "final days" in the title is perhaps misleading, because there are more than 730 days meticulously chronicled in this volume (an average of more than a page per day). Trujillo ruled the country for more than thirty-one years, but his last two years in power were the most tumultuous, and merit the close attention devoted to them here. The table of contents alone is more than eleven single-spaced pages, detailing twenty chapters, most of which cover a single month. Continuing the precedent set by Vega's previous works, the book is a cross between a narrative and a compilation, with important documents quoted at length, sometimes in their entirety, for pages at a time.

The book is filled with gripping details about the crash of an epic dictatorship. Assassination plots fill the pages of the collection. The juiciest revelations come from the recently declassified records of the National Security Council, the Eisenhower and Kennedy Presidential Libraries, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency. But Vega went beyond the paper trail to shed light on Trujillo's fall. He located and interviewed many of the U.S. diplomats and CIA agents (many wore both hats) posted in the Dominican Republic in 1960-61, even gathering them together for a party at the Dominican embassy in Washington when he was the ambassador there in 1996. In all, he interviewed or corresponded with forty individuals involved

in the events. Hundreds of photographs and political cartoons also help to tell this tale.

As one might expect, the CIA, working through the State Department, played a crucial role in the conspiracies to murder Trujillo. This book offers vivid evidence not just of U.S. officials' complicity in the assassination plans, but their active encouragement of the conspirators. The link between the diplomats and dissidents began in earnest at a U.S. embassy reception, when a plotter asked the U.S. ambassador to provide guns. That daring contact led to an agreement to supply high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to a group hoping to shoot El Jefe as he rode his horse at the urban hippodrome. The plan fizzled when Trujillo changed his routine, but there were many more plots to come, including elaborate invasion schemes.

At the same time, Trujillo himself was plotting to kill his chief critic, President Rómulo Betancourt of Venezuela, with a car bomb. Vega located and interviewed an anonymous source in Caracas about this act of terrorism, which badly burned Betancourt and prompted the Organization of American States to impose sanctions against the Dominican Republic. There are many other dramatic subplots here, notably the Kennedy administration's decision to end arms deliveries to the "Action Group" preparing to shoot Trujillo. But a half dozen guns had already been sent to the future assassins, who resolved to act despite Kennedy's second thoughts in the wake of the Bay of Pigs debacle.

The climax of the story took place on May 30, 1961, when Trujillo was gunned down by seven gunmen, three of them using carbine rifles supplied earlier by the CIA.

Readers interested in the U.S. role in Trujillo's fall, who either do not read Spanish or do not have the appetite for 740 pages on the subject, can turn to two recent studies in English: Stephen Rabe's encapsulation in *The Most Dangerous Area in the World* and Michael Hall's concise *Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic*.

REFERENCES

HALL, MICHAEL R., 2000. Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Trujillos. Westport CT: Greenwood Press.

RABE, STEPHEN G., 1999. The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

The Cuban Democratic Experience: The Auténtico Years, 1944-1952. CHARLES D. AMERINGER. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. ix + 230 pp. (Cloth US\$ 49.95)

JAVIER FIGUEROA-DE CÁRDENAS Department of History University of Puerto Rico Río Piedras 00931, Puerto Rico <javier@backroompr.com>

With *The Cuban Democratic Experience* Charles D. Ameringer revisits a period and a subject of Latin American history for which he has a particular esteem. These are the years immediately after the end of the Second World War and the topic is the activities of the so-called Latin American democratic left. Ameringer focuses on the Auténtico years, a period of Cuban history in which the government was under the control of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Auténtico), a political organization born out of the struggle to defeat Cuban dictator Gerardo Machado during the 1930s. In 1944 Ramón Grau San Martín, a founder of the PRC(A) and a former president of the republic from 1933 to 1934, was elected president of the Cuban Republic; four years later his former labor minister, Carlos Prío Socarrás, was elected to the same office. Prío's presidency ended in 1952 when he was overthrown by Fulgencio Batista.

Ameringer's main point is that these two administrations represent a very special moment in the political history of the Cuban Republic, for this was a period in which Cuba lived a unique democratic experience. He argues that knowledge of those years is limited, as they have been ignored by most historians of Cuba.

A main weakness of *The Cuban Democratic Experience* is that it fails to provide a discussion about the meaning of democracy. If by democracy Ameringer means the holding of free and honest elections or the predominance of basic freedoms within the political climate of the country, one has no choice but to conclude that the Auténtico years were not a unique experience in Cuban history. Was not the electoral process that led Cuba to its famous 1940 constitutional convention a democratic one? How about Batista's presidency from 1940 to 1944? By the same token, and using Ameringer's suggestion of what democracy means, it would be difficult to characterize some of the early years of the Cuban Republic as undemocratic. Furthermore, Ameringer fails to explore several developments that were taking place during the Auténtico years which might have been helpful in establishing the significance of the period. A case in point is the adoption of a new strategy for

the development of the Cuban economy in which the United States used its power to influence the outcome.

The Cuban Democratic Experience is fundamentally a political chronicle of Cuban life during the years in which the Auténtico party was in power. The text could be read as if it were a newspaper. In fact, a substantial part of the information contained in the book comes from Bohemia, a weekly magazine published in Cuba. Unfortunately, Ameringer's use of primary sources is very limited. Perhaps this explains the shallowness of the book.

Three of its chapters nevertheless deserve to be highlighted. Chapter 1. "The Torrid Season," deals with a fascinating issue that otherwise has been ignored by most historians of Cuba and about which Ameringer is a specialist: the effort made by Cuba and other Caribbean countries to democratize the region, an initiative that even involved consideration of armed intervention. The two Auténtico presidents, Grau and Prío, supported the overthrow of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, the Dominican Republic dictator. As they lent support to several attempts directed toward that goal, they also put Cuba in a difficult position as the specter of war in the Caribbean was raised by that confrontation.

A chapter entitled "Sugar and Vinegar," which deals with the Cuban economy during the Auténtico years, offers an excellent synthesis of a text that should be required reading for anyone trying to understand the history of Cuban-American relations in the years prior to the Cuban Revolution. The reference is to the Report on Cuba, a voluminous study on the Cuban economy published in 1951 by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This chapter lays out the main economic and social issues confronting Cuba in those days and clarifies the Bank's point of view regarding Cuba and its problems.

Ameringer's "Conclusion" includes a magnificent description of the Auténtico's 1952 political platform. That was an electoral year and the PRC(A) was fighting for its life as the Ortodoxo party, a political organization founded in 1947 by former Auténticos, was ahead in the polls. Although the elections were never held because of Batista's coup d'état on March 10 of that year, the significance of this document is that the PRC(A) platform demonstrates that one of the most cherished pillars of the Cuban political culture was the idea that the state had an outstanding responsibility in guaranteeing the people's welfare. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 cannot be fully comprehended if this fact is not taken into account.

If the Auténtico years are seen by Ameringer as some sort of lost episode in Cuban history, then The Cuban Democratic Experience represents only the beginning of the search. Much of that historical period has still not been uncovered by this book.

The U.S. Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963. CHARLES T. WILLIAMSON. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999. xv + 395 pp. (Cloth US\$ 38.95)

ROBERT LAWLESS
Department of Anthropology
Wichita State University
Wichita KS 67260-0052, U.S.A.
<robert.lawless@wichita.edu>

As I began reading this book, the images of the brutal occupation of Haiti by its own army from September 1991 to September 1994 kept creeping into my mind and producing a nagging question: What did U.S. policy makers, members of this Mission, and in particular Col. Robert D. Heinl (head of the Mission for most of its existence) think they were doing by trying to improve the performance of the Haitian army when the very probable use of an army in a country like Haiti would eventually be to suppress its own people? And I don't think I'm guilty of hindsight; the history and role of armies worldwide was quite clear at the time of the Mission.

Williamson finally faces this question only toward the end of the book when he writes, "Finally, there is the oft-asked question, 'Why did Haiti need an army?' The answer is simple. Haiti did not need an army" (p. 355). The Mission was, therefore, not only a failure in terms of its own defined goals but also simply a bad idea. The Mission came from a Duvalier request for military assistance, and the members of the Mission initially and erroneously thought they would "provide the Haitian army with mobile tactical units, trained to use light modern weapons, and capable of being integrated into a hemispheric defense force" (p. 356).

Williamson makes clear in Chapter 1 that the Mission was often unable to discern what Duvalier really wanted. It is certain that he didn't want any competition to his power, but this is exactly what Heinl came to see as *his* mission. Williamson quotes a 1962 memo from Heinl saying,

Our policy of 1959, of trying to sustain and build up the Haitian Armed Forces while Duvalier distrusts and downgrades them, is highly realistic and is premised on the sound, long-term considerations that, however troublesome Duvalier may be, he is mortal and therefore a short-term problem, while the Haitian Armed Forces will remain as a central focus of internal power in Haiti as long as the country exists ... They ... will dominated [sic] the selection of the junta or provisional president that succeeds Duvalier. (p. 198)

Heinl was incorrect in both of his predications; in 1971 Duvalier's son succeeded him with no opposition from the army, and under President Jean-Bertrand Aristide the Haitian army was effectively abolished in 1995. And most of the top officers in the several incompetent and brutal regimes that ran the country in the years subsequent to the fall of Duvalier in 1986 were in the Mission training program. In this same memo Heinl writes:

The overriding requirement for civil stability and freedom from disorder in Haiti can only be met through the Haitian Armed Forces. At this time the symbolic presence of even a handful of Marines is a major prop to this stability, frail though it may be. (p. 215)

Ironically Haitians were able to get rid of the Duvaliers only through civil disorder. And the instability that Haiti experienced after 1986 was created largely by its own army and the allies of this army.

A major theme of the United States for policy in the Caribbean is the craving for sociopolitical stability. U.S. policy-makers often disconcertingly equate stability with the suppression of popular discontent, reflecting their distrust of mobs. The year after the end of the Mission, the United States with the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson implemented the so-called Mann Doctrine, which virtually lifted all sanctions on military regimes. By 1969 President Richard Nixon had restored military assistance to the unsavory Duvalier regime. After the end of the Duvalier era and after the U.S.trained general Henri Namphy became chief of state, the Reagan administration almost doubled aid dollars to Haiti, including about \$500,000 of riot equipment. The poor and powerless all suffered from the military's use of that equipment. The United States under the Bush administration continued the strange notion of the Reagan administration that democracy could flourish under a military dictatorship and viewed the simple mechanism of an election as an elixir – as long as the "right" person was elected. Unfortunately, in the view of U.S. policymakers, the wrong candidate was eventually elected and took office in 1991 in the person of Aristide, the fiery priest and advocate for the poor. He was, of course, overthrown by the military.

Williamson's story, however, is simply a straightforward, chronological, detailed, abundantly readable account of the Mission. A retired Marine Corps officer, Williamson is well qualified to write this history; he was a member of the Mission in the early years and "privy to most of the meetings between Colonel Heinl and the Haitian General Staff" (p. xi). He makes excellent use of official documents and also of the memoirs, diaries, and private papers, as well as magazine and newspapers articles and the published works on Haiti. He also interviewed many members of the Mission. Most of the book is an account of the obstructions and frustrations met by the Mission, especially evident in its dealings with an unpredictable Haitian general staff that changed personnel quite often.

The Shaping of the West Indian Church, 1492-1962. ARTHUR CHARLES DAYFOOT. Kingston: The Press University of the West Indies; Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999. xvii + 360 pp. (Cloth US\$ 49.95)

NOEL LEO ERSKINE
Candler School of Theology
Emory University
Atlanta GA 30322, U.S.A.
<nerskin@emory.edu>

Arthur Charles Dayfoot's carefully written book on West Indian Church history represents the most complete study available of the history and interaction of the colonial church with local populations in the Caribbean. The book focuses on the English-speaking Caribbean but unlike several other books that concentrate on the more populous and larger islands, this one gives a full and accurate accounting of colonial forces that shaped the church in many of the islands. The scope is breath-taking. But equally impressive is the attention to detail evidenced in this artfully crafted work.

Dayfoot catches the reader by surprise as he opens, not with the foray of Europeans into the Caribbean Sea in the 1490s intent on the expansion of Empire and the planting of their Church, but with the decade of independence in the 1960s. He begins with the Caribbean Church's emergence from colonialism and its attempt to create a new history. It was precisely at this point that Dayfoot had an interesting decision to make in writing West Indian Church history (as he prefers to call his work). The challenge was whether to allow the new status and identity fashioned by independence on many of these islands to provide the prism through which he would look at the history of this church or, alternatively, to allow colonial history to dictate the narration. He opted for the more predictable course, telling the story of the West Indian Church from the perspective of the aristocracy. Periodically, we receive glimpses of those whom the colonial church sought to Christianize – enslaved persons, indentured workers, freedmen, and persons of color – but always the story is told from the perspective of the European. One is keenly aware that there are several factors favoring this choice. One had to do with sources, many of which came from Europe. The missionary societies kept records: letters, sermons, tracts, books, and journals written by missionaries. One could not write West Indian Church history from the perspective of victims of oppression on the basis of these sources. One would have to turn to hymns, calypsos, stories, sermons, oral traditions, liturgies, and rituals pertaining to Shango, Cuminia, and Obeah. These would be the raw material for fashioning West Indian Church history from the perspective of those on the margins of society. The victims would become subjects of the history.

This takes me to the problem and the promise of Dayfoot's book. Chapter 5, "The Monopoly Breached, 1552-1670," is emblematic of the rest of the book and points, in my opinion, to the main thesis that runs throughout this important work. Dayfoot points out that the decades from 1519 to 1559 were marked by wars between France and Spain. The motives for the wars were nationalist rather than religious as French monarchs were not as eager to stamp out Protestant heresy at home as were their opponents, Charles V and Philip II. However, according to Dayfoot, the French were willing to have Protestants challenge Spain's position. The French succeeded by encouraging corsairs to raid fleets carrying gold and silver through the Caribbean, and to attack ports in the Greater Antilles and Central America. Much of this chapter concerns attacks and counter attacks between Europeans in their attempts to claim Caribbean islands for the Crown.

English as well as Dutch adventurers continued to appear in the Caribbean in the 1590s. One of them, Sir Walter Raleigh, focused his interest on the Orinoco valley, the site of 'El Dorado', and the adjacent island of Trinidad. Raleigh raided Trinidad, made friends with the Amerindians, and carried away Governor Antonio de Berrío while he explored the Orinoco. (p. 46)

The remainder of the chapter concerns Europeans who were inducted as bishops, priests and governors throughout the Caribbean. Dayfoot forces the question as to whether the factors that shaped the West Indian Church history are primarily European. Another question that this text inspires is what West Indian Church history would look like from the perspective of the victims of oppression? Dayfoot states that Sir Walter Raleigh and his companions made friends with the Amerindians. I believe it is appropriate to ask Dayfoot whether there are any clues as to what the Indians would say about this relationship. Would they have called Raleigh a friend?

Finally, we must inquire not only about the problem of interpreting West Indian Church history from a European perspective but also about the promise of this work. Dayfoot raises the issue in the final chapter:

Care has to be taken in applying categories borrowed from abroad to the different circumstances here. For one thing, most denominational differences were brought to the Caribbean from Europe and North America and are quite irrelevant in the local setting. (p. 223)

Here, Dayfoot offers promise for the renewal of the Caribbean Church as he points out that there were religious groups that sought to bring the Christian gospel to the disinherited, "the African slaves, the people of colour, the freedmen, the indentured labourers and the later rural and urban proletariat" (p. 225). Dayfoot names the Moravians, Methodists, Baptists, Disciples of Christ, the Salvation Army, and the African Methodist Episcopal Church as churches that were active in taking the indigenous people seriously. While he

would not describe these churches as "churches of the poor," since most of them included some privileged members, he does acknowledge that they ministered to the poor. Was the church that Dayfoot described throughout the book "a church for the rich" or upwardly mobile? Perhaps this work will inspire someone to write a history of the Caribbean Church from the perspective of the poor.

An Introduction to West Indian Poetry. Laurence A. Breiner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. xxii + 261 pp. (Cloth US\$ 64.95)

EDWARD BAUGH
Department of Literatures in English
University of the West Indies
Mona, Kingston 7, Jamaica
<ebaugh@uwimona.edu.jm>

The blurb tells us that this book was written "for readers making their first approach to poetry in English written in the Caribbean." It fulfills this function admirably. Persons who are as familiar with the field as Breiner is are unlikely to find that he has overlooked any of the considerations they would expect to be broached. In addition, they will discover enough that is engaging and even thought-provoking for them in Breiner's packaging of the material, in some of the linkages that he identifies, and in some of his insights.

As "a comprehensive literary history from the 1920s to the 1980s," the book supersedes Lloyd Brown's West Indian Poetry, and nicely complements J. Edward Chamberlin's Come Back To Me My Language. Breiner's warm feeling for his subject is informed by meticulous scholarship and the collation of an impressive range of detail, events, forces, issues, and agencies that have gone into the making of West Indian poetry. For instance, he calls attention (as neither Brown nor Chamberlin do) to the significance of the British Broadcasting Corporation's "Caribbean Voices" program, which flourished between the mid-1940s and the mid-1950s; and proposes the arguable view that the program, by virtue of being something heard, helped create the climate for the later trend toward orality in West Indian poetry. One welcome dimension of the book is the factoring in of some of the critical debates about directions, cultural identity, form, and language that attended, and no doubt to some extent guided, the progress of the poetry. In this way, the reader is made aware of a critical tradition developing along with the poetry.

Breiner opens his narrative dramatically, in medias res and establishing a strong sense of history, with reference to an occasion that, while not much documented, has become legendary - the conference of the Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies (ACLALS) held at the Mona campus of the University of the West Indies in January 1971. He uses reports of this event, and of the debate that made it famous, to focus on what he sees as central issues and concerns in the story of West Indian poetry. including the questions of audience and critical standards and, ultimately, "the challenge of representing West Indians in poetry" (p. 193). To sharpen his point about the significance of this conference, he calls attention to the fact that it was held at the Mona (Jamaica) campus of the University of the West Indies, and not at "the usual British university" (p. 1). That phrase, "the usual British university," is ambiguous in more than one sense. With regard to one possible ambiguity, it is worth noting that only two ACLALS conferences (triennial) had been held prior to 1971. The first took place at the University of Leeds, where the Association was started, and the second was held at the University of Queensland in Australia. So it was not "usual" for it to be held "at Leeds" (p. 4).

After the opening chapter, "West Indian Poetry and its Audience," a chapter entitled "The Caribbean Neighborhood" gives a brief account of poetry in the non-Anglophone countries of the Caribbean, so as to highlight the salient concerns of Anglophone Caribbean poetry, by way of parallels and contrasts. The idea of the neighborhood might have been enhanced by greater attention to instances, however few, in which West Indian poets and critics have shown an active interest in non-Anglophone poets and critics.

The next chapter, "Overview of West Indian Literary Histories," may be misleading in its title. It is not an overview of histories of West Indian literature, but a survey of the history of poetic activity in each West Indian country. This is another welcome dimension of Breiner's study. Its effect is to complicate and make subtle, but by no means negate, the idea of "West Indian" literature. The integrity of this idea is well established, but insufficient attention to differences in the literary profile of each country produces distortions in the general picture.

The titles of the following three chapters – "The Relation to 'Europe'," "The Relation to 'Africa'," and "The Relation to 'America'" – are purposive and convenient enough, but oversimplify the content of the texts themselves. Breiner seems to be aware of this. "The Relation to 'Africa'" begins: "The real subject of this chapter is the specifically literary project of enabling actual West Indian people to be seen and heard in poetry, unimpeded by the filter of 'Europe'" (p. 141). After initial observations on the representation of Africa in West Indian poetry, Breiner, taking Brathwaite's work as seminal, settles down to a prime focus of his critical energy: a searching exposition of recent developments in the oral/performance/creole factor(s) in the poetry. On

the face of it, there is no compelling reason why the chapter "The Relation to 'America'" should be the place to propose a characteristically illuminating close reading of Orlando Wong's ten-line poem "Scene." The reading shows Breiner's understanding of poetic craft, a factor which tends to get short shrift in these post-structuralist times.

REFERENCES

Brown, Lloyd Wellesley, 1978. West Indian Poetry. Boston: Twayne Publishers.

CHAMBERLIN, J. EDWARD, 1993. Come Back To Me My Language: Poetry and The West Indies. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Caribbean Waves: Relocating Claude McKay and Paule Marshall. HEATHER HATHAWAY. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. xi + 201 pp. (Cloth US\$ 29.95)

LYDIE MOUDILENO
Department of Romance Languages
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia PA 19104-6305, U.S.A.
<moudilen@sas.upenn.edu>

Published by Indiana University Press in its "Blacks in the Diaspora" collection, Caribbean Waves offers a challenging re-assessment of the lives and works of Claude McKay and Paule Marshall, in the light of their respective immigrant experiences. While abundant scholarship has been devoted to these "Americanized" authors, the most intriguing feature of this book resides less in the fruitful juxtaposition of two prominent authors as "figurative bookends to this century" (p. 5) than in its systematic examination of their aesthetic production as illustrative of a diasporic condition. Focusing on first generation Jamaican McKay (who was born in 1890 and arrived in the United States in 1912), and on second generation Barbadian Marshall (born in 1929). Heather Hathaway's study is not simply about turning Americanized canonical figures back to the field of Caribbean studies. On the contrary, shifting away from traditional criticism, her contention is that the best way for contemporary critics to account for these authors' dual origins is to acknowledge and re-examine their ambiguous, and often conflictual position at the crossroads of Caribbean and African-American (literary and cultural) spaces.

In "relocating Claude McKay and Paule Marshall," Hathaway chooses to work in the liminal and troubled space created by migration as a fundamental event which in turn produces migratory subjects, forcing the critic - and the artist – into a constant dislocation and reassessment of affiliations. Ultimately, this "relocation" highlights what can be seen as another avatar of a reciprocal creolization process on the American continent by which

African American and African Caribbean cultures, like all cultures, modified and will continue to modify one another, particularly in the hybridizing space of the city in which the two communities are still concentrated. With each new wave of immigration, the dramas of association and dissociation that began during the first stage of contact will continue to shape and be shaped by the historically specific complexities of racial, ethnic, and national identity formation in the United States. (p. 28)

In its attempt to contextualize the writers' "dislocation and dual location" (p. 86) between "home" and "America," the thoroughly documented introductory chapter provides a sound overview of the representation of the Caribbean immigrant as "other" or "foreign" within American black communities from the first decades of the century to the present. It shows the extent to which the question of difference between African-Americans and Caribbean immigrants in the United States has pervaded both communities' imaginary, creating, among other things, a whole network of desires and stereotypes with which the migratory self has to negotiate. Indeed, given the fact that the literary texts used as case studies are often highly autobiographical, an awareness of the specific cultural context in which McKay and Marshall re-invent their relationship to "home" and to America proves crucial to a better understanding of their writerly projects.

The remaining four chapters consist of elegant close-readings of McKay's selected poetry and three novels - Banjo, Home to Harlem, and Banana Bottom – and of Marshall's first and (as of 1999) last novels – Brown Girl, Brownstones, and Daughters respectively. In these chapters, Hathaway convincingly draws on biographical information in order to illustrate what she sees in the fiction as the expression of an irreducible form of hybridity defined by the persistence of an ever-returning "Black foreign" origin in an Americanized self. While the analysis of Marshall's two novels undoubtedly yields some interesting comments on the troubled and troubling relationship to "home" and the self as "other," the chapters on McKay's poems and novels seem the most successful in their attempt to underscore the scope of the writer's distressing sense of placelessness. In contrast, the sections on Marshall forsake the "cultural studies" approach that is so appealing in the McKay section, as textual analysis sometimes gets lost in details about plot and characters which readers not familiar with the novels might find overwhelming.

This being said, the book as a whole is an example of diaspora scholarship at its best, itself at the crossroads of many disciplines which it will undoubtedly enrich. Superbly written, and supplemented with an excellent eighteenpage bibliography, *Caribbean Waves* is a welcome redefinition of Caribbean literary and cultural studies. The book is bound to encourage similar comparative approaches to many other writers who share some of McKay's and Marshall's characteristics as diasporic subjects. As such, this study will find a significant place in the growing body of criticism on migratory identities.

Charcoal and Cinnamon: The Politics of Color in Spanish Caribbean Literature. CLAUDETTE M. WILLIAMS. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. xii + 174 pp. (Cloth US\$ 49.95)

La mujer negra en la literatura puertorriqueña: Cuentística de los setenta: (Luis Rafael Sánchez, Carmelo Rodríguez Torres, Rosario Ferré y Ana Lydia Vega). MARIE RAMOS ROSADO. San Juan: Ed. de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, Ed. Cultural, and Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1999. xxiv + 397 pp. (Paper US\$ 19.95)

NICOLE ROBERTS
Department of Liberal Arts
University of the West Indies
St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad
<mikerob@tstt.net.tt>

Insofar as these texts both explore the shifting boundaries of black identity, as well as what it means to be black or mulatto and female in the Caribbean, they both ought to be of significant interest to anyone involved in the study of Caribbean literature and Caribbean cultural studies.

Claudette Williams's use of language is superb. Given such an expansive body of writing, it is her precise language use which leaves the reader with a sense of the scintillating variety of representations of black women witnessed over two centuries. This text stands out among recent works on Caribbean women writers because it centers specifically on the prose and poetic fiction by and of Hispanic Caribbean women and presents the works within the context of a wider Caribbean cultural mold. It is possibly the first text of this nature which so comprehensively compares the Anglophone Caribbean with the Hispanic Caribbean in an attempt at understanding the continuous development of the black Caribbean woman.

Williams presents the premise which binds her text early in the Introduction: "Sociocultural and racial considerations are related parts of the framework for analyzing Caribbean literature and the writers' relation to their subiect matter" (p. 3). However, she is also preoccupied with ideological concerns, especially how language can be exclusionary in its representations as well as false in its posture. The first chapter, poignantly titled "The Nice One... and the Other One': The Discourse of Race and Color," points out that Caribbean societies still have a long way to go in the realization of changes in traditional racial perceptions. Chapter 2, "Sexual Myths and National Icons." effectively argues that *mulatez* is far from becoming reality in the Caribbean but is presented in the texts under discussion as an idealized and existing condition of Hispanic Caribbean reality. Williams clearly presents the paradox of black desire, and black fear on the sexual level as well as on the national level. Charcoal and Cinnamon captures the essential ambiguity of Caribbean texts which frame black women as both sexual and sexless, exploited and exploiter. violated and violator. Williams's argument that an insidious racism lies at the heart of Caribbean society is based on examples from Caribbean texts as varied as the Trinidadian novelist Merle Hodge's Cric Crack, Monkey and the Cuban poet Pura del Prado's poem "Abuela." Her lengthy final chapter. "From Voiceless Object to Human Subject: Filling the Historical Vacuum." traces the path of the black woman from mere (sub)object to spokesperson subject/protagonist in the Caribbean text. With regard to the pervasive nature of racism. Williams rightly points out that racial fixation and black fear continue to color Caribbean perceptions of sex, gender, color, class, and even history.

Marie Ramos Rosado's *La mujer negra en la literatura puertorriqueña* is similarly centered on the image of the black and mulatto woman, specifically in Puerto Rican narrative since the 1970s. Although the selection of writers under discussion is balanced with regard to gender (focusing on Rosario Ferré, Carmelo Rodríguez Torres, Luis Rafael Sánchez, and Ana Lydia Vega), the only genre of writing selected is the short story. The book's length is justified by its wide scope. Of considerable note is a forty-page bibliography of the four writers in question. This extensive piece of work is divided into comprehensive sections on the authors' works, scholarly criticism on the four authors, and a general bibliography.

In Chapter 1, "Panorama de la mujer negra en la literatura puertorriqueña," Ramos Rosado describes varied representations of the black woman in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Puerto Rico and provides a brief synopsis of the trajectory of the short story on the island. She uses Chapters 2 and 3 ("Los años sesenta: Década de liberaciones" and "Cuentística de la década de los setenta") to describe the Puerto Rican political and social ideology across two decades. It is here that she shows the development of a revolutionary and cultural renegotiation of Puerto Rican space. This is, as she sug-

gests, a redefinition of history which fuels the feminist movement in Puerto Rico and further empowers nationalistic writers to create spaces where they can both rewrite Puerto Rican national history and continue to develop texts in a modern context.

Nowhere is multiplicity more evident than the Caribbean, and the case of Puerto Rico is no exception. Ramos Rosado goes on to delineate the vision of the black Puerto Rican woman presented by these four authors. For Luis Rafael Sánchez, *la palabra* is all important. His subversion of the social order in Puerto Rico is explored in Chapter 4, "Luis Rafael Sánchez y los cuentos de los desclasados." Here Puerto Rican society is rehumanized but the issues of ethical complexities continue to plague the island. Identity in postcolonial society is at once limited and limiting. This is the sense that grows out of Ramos Rosado's Chapter 5, "Carmelo Rodríguez Torres y 'la realeza mítica de los orígenes'." The question is posed: Will Puerto Rico, the mythical synthesis of woman half-white and half-black, ever attain the "aura" of racial perfection? Ramos Rosado suggests that this can only be achieved through an acceptance of the contradictory nature of Caribbean blackness.

In Chapter 6, "Cuentos de las rupturas: De la ira a la ironía," Ramos Rosado suggests that the work of Rosario Ferré is a demystification of the Puerto Rican woman. She concludes that Ferré's objective is as much the breaking down of previously established barriers as the destruction of the bourgeois class. In Chapter 7, "Cuentos de las rupturas: De la ironía a la sátira social," she comments on the writing of Ana Lydia Vega, with its appeal to the larger masses. Vega's work is populated by the masses, but even more by a large/r female body – the body of one who is no longer a passive creature existing on the margins of society, but rather is prepared to transform and more importantly be transformed. Ramos Rosado convincingly argues that in popular Caribbean culture, class still outweighs race, but that in the wave of the future, a more just society can be achieved through resistance. This will be realized if and when other female writers like Ferré and Vega continue the debate over social justice that has been so convincingly begun by these two Puerto Rican icons.

Williams is markedly optimistic about the future of black women. She suggests that the dominant Eurocentric discourse is no longer being imitated as Hispanic Caribbean writers seek to find new models and conventions which are located in the Caribbean. Williams sees in the texts the birth of a Caribbean-centered consciousness. This is a first for the prevailing critical discourse on the Caribbean in which gender already informs the cultural agenda. What most joins these two books is that both authors are concerned with the writers' attitude toward race and not the race of the writers *per se* (although Ramos Rosado does mention the race and, more importantly in her opinion, the class background of each of the four authors in the study). Both books offer a wide-angled view of Caribbean and Puerto Rican society and

the women who populate them. It is significant that both conclude with a reaffirmation of black and Caribbean womanhood.

It is difficult to present anything but a glowing review of these two books because they are both so well written, obviously extensively researched, and very informed. Both authors reaffirm a strong commitment to Caribbean identity. Language is inheritance. But in the two texts, the very essence of that inheritance is questioned and readers are forced to reexamine their own conventions. As the Caribbean continues in the struggle to define itself, as Caribbean people move to defend themselves against American hegemony as well as European-centered thought processes, as black women's bodies continue to be sites of sexualized interest, as black Caribbean women authors move to humanize themselves as subject in the text, Charcoal and Cinnamon and La mujer negra en la literatura puertorriqueña stridently call on readers to pay close attention to the cultural messages which are so evident in the text.

The Missing Spanish Creoles: Recovering the Birth of Plantation Contact Languages. JOHN H. MCWHORTER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. xi + 281 pp. (Cloth US\$ 45.00)

WILLIAM W. MEGENNEY Department of Hispanic Studies University of California, Riverside Riverside CA 92521, U.S.A. <william.megenney@ucr.edu>

This book revolves around the author's Afrogenesis hypothesis (AH), according to which pidgins were formed in English and French slave forts and were taken to the Atlantic and Indian Ocean plantations, where they became pivotal in the formation of creole languages which, in turn, spread throughout each area and changed over time according to historical and geographical circumstances. This hypothesis was conceived principally due to the lack of creole languages in the Spanish-speaking countries of the New World where there were plantation societies in which creoles should have developed according to current theories of creole genesis. The Spanish colonies are the only ones to which African-formed pidgins were not taken and they also are the ones in which we do not find creoles but rather only vernacular forms of the local standard varieties.

Glancing at the "Contents," one is initially surprised to see what appears to be only one short chapter devoted to the theme of the book's title (Chapter 2: "Where are the Spanish Creoles?"), the other chapters being devoted to the Atlantic English-based creoles (AECs) and the French-based creoles (FPCs) of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that John McWhorter requires historical and linguistic data from these creoles to compare to the Spanish scenario in order to clarify and bolster his arguments in favor of the AH; the old adage from psychology applies here, i.e. you are able to understand one concept thoroughly only if you compare it to other concepts.

After McWhorter's "Introduction," in which he states that creole studies is "a field on the brink of a serious mistake" (p. 1) for adhering too closely to the limited access model (according to which creole languages developed on colonial plantations due to disproportionate demographics – more blacks than whites), and in which he clings to the idea that creole genesis begins with pidginization, unlike some other creolists (e.g., Chaudenson and Mufwene) who do not acknowledge a pidgin stage in the formation of plantation creoles, McWhorter presents arguments and counter-arguments for the absence of creoles in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Mexico, precisely where contemporary models of creole genesis would predict their appearance. For those who would cite Papiamentu and Palenquero as Spanish-based creoles, McWhorter shows us that they were originally Portuguese-based (subsequently relexified in Curação and Cartagena, Colombia) and that the Portuguese indeed had slave forts along the West African coast in which pidgins probably developed and were carried to the New World. In addition, McWhorter offers both linguistic and sociohistorical evidence that the so-called bozal Spanish is not an extinct creole, but rather simply an L2 variety of an immigrant generation. The absence, then, of synchronic and diachronic Spanish-based plantation creoles helps support the supposition that the limited access mechanism (i.e. an overabundance of slaves having only limited access to the lexifier) should no longer be considered a viable theory for creole genesis.

In Chapters 3 and 4, McWhorter presents a large amount of data surrounding the AECs which further question the limited access model as a description for plantation creole genesis, while providing comparative evidence to explain the absence of Spanish-based creoles. In Chapter 3, the arguments revolve around what McWhorter designates as the Six Smoking Guns (da, de, modal fu, unu, bin, self) (p. 76) and Smith's (1987:104-7) Ingredient X (e.g., njam "eat", kokobe "leprosy", kongkosa "gossip", pinda "peanut", mumu "dumb"), which appear quite consistently in many of the AECs. How could most of them appear in most of the AECs if these creoles had appeared independently throughout the colonies? asks McWhorter. Their choice among so many of the AECs can only point to a common ancestor.

Again, in Chapter 4, McWhorter provides evidence, through dating the emergence of Sranan (before 1667, when the Dutch arrived) and its comparison with Saramaccan, that the limited access model falls short in proving the genesis of the AECs. Revisiting historical and linguistic evidence,

McWhorter shows how the origin of all of the AECs may be traced to the mixing of so-called "castle slaves" (p. 110) with Europeans on the Ghanaian coast (specifically Cormantin), whence came a utilitarian pidgin, which, in turn, was taken to St. Kitts or Barbados and from there disseminated to other parts of the Americas.

In Chapter 5, McWhorter presents linguistic and sociohistorical evidence (a 1671 Martinique text traceable to a small farm society and priests' accounts) that the FPCs have a single ancestor in West African trade settlements along the coast of Senegal. Commonly shared features among several of the FPCs which cannot be derived from the French superstrate, from commonalities among substrate languages, or from universals, point in the direction of one source.

The final two chapters, "Synthesis" and "Conclusion," provide a review of the materials discussed in the first five chapters, emphasizing the pivotal role of West African trade pidgins in the formation of plantation creoles, the importance of motivation over demographic disproportion in the formation process of pidgins and creoles, along with other pertinent questions which support his AH.

Overall, the book is very well written and well argued, although at times one has the impression that John McWhorter is over-reacting to previous claims and/or possible rebuttals to his theory. A useful index and a good bibliography complete this new approach to pidgin/creole genesis.

REFERENCE

SMITH, NORVAL S.H., 1987. The Genesis of the Creole Languages of Surinam. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Amsterdam.

From French to Creole: The Development of New Vernaculars in the French Colonial World. CHRIS CORNE. London: University of Westminster Press, 1999. x + 263 pp. (Paper £20)

ROBERT CHAUDENSON Institut d'Etudes Créoles et Francophones Université de Provence 13621 Aix-en-Provence Cedex 1, France <chaudens@newsup.univ-mrs.fr>

As Chris Corne points out in his introduction, From French to Creole was originally written for students at the University of Auckland who expressed interest in "a book written in English about the development of new vernaculars with a substantially French lexicon" (p. 1). And as he remarks, the lack of such a book might reasonably be explained by the fact that the definition of the subject is far from self-evident.

The general organization deserves mention, both as a point of information for readers and for a second reason that needs to be spelled out. Corne begins with a long introduction that gives a rationale for the content and plan of the book and explains, in a rudimentary and somewhat problematic way, central concepts such as "pidgin," "creole," and "lexifier." The following six chapters constitute a global journey which takes readers from New Caledonia (Chapter 2) to the Ivory Coast and Manitoba (Chapter 7), passing along the way through Réunion, Louisiana, the French Antilles and French Guiana, and Mauritius. No real justification is offered for this tour, though the final chapter seems to be devoted to pidgins, implying the questionable idea that Ivorian French should be viewed as a pidgin. In fact, the only organizing principle of this book is the author's own career as a linguist, as readers are led through the various issues that he has dealt with as a researcher. For those unfamiliar with Corne's work to be persuaded of this, all that's needed is a side-by-side comparison of the table of contents and the bibliography.

Corne's approach has its drawbacks, especially for what he sees as one of the most important focuses of his work, the Tayo of New Caledonia – a subject that has occupied the heart of his published research over the past five years. This may explain the surprising choice of New Caledonia as the geographical center here. It is unfortunate that Corne's historical and descriptive treatment of Tayo (pp. 19-27) fails to mention (as a matter of choice, since he knows the subject well) that Tayo originated at the exact place where Indians from Réunion, brought to New Caledonia in 1865 as a labor force for a nascent agro-business in sugar, were set up. (In 1871 maps of Saint Louis show two "Indian" villages, presumably home to these laborers.) This fact may explain, on a sociolinguistic level, why a language such as Tayo exists in Saint Louis and nowhere else and why, on a linguistic level, there are such striking parallels between Tayo and the creole of Réunion. The point is obviously crucial theoretically, and even if one were to reject this hypothesis, the idea of sweeping such essential aspects of the case under the rug seems inadmissable. Furthermore, it is somewhat surprising that Corne, who has elsewhere acknowledged certain errors, should treat in this way a question to which he accords an almost excessive importance; note that 47 of the text's 234 pages are devoted to this language of rather limited importance. We can of course agree that the language deserves detailed discussion, since it is the only "creole" (if it is indeed a creole) developed outside of the social setting of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colonial plantations. Given this, it becomes yet more important to be vigilant about the research bias that would come about when critical pieces of the puzzle are hidden from view.

Another curious aspect of this book is the separation of creoles from Réunion and Mauritius (pages 67-96 and 163-96, respectively), with those of Louisiana, the Antilles, and French Guiana sandwiched in between. For anyone who has read Baker and Corne's *Isle de France Creole*, it is clear that this choice arises from a wish to create a physical separation between the creole of Réunion and other creoles of the region, according to a hypothesis that must be considered questionable at the very least. Does not this organizational decision suggest that the author has abandoned his blind faith in the hypothesis of 1982? Corne acknowledges here, however, that, in pulling back from his earlier positions, "Mau[ritian Creole] is a language in the formation of which Reu[nion Creole] played at best a very minor role for a few months from 1721" (p. 85). As for the Bourbonnais contingent who came to the island as "technical aids" avant la lettre in order to "offer instruction to the new colonists" (Baker & Corne 1982:151), it would be more accurate to gloss the amount of time they spent there as a year, rather than "a few months." If Corne admits, as he does here, that Bourbon speech could have contributed to the origins of Mauritian Creole, why does he claim that it had only a "very minor" influence when the two creoles share such fundamental, specific, and unique linguistic features as personal markers and second and third person possessives (zot) as well as the plural marker (bane)?

The book does have the merit of giving both useful syntheses of the languages it treats and also, for each, examples of ancient and modern texts as well as appendices (for the most part essays written by Corne) on those with which Corne has the greatest familiarity – Tayo and the creoles of Réunion, Louisiana, and Mauritius.

The final chapter is a synthesis that tends to give a little unity to the global wanderings through which readers have been escorted. Some of the perspectives are questionable, and it is surprising not to encounter mention of important recent work such as, for example, that of Salikoko Mufwene; the most recent reference is dated 1993. Although the discussion is well informed, it suffers from the constant reference to Tayo, which brings us inevitably back to my earlier remarks. Indeed, it's an either/or question. Either Tayo developed along the lines that Corne suggests, in which case it would be of greatest interest, having been formed in conditions very different from those of "historic creoles" in the Caribbean or the Indian Ocean. Or else, we must take into account the fact that at the end of the nineteenth century there were creole-speaking Indian laborers in the area where Tayo appeared. This would explain both why this language appears only in this region and why its structural and lexical features show such similarity to Indian Ocean creoles. Thus, Tayo would represent a second-generation phenomenon – that is, a language whose development was influenced by another creole, introduced by immigrants. In this case, structural similarities between Tayo and other creoles takes on a very different meaning and their significance is considerably

reduced. From that, the consequences of glossing over the Réunion immigra-

This book is interesting in that it approaches creolization, pidginization, and variation in French from a single perspective. On several points, however, such as the relationship among Indian Ocean creoles, and on recent developments in creole linguistics, the information it presents would deserve to be filled out or corrected. For specialists, on the other hand, it has the great interest of offering an exhaustive account of the research and perspective of this scholar who has played such an important role over the past thirty years. This is especially useful since a number of his articles were originally published in rather inaccessible journals, such as *Te Reo*. Thus, in spite of some weaknesses, the book merits a place in the library of anyone working in this field.

REFERENCE

BAKER, PHILIP & CHRIS CORNE, 1982. Isle de France Creole: Affinities and Origins. Ann Arbor MI: Karoma.